Chapter-5 Background Knowledge (Context)

Chapter-5

5

Background Knowledge (Context)

The previous chapter surveyed the background knowledge directly relating to the Christian religion (origins, beliefs and development) that we must take into account when evaluating any hypothesis regarding the historical existence of Jesus. This chapter will survey the most important background knowledge regarding the context in which Christianity began (political, religious and literary), as well as its most pertinent scientific and historical analogs.

1. Elements of Political Context

The origin of Christianity makes sense only within the peculiar political context that produced it, and in light of analogous movements throughout history.1

Element 23: The Romans annexed Judea to the imperial province of Syria in 6 ce, bringing the center of the Holy Land under direct control of the Roman government, ending Jewish sovereignty over Jerusalem and the temple of the Most High God, along with most of the Holy Land that had been promised by God to the Jews.2

In fact, God had promised that the Jews would not only rule their own land, city and temple, but subjugate all peoples and rule the whole world as the chosen people of God (Zech. 14.9-18; Psalm 2), which was also a common feature of messianic belief (Elements 3 and 4), one timetable for which predicted this outcome was imminent (Element 7). The Roman annexation contradicted all of this, which would have inevitably produced cognitive dissonance between what Jews expected (the fulfillment of God’s promise) and what happened (the Jews lost their sovereignty and became a subject people). The result was a permanent state of violent tension between the Roman occupation and Jewish rebellion that concluded in three devastating wars (against Nero in 66–70 ce, against Trajan in 115–117 and against Hadrian in 132–136) and countless smaller rebellions (beginning with Judas the Galilean in 6 ce), all of which the Jews consistently lost.

Element 24: (a) Owing to their vastly greater resources (in materials, money and manpower) and superior technical ability (in the training, equipping and supplying of their armies) the Romans were effectively invincible and could never be expelled from Judea by force or diplomacy. (b) This fact was so empirically evident and publicly tested and demonstrated on such a wide scale that it had to have been evident to at least some Jews, even while many either didn’t see it, denied it even when seen, or imagined celestial aid would redress the imbalance.

In other words, the traditional messianic hope (of a conclusive military victory over all of Israel’s neighbors) was a doomed hope, and that would have been obvious to at least some Jews. History would of course decisively prove this, as messianic movements were either wiped out quickly (Element 4) or led to the utter defeat and destruction of Jerusalem and the entire Jewish polity (already in the Neronian War of the 60s; even more so in the subsequent wars under Trajan and Hadrian: Element 23). This had happened before, most infamously to both Carthage and Corinth in the same year (146 bce), which any educated observer would know about. In fact, up to the time Christianity began, Roman victory was always the outcome, without exception, for every nation that ever stood against any concerted Roman conquest and occupation.

For example, even the infamous defeat of Varus by the Germans in 9 ce was decisively redressed by Germanicus only a few years later, illustrating the futility even of a victory against the Romans. This was a phenomenon so consistently repeated that it had already become a popular joke by the time of Christ, which is called even still a ‘Pyrrhic victory’, from the legend, widely circulated in antiquity, that in the third century bce the Greek upstart Pyrrhus had won his victories against the Romans at such cost that he declared ‘one more victory and I’m done for’ (or words to that effect), which prophecy was fulfilled in short order. After centuries of history repeating itself like this without fail, only a fool would bank on a future rebellion against the Romans having any other outcome. And though fools were always to be found, not all men are fools.

It would therefore be extremely improbable if no early-first-century Jews could foresee this (even if most, evidently, did not). Predicting this outcome would have been all the easier for anyone aware of recent analogous events, from the fates of Carthage and Corinth to the early Jewish rebellions described by Josephus, which were so quickly and easily suppressed that the reality must have become apparent to some. It would have been a simple matter to put two and two together: Roman military might plus Jewish military messianism equals the inevitable destruction of the Jews.

Element 25: The corruption and moral decay of the Jewish civil and temple elite (regardless of to what extent it was actual or merely perceived) was a widespread target of condemnation and often a cause of factionalizing among Jewish sects. This is evident throughout the narrative of Josephus regarding the causes and outcomes of the Jewish War, as well as in the literature recovered at Qumran (e.g. 4Q500), and in much of the apocryphal, apocalyptic and pseudepigraphical literature produced or popularized by first-century Jews.3 It is also a persistent theme in the Christian Gospels, which in that context do not seem aberrant in this respect but in fact typical.4

Element 26: For many Jews in the early first century (in accord with the previous element) the Jewish elite became the scapegoats for God’s failed promises (in accord with Elements 23 and 24): the reason God withheld their fulfillment (and instead allowed the Romans to rule) was imagined to be the Jewish elite’s failure to keep God’s commandments and govern justly (already a common theme throughout the OT, e.g., Jeremiah 23 and 25, the latter being the very prophecy whose ‘mystery’ is decoded in Daniel to produce the timetable that was now indicating the messiah would arrive in the early first century: Element 7). God would come through only when all sin had ended and been atoned for (Dan. 9.5-24).

The Dead Sea Scrolls, for example, repeatedly denounce the Jewish civil and temple elite as responsible for the evil that has befallen the land, in terms similar to those found in the Christian Gospels. And since the sins of the Jews are what kept God from holding back his promised judgment (as explained in Jeremiah 23 and 25, and Daniel 9), any plan that would cancel those sins would be seen as removing that obstacle and thus ushering in God’s promise. The fact that Daniel and Isaiah both connect the death of a messiah or savior with a final cancellation of Israel’s sins (see Elements 4 to 7) thus would have made those texts of primary interest to any apocalyptic Jew. A messiah’s atoning death (Elements 5, 10 and 18) therefore would have an obvious apocalyptic significance and function. The end of the world (and a fulfillment of God’s promises) could not occur without something like it, and scripture was practically handing it to them (Element 17).

Element 27: (a) The temple at Jerusalem was the central focus of most Jewish messianic hopes (as, for the Samaritans, was Mount Gerizim), which entailed that as long as the ‘corrupt’ Jewish elite controlled it, God would continue Israel’s ‘punishment’ (in accord with Elements 25 and 26); and as long as the Romans remained in power, they would maintain the corrupt Jewish elite’s control of the temple. Accordingly, (b) Jewish religious violence often aimed at seizing physical control of the temple and its personnel.5

Element 28. A spiritual solution to the physical conundrum of the Jews would have been a natural and easy thing to conceive at the time. Those Jews who believed they could physically retake control of the temple naturally pinned their hopes on military messianism (as exemplified by the Zealots and the Sicarii, and everyone who led actual rebellions against Rome, from Judas the Galilean to Bar Kochba). But if any Jews had realized that such a reconquest was impossible (as some must, in accord with Element 24) but still sought a means to escape their cognitive dissonance (in accord with Element 23) without denying the evident facts or abandoning deep-seated religious beliefs (and it is reasonable to assume at least some Jews did seek such means without going to such ends), then for them only one solution remained: to deny the physical importance of the temple at Jerusalem itself.

That would require replacing it, and not with another temple (as that would only recreate the same problem all over again and thus not in fact solve it, as was evident in the fate of the Samaritan messianic uprising at Gerizim: Element 7), but with something intangible, which neither the Romans nor the corrupt Jewish elite could control (as the intangible cannot be seized or occupied), and which required neither money nor material power to bring about or maintain (the two factors perceived to have corrupted the original temple cult—and to always favor the Romans, who alone had boundless quantities of both), and whose ruler was himself incapable of corruption (and there was only one who was truly incapable of corruption: God).

This does not entail that anyone did think this, only that it would have been an easy and natural progression of thought from problem to solution, and therefore not implausible. It fits the political and religious context and our understanding of human nature and ingenuity. Therefore, if any religious innovator had proposed that God had arranged a supreme sacrifice capable of cleansing all sins once and for all (such as, e.g., through the ritual atoning sacrifice of his firstborn son: Element 10), and further arranged that God’s spirit would, as a result, dwell forever within each individual who pledged himself to him (and thus no longer dwell, or dwell only, within the temple at Jerusalem: Element 18), then his message would resonate among many Jews as an ingenious and attractive solution to the problem of Jewish elite corruption and Roman invincibility (Elements 23-26), by eliminating the relevance of the temple to messianic hopes, and thus eliminating the basis for any doomed military conflict with Rome, and further eliminating the problem of the corrupt Jewish elite by simply disinheriting them from God’s kingdom and removing them as middlemen between the people and their God—all without requiring the deployment of any physical or military resources. One simply had to declare that it had been done. God’s will. Sorted.

The basic Christian gospel—imagining that the death of a messiah had conclusively atoned for all sins (as the OT could already be understood to say, per Elements 5, 6, and 17), and that by joining with him (through adoption by baptism, in accord with Element 12; and through symbolic consumption of his body and blood, in accord with Element 18) God would dwell in us (instead of the temple)—would thus be recognized by many Jews as an ingenious and attractive idea.6 Especially since the end result would be that instead of taking orders from the Jewish elite, we would have as our sovereign no fallible men but Christ himself, God’s appointed Lord, directly speaking to his subjects from the right hand of God in heaven (by spirit and angelic communication, and secret messages planted in scripture, in accord with Elements 8 and 15).7 Thus the problem of elite corruption is seemingly removed without requiring violence or money or diplomacy or military victory. God has his victory; and all cognitive dissonance is resolved.

The only sacred space this doctrine required one to physically control was one’s own body, a notion already popularized by philosophical sects such as the Stoics, who taught that nothing external can conquer a man who in his wisdom remains internally free. Not death, nor imprisonment, nor torture represented any victory over him. This was therefore a battle one could always win, even against the ‘invincible’ Romans. One merely had to believe it, to feel it was true, that God now lived in you. No other evidence was required. Thus it should not surprise us that Christianity converted all the military imagery of popular messianism into spiritual metaphor, to represent what we would now call a culture war.8 This aligns perfectly with the notion of a spiritual transfer of authority to the people, negating the relevance of the temple and the Jewish elite, while retaining the most fundamental requirements of being Jewish (namely, faith and obedience to the commandments of God; though even that would later be done away with, per Element 20).

The relevance of this observation is that the earliest Christian gospel makes far more sense as a product of its political context than it does when completely divorced from that context, and in consequence, theories of historicity that ignore that fact are unlikely to have any objective merit. The centrality of the temple was a continual problem for the Jews. A physical location requiring political control entailed military domination. So long as the Romans had the latter, the Jews would never have the former. The Zealots took the logical option of attempting to remove the Romans and restore Jewish control. But the Christians took the only other available option: removing the temple from their entire soteriological (or ‘salvation’) scheme.9

Christians could then just await God’s wrath to come from heaven (in accord with Element 10), while in the meantime, God’s promise could be delivered unto the kingdom they had spiritually created (Rom. 14.17-18; 1 Cor. 4.19-20), first in an anticipatory way (in the moral and ‘supernatural’ success of the Christian community), and then in the most final way (in the apocalypse itself: e.g. 1 Cor. 15.24, 50; 6.9-10; Gal. 5.19-25; 1 Thess. 4.10-5.15). That the Christians and the Zealots both may have come from the same sectarian background, and pursued collectively the only two possible solutions to the problem facing the Jews at the time, reveals Christianity to be more akin to something inevitable than something surprising.10

Element 29: Further supporting the previous element is the fact that what are now called ‘Cargo Cults’ are the modern movements most culturally and socially similar to earliest Christianity, so much so that Christianity is best understood in light of them. For not only are their attributes remarkably similar, but so are the socio-political situations that created them; and it is this distinct parallel of both cause and effect that makes the comparison illuminating. In the words of I.C. Jarvie:

One of the most remarkable things about apocalyptic millenarian movements [like the Cargo Cults] is that, despite the fact that they crop up at all periods of history, in all parts of the world, and in all sorts of different social set-ups, we can find remarkable similarities between them.11

Indeed.

These cults rocked numerous small Melanesian island nations in the early twentieth century, producing a variety of savior religions often surrounding mythical (but fully historicized) messiahs, from John Frum to Tom Navy, men who never really existed but were believed to have been real persons who visited the islands and would return messianically one day with ships or planes full of marvelous ‘cargo’, including the resurrected dead of the island peoples. Some of these cults did worship real people, yet who had nothing to do with founding the cult and are quite perplexed at having been deified (like Prince Philip, the current husband, ‘royal consort’, of the Queen of England, who is worshiped as the savior deity in one of these cults). Notably, in no case was the savior god, despite being conceived from the start as a historical person, ever an actual founder of any of these religions, yet they are always portrayed as such in their sacred stories, issuing teachings and prophecies and establishing ‘their’ church.

The earliest documented of these uprisings was the Vailala Madness in the Territory of Papua.12 But all subsequent cults had similar features: they are all charismatic apocalyptic cults (in this case arising in Melanesia), characterized by glossolalia and mass hysteria, prophesying, receiving secret communications from God (who thus provided instructions on forming the religion and its teachings), and experiencing powerful and convincing visions (thus cargo cults were schizotypal cults: Element 15). In fact, in several documented cases things that were seen in visions or merely prophesied were later believed to have historically happened, within just fifteen years (some such ideas originating in 1919 became fully historicized beliefs by 1934), demonstrating rapid legendary development.13 Cargo cults were also characterized by radical reform (abandoning old traditional cult and instituting a new), apocalyptic expectations (preaching a coming end of the world in which all injustices would be redressed, the dead raised, and the faithful rewarded), and a strong moral dimension—as well as new diversions of charity from which the movement’s leaders benefitted, similar to what the letters of Paul show happened in early Christianity.14

Peter Worsley’s study of cargo cults (and related millenarian movements such as the Native American ‘Ghost Dance’ movement of the late nineteenth century) found that they arise in one of three conditions—though sometimes more than one condition is present, and notably all three were present at the origin of Christianity:

1. First in racially and culturally fragmented societies; ‘the main effect of the millenarian cult is to overcome these divisions and to weld previously hostile and separate groups together into a new unity’ against the ruling power; and ‘the social necessity which produces this drive towards integration is the subjection of all the separate units to a common authority’, like a foreign imperial power (and, of course, the local elite who support it, who are then seen as in collusion with it).15 Christianity, too, arose in a racially and culturally fragmented society under the thumb of a foreign power. The first Christians sought to resolve this tension by recruiting Gentiles to become Jews, but very soon Paul saw (consciously or not) that Christianity had to relax that requirement to achieve its goal of unity, making this an almost inevitable development, since the need of it would have been all but obvious, while the alternative was certain to fail, as in fact it did.16

2. And ‘the second major type of society in which millenarian cults develop is the agrarian, and especially feudal, state’ where ‘the cults arise among the lower orders—peasants and urban plebeians—in opposition to the official régimes’, because ‘due to the material conditions of their lives, they lack any organization which could give practical expression to their common interests, and they do not see their common interests except in times of social crisis’, so they must then create such an organization.17 Christianity likewise originated in an agrarian society, with an effectively feudal structure (with powerful landholders controling economic and political institutions and exploiting a peasantry), and among the lower orders, in a condition of growing social crisis (see Elements 22-25 and Element 4), where no political organization for expressing their concerns was made available, thus necessitating that they create one. This would explain Christianity’s rapid organization into ‘churches’ with a hierarchy and rules of order (1 Cor. 11–14 and 6; cf. Rom. 16.1; 1 Cor. 1.2; 12.28; 16.19; etc.), and its steady move toward control of orthodoxy through an increasingly organized political system independent of the imperial government. This same pattern is observed in other cases: most millenarian movements begin with a ‘terrific release of emotional energy’ and ‘the overthrow or reversal of the present social order’ and ‘the promise of heaven on earth—soon’, but this revolutionary aspect has a brief life; if the movement survives, it does so only by becoming an institutionalized expression of a more distant future promise, with more muted emotional energy, and more socially conservative.18 Just as happened to Christianity.

3. And ‘there is a third type of social situation in which activist millenarian ideas are likely to flourish’, which is ‘when a society with differentiated political institutions is fighting for its existence by quite secular military–political means, but is meeting with defeat after defeat’, such that ‘when the political structure of a society is smashed by war or other means, or fails to answer the needs of a people who wish to carry on the struggle, then a prophetic, often millenarian, leadership is likely to emerge’.19 In other words, when ‘the military solution’ to oppression and social disfunction so consistently fails and is so obviously unlikely to succeed, social pressures produce apocalyptic, non-militarized grassroots movements instead, which arise from a retooling of the dominant native religion. Apocalypticism (both its eager expectation and its florid description through revelation and pronouncement) becomes a way to passively voice discontent with the ruling powers and re-envision a better society, proclaiming that God himself will bring it upon us soon—rather than taking up arms to bring it about directly, a solution already seen to be incapable of success; and since it ‘must’ happen, as God would not abandon his people, God must be waiting in the wings.

This so appositely describes the situation and solution of early Christianity (Elements 22-25) that it is again a conspicuous match. So the sociological situation that spawned Christianity had all three conditions for generating millenarian cults exactly like Christianity. In fact, these are now recognized as the common conditions giving rise to all martyrdom movements, from Islamic to Buddhist to pagan, Jewish, and Christian: a subject people, in relative poverty, powerless, effectively dominated by a foreign people (either directly or through collusion with an unresponsive local elite) who are racially and culturally different from themselves, and whose economic and military capability is so awesome it cannot be overcome.20

Anthropology thus teaches us that Christianity is exactly the sort of thing one would expect to arise in those conditions.21 And we should also expect it to take on the characteristics typical of those conditions: it would arise from an oppressed natives’ religion (Judaism) in a time of escalating, unresolvable crisis (as in early-first-century Palestine), and it would prominently adopt matryrdom, apocalypticism, a program of social-moral reform and its own internal political organization separate from the established political and religious institutions. It will also syncretically merge (per Element 11) its local faith with useful or admired elements of the cultural and religious ideas of their oppressors in order to ‘co-opt’ them and produce a ‘greater’ religion than either the failed local cult or the illegitimate alien cult—as all these other millenarian movements did.22 When the conditions are added that strongly support schizotypal cult behavior (Element 15), the features thereof will be integrated as well (as happened with the Cargo Cults).23 And when the further condition is added of a rising popularity of syncretic unification movements such as the Hellenistic mystery religions (Element 11), we could again have described what Christianity would look like without ever having heard of it. Can that really be a coincidence?

2. Elements of Religious and Philosophical Context

Element 30: Early-first-century Judea was at the nexus of countless influences, not only from dozens of innovating and interacting Jewish sects (Elements 2 and 33), but also pagan religions and philosophies (Elements 31 and 32). The influence of the latter is sometimes denied, but cannot be, not only because pagans lived, traveled, and traded all throughout Judea (with significant populations in cities throughout the Holy Land, from the pagan quarters of Caesarea, Gaza, Ptolemais, Tiberias and Sepphoris to the ten cities of the Decapolis and major port cities such as Tyre and Ashkelon, and likewise in Samaria, which was right in the center of the Holy Land, with ongoing interactions with the surrounding districts through pilgrimage and trade),24 but even more so because Jerusalem, and all Judea, was frequented by millions of pilgrims from the diaspora every year, many (such as Philo of Alexandria) thoroughly Hellenized, who brought with them ideas and teachings from the foreign communities they came from. Acts 2.5-11 and 6.9 are thus reflecting the reality, and that in Jerusalem itself.

These latter ideas would have infiltrated Palestinian society in two ways. Some would arrive by simple report: pagans and Jewish pilgrims retelling what they heard and knew and what they thought about it; and likewise bringing books with them, to loan, sell or read aloud; it would also be incredible to think that none of the cities in Palestine had public libraries, which were otherwise a standard feature of major cities of the time, and surely a feature of every city with a large Gentile presence, such as Caesarea or Tyre.25 But others would arrive through prior syncretism: diaspora Jews combined pagan religious and philosophical ideas with their own Jewish faith (as Philo of Alexandria did—and just as what were then ‘mainstream’ Palestinian Jews had done before when they adopted notions of hell and resurrection, and the Devil as a supernatural enemy of God, all from their pagan Zoroastrian overlords centuries before), and then came to Judea and promulgated their new ideas as Jewish ideas rather than pagan.26 Paul himself is an example: a diaspora Jew, from either Tarsus (Acts 9.11; 21.39; 22.3) or Damascus (Gal. 2.17; 2 Cor. 11.26), whose own version of Christianity, ultimately accepted even by the founders (the ‘pillars’ of Gal. 2), was laden with ideas from pagan philosophy, literature and mystery cult.27

Two common objections to this conclusion are (1) that the ideas exhibiting influence (as in Philo or Paul) are in many ways different from their ideological sources, and (2) we do not have direct archaeological confirmation of the presence of such ideas (e.g. in the form of pagan books or references to same). But neither objection is logically valid, because (1) syncretism always changes the adopted ideas by plucking them out of their original system and combining them with other ideas, and therefore differences are expected, and thus cannot argue against the existence of influence, and (2) almost nothing survives from ancient Palestine that would be relevant to determining what ‘wasn’t’ there in the first century (certainly in terms of books, much less in terms of orally transmitted texts and cultural knowledge), therefore this is simply not a valid argument from silence.28 In contrast, the evidence of transmission vectors heavily transiting and residing in Palestine (as surveyed above) is conclusive, and to suggest that all those transmission vectors were there year in and year out for centuries and not transmitting anything is to argue against all human probability.

Likewise, though someone like Philo or Paul could light upon one idea or two that was only accidentally similar to pagan counterparts, it is massively improbable that they could do this dozens of times over. Such a coincidence has only one plausible explanation: influence.29 Moreover, as both wrote in excellent Greek—as did the authors of several of the books found at Qumran, and numerous persons in Palestine transcribing (and thus also evidently reading) Greek inscriptions and grave markers—and Greek could then only be learned in pagan-style schools based on pagan models of pagan literary classics and commentary (which would undeniably transmit pagan religious and philosophical knowledge)—to suggest there was no transmission of pagan knowledge and ideas there is to suggest the absurd.30

Finally, one might concede the knowledge existed but that ‘the Jews’ would never adopt ideas from foreign cultures and religions. That is a dubious premise (history does not support it), but even if granted, what conservative or elite Jews would do can have no bearing on what desperate, radical or fringe Jewish sects would do. And Christianity did not originate within conservative or elite Judaism but from the radical fringes, as a protest movement against conservative elite Judaism, and thus represents the very kind of heresy conservatives were always combating (Element 2). By the very fact of their being heretical, any innovations such an embattled sect might resort to in order to ‘reform’ the Judaism of their day would not be confined to what conservative Jews would allow. In fact, anthropological precedent tells us syncretism in that case is actually likely (Element 29). And ultimately, such adaptations, even if we can see their pagan roots, would always have been marketed as Jewish, not pagan (exactly as happened to Jewish adaptations from Zoroastrianism).

Element 31: Incarnate sons (or daughters) of a god who died and then rose from their deaths to become living gods granting salvation to their worshipers were a common and peculiar feature of pagan religion when Christianity arose, so much so that influence from paganism is the only plausible explanation for how a Jewish sect such as Christianity came to adopt the idea (again, Element 11). For example, you won’t find this trend in ancient China. No such gods are found there. If Christianity had begun in China, its claims would indeed have been unique and astonishing. Yet in its actual Greco-Roman context it was neither unique nor astonishing. Thus it cannot be a coincidence that Christianity arose with an idea matching a ubiquitous pagan type unique to the very time and place it was born. Any theory of historicity, to be plausible, must take this into account.31

In the middle of the second century, Justin Martyr wrote the following:

When we say that the Logos, who is the firstborn of God, Jesus Christ our teacher, was produced without sexual union, and was crucified and died, and rose again, and ascended to heaven, we propound nothing new or different from what you believe regarding those whom you call Sons of God. [In fact] . . . if anybody objects that [our god] was crucified, this is in common with the sons of Zeus (as you call them) who suffered, as previously listed. Since their fatal sufferings are all narrated as not similar but different, so his unique passion should not seem to be any worse—indeed I will show, as I have undertaken, and as the argument proceeds, that he was better; for Jesus is thus shown to be better by his actions.32

Thus even Christians acknowledged the ubiquity of the dying-and-rising son-of-god theme in their surrounding pagan culture, and recognized it as a common theme even when every story differed in details from every other (on that being how syncretism works, see again Element 11).33

The dying-and-rising son (sometimes daughter) of god ‘mytheme’ originated in the ancient Near East over a thousand years before Christianity and was spread across the Mediterranean principally by the Phoenicians (Canaanites) from their base at Tyre (and after that by the Carthaginians, the most successful Phoenician cultural diffusers in the early Greco-Roman period), and then fostered and modified by numerous native and Greco-­Roman cults that adopted it. The earliest documented examples are the cult of Inanna and Dumuzi (also known as Ishtar and Tammuz), the cult of Baal and Anat, and the cult of Marduk (also known as Bel or Baal, which basically meant ‘the Lord’), all of whose resurrection stories are told in Sumerian, Ugaritic and Assyrian tablets (respectively) long predating the advent of Christianity.34 That in pre-Christian belief Inanna was indeed killed and her corpse resurrected I already demonstrated in Chapter 3 (§1), providing the most indisputable example.

These cults then influenced the development of others in the Greco-­Roman era, including the cult of a resurrected Adonis. Although too few pre-Christian texts about this specific Adonis cult survive to reconstruct its liturgy, in the third century the Christian scholar Origen says in his Comments on Ezekiel that Tammuz is still worshiped in his day under the name Adonis, and as such ‘certain rites of initiation are conducted’ for him, ‘first, that they weep for him, since he has died; second, that they rejoice for him because he has risen from the dead’ [apo nekrōn anastanti], by way of explaining the reference in Ezekiel to women ‘weeping for Tammuz’ at the gates of Jerusalem (Ezek. 8.14), which Ezekiel was denouncing as pagan.35 We know that refers to the resurrection story of Inanna, which we have on clay tablets long predating Christianity, and there is evidence of a corresponding resurrection story for Tammuz—already widely known in Jerusalem long before Christianity, as Ezekiel was attesting.36

It is far more likely the resurrection of this Adonis (in the cult to which Origen refers; not all Adonis cults were necessarily the same) had been celebrated long before Christianity began than that it would be a recent innovation. Surely Origen would know if it were and make obvious sport of the fact; it would likewise be incredible that even at this early stage major pagan cults would fundamentally change their entire religion in emulation of Christianity, which was a little known, wholly uninfluential cult that was rarely liked.37 And indeed Lucian directly attests to there being a resurrection myth for the Syrian Adonis half a century before Origen, and it’s clear Lucian is relating an ancient ceremony of its celebration, not some recent novelty.38 So it is far more likely a resurrected Adonis cult was not new. The more so as we can confirm several other examples of clearly pre-Christian dying-and-rising gods well known across the Roman Empire: the savior cult of the resurrected Zalmoxis (of Thracian origin) is clearly attested in Herodotus centuries before Christianity; the imperial cult of the resurrected Romulus is likewise attested in several pre-Christian authors (see Chapter 4, §1); and the Egyptian savior cult of the resurrected Osiris is likewise undeniably ancient.39

Well before Christianity, inscriptions among the Egyptian pyramids had long declared of Osiris (usually in the voice of his sister-wife Isis):

I have come to thee . . . that I may revivify thee, that I may assemble for thee thy bones, that I may collect for thee thy flesh, that I may assemble for thee thy dismembered limbs . . . raise thyself up, king, Osiris; thou livest!40

Raise thyself up; shake off thy dust; remove the dirt which is on thy face; loose thy bandages.41

Osiris, collect thy bones; arrange thy limbs; shake off thy dust; untie thy bandages; the tomb is open for thee; the double doors of the coffin are undone for thee; the double doors of heaven are open for thee . . . thy soul is in thy body. . .raise thyself up!42

It is absurd to insist there is no parallel in concept here to what would later be claimed for Jesus. Jesus is clearly very much like Osiris: both die and both get raised in improved bodies and both end up living as lords in heaven (not on earth).

As surveyed for Element 14, Plutarch is explicit about the cosmic version of the Osiris myth: he says Osiris actually incarnates and actually dies (albeit in outer space; but he dies, too, as Plutarch admits, also in the myth that places his death on earth at a single time in history) and is actually restored to life in a new supernatural body (just as Jesus was, as Paul thoroughly explains in 1 Cor. 15).43 Plutarch has this event repeated only annually (as was also likely the case for Ishtar and Tammuz), but that’s not a relevant difference, since syncretism with Jewish apocalypticism fully explains the replacement of a cyclical with a one-time resurrection (in fact the peculiarly Jewish logic of that modification is fully explained in Hebrews 9; see Element 43, and Chapter 11, §5). Similarly, the resurrections of Romulus and Zalmoxis were and remained singular events in history (and likewise, in public myth, that of Dionysus), demonstrating the flexibility of the mytheme in just this respect. I already discussed the example of Romulus in Chapter 4 (§1).

Speaking of the entire genre of incarnated dying-and-rising gods, Plutarch writes:

Now we hear the theologians affirming and reciting, sometimes in verse and sometimes in prose, that God is deathless and eternal in his nature, but due to some predestined design and reason, he undergoes transformations of his person, and at one time enkindles his nature into fire and makes it entirely like everything else, and at another time he undergoes all sorts of changes in his forms and his passions and powers, even as the universe does today, but he is still called by the best known of his names. The more enlightened, however, concealing from the masses this transformation into fire, call him Apollo because of his solitary state, and Phoebus because of his purity and stainlessness. And as for his turning into winds and water, earth and stars, and into the generations of plants and animals, and his adoption of such guises, they speak in a deceptive way of what he suffers in his transformation as a tearing apart, as it were, and a dismemberment. . . . They give him the names of Dionysus, Zagreus, Nyctelius, and Isodaetes, and they narrate deaths and vanishings, followed by returns to life and resurrections—riddles and myths quite in keeping with his transformations.44

Thus Plutarch attests to there being many historical narratives of pagan gods becoming incarnate and dying, their corpses vanishing, and rising from the dead, which are meant to allegorize what is really going on, which (as he implies here and explains elsewhere) is more cosmic in nature (see Element 14). But the myths were still there, and everywhere known.45 The public ubiquity of dying-and-rising god myths, always the divine sons or daughters of a supreme god, and often being worshiped as personal saviors, is therefore beyond dispute, and could not have failed to play a major role in the origins of Christianity—otherwise we must posit an extremely improbable coincidence.

Element 32: By whatever route, popular philosophy (especially Cynicism, and to some extent Stoicism and Platonism and perhaps Aristotelianism) influenced Christian teachings.46

The influence of Cynicism has been particularly argued and debated in recent scholarship.47 But most of this debate talks past the point. It is not necessary to suppose that Q (discussed in Chapter 7, §4, and Chapter 10, §6) or any of the sayings of Jesus directly emulate Cynic sources (although that is a hypothesis deserving consideration). Rather, there could have also been influence from Cynics and Cynic philosophy on the Jewish sects that later influenced or grew into Christianity (possibly even just orally through itinerant Cynic preachers, but still also possibly by written sources). And it is this influence that cannot reasonably be denied. Even apart from whether or not such concepts and teachings originated with a historical Jesus, there are undeniably Cynic elements in the Gospels. These could be simple borrowings from Cynic teachings circulating everywhere, by adopting those that were attractive and merging them with Jewish moral values similarly selected from those commonly available, to produce a more ideal hybrid. Much of this may already have preceded Christianity, through other Jewish sects, and some of it may have come together as the Christian movement formed, and some possibly introduced after.

By the nature of syncretism, again, the differences (the Cynic ideals that were ‘not’ adopted, or were modified, or even rejected and replaced with contrary Jewish ideals) do not argue against adoptions and adaptations. Just as their many differences from other Jewish sects did not mean the Christians were not influenced by Judaism, so also their differences with the Cynics did not mean they were not influenced by Cynics. As in religion, so in philosophy: eclecticism, the combining and melding of philosophies and the picking and choosing of ideas and ideals to produce unique combinations more or less favoring yet still differing from one sect or other, was the norm (Elements 2, 11 and 30). The first-century Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus, for example, shows clear signs of having been influenced by Cynicism, and in result taught things very similar to Jesus, concerning, for example, charity, pacifism, forgiveness and brotherly love. And if that can be so for him, it can be so for Jesus, or anyone in the Christian tradition after him, or the Jewish tradition before him.48 And so, too, any other popular philosophy of the age.

Element 33: In addition to its pagan influences, Christianity was also (obviously) influenced by several Jewish sects (see, in general, Elements 1-5), and can be understood only in this context, too. This means the role must be considered not just of the OT and many other Jewish scriptures then revered (see Elements 6-9), but of specific Jewish sects and their distinctive ideologies and innovations, many of which we do not in fact know much or anything about (such as the so-called Galilean sect, whose particular beliefs, apart from being somehow opposed to the Pharisees, are otherwise unknown).49

Christianity is a syncretism of pagan and Jewish salvation ideology, and as such differs from each precisely in what it borrows from the other. Therefore both must be understood, or at least be ‘on our theoretical radar’. Even considering what is known, influences have been detected from the Pharisees (especially the liberal branch associated with the pre-Christian R. ­Hillel), the Essenes (and/or the sect[s] represented at Qumran), and certainly the Baptists—the pre-Christian Jewish sect led (if not founded) by John the Baptist around the assumed time of Christianity’s birth—and possibly the Therapeutae (or whatever sectarian influence they and Christianity share in common), or even the Samaritans.50 The more these influences are examined, the less original Christianity appears.50

The beatitudes, for example, are barely more than a redaction of pre-Christian beatitude literature recovered from Qumran.51 And the collection at Qumran by no means represents all the literature that would have been available to the first Christians. Indeed even what was there survives now only in scraps and fragments—in other words, we barely have a fraction of what was at Qumran. Think of all the new ideas, scriptures, concepts, interpretations, variants, genres and precedents we have discovered just in these fragments, and then realize what must be the number of other ideas, scriptures, concepts, interpretations, variants, genres and precedents there were in those times that we have not discovered (hence Element 9). This makes it impossible to argue that anything now thought peculiar to Christianity did not derive from some preexisting Jewish precedent (in one of the well-known sects, or one of the lesser-known), which has simply become lost in the scarce transmission of evidence from the past (hence Element 2).

It must also be considered that Jewish sectarianism was often not associated with formal institutions or control hierarchies and would therefore have been extremely fluid. For example, a sect of Essenes could adopt many of the teachings of the Pharisee Hillel and then go on to see itself as the genuine expression of the Baptists, and thereby look like all three sects. Which would make classification challenging, but ultimately unnecessary, since it really doesn’t matter whether we identified it as an Essene sect or a Pharisee sect or a Baptist sect—no matter what we chose to call it, it would still be a hybrid of them all, and we would still need to attend to how it was influenced by each. As I’ve mentioned, this kind of eclecticism was a cultural fad of the time, characterizing philosophical schools as well as the sciences (Element 11); so it would be natural to see it anywhere experimentation and innovation were especially rampant, and this was certainly the case in first-century Judaism (Element 2).

Element 34: Popular cosmology at the dawn of the Common Era in the Middle East held that the universe was geocentric and spherical and divided into many layers (see Chapter 3, §1), with the first layer of ‘heaven’ often called the ‘firmament’ (being the foundation holding up all the others) and consisting of all the air between the earth and the moon (or sometimes the same term only meant the topmost part of this: the sphere traveled by the moon). This expanse was known even then to extend hundreds of thousands of miles (see discussion in Chapter 4, §3).52 Above that were several more levels of heaven, the number varying depending on the scheme adopted, but the most commonplace view was that there were seven in all, one for each major celestial body: the region from the moon to Mercury being the first, then on to Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn (not always in that order), and finally the sphere of the stars (astronomers tended to regard the stars as distant suns; theologians tended to favor the theory that the stars comprised a single layer of lights at the top of heaven).

This view was particularly popular with Jewish theologians, and readily accepted by the earliest Christians.53 This model had already been read out of scripture even before the explosion of scientific discoveries that began in the classical period (the sixth and fifth centuries bce) and took off in the Hellenistic (the fourth through second centuries bce). As Genesis said, ‘In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth’, and ‘the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God was moving over the face of the waters’; then God creates and separates light and darkness, producing the first evening and day, and then ‘God said, “Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it separate the waters above from the waters below”’, and so it was done, ‘and God called the firmament Heaven’, and that was the second day. Then ‘God said, “Let the waters under the heavens be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear.” And it was so. God called the dry land Earth, and the waters that were gathered together he called Seas’ (Gen. 1.1-10).

In this account God does not create ex nihilo. There were primordial waters, and a formless and empty earth.54 God began creation by separating the primordial waters, which he did by forming a solid dome (in later cosmology, a sphere) called the ‘firmament’, raqia in Hebrew, or stereōma in Greek (a ‘solid body’, often the foundation or framework of a building).55 In this account, the firmament is called heaven, but it’s clear what is meant is the floor or basement of heaven, heaven itself being the ‘waters above’ the firmament. The rest is the world below, including the earth and its seas. In Gen. 1.20 birds are allowed to fly above the earth, but kata to stereōma tou ouranou, ‘across the firmament of heaven’; so the ‘firmament’ was not just the roof of the first heaven but the whole sky holding up the heavens, the place where birds fly. The term could thus refer to the region of the air, or its ceiling, depending on the context.

At the time Genesis was written, it was thought all the stars and planets and sun and moon were located on the same level, and thus Genesis says God attached them all to the firmament (1.14-17), so there would be the atmosphere up to the firmament (the place of clouds and air), the firmament itself (with all its stars and sun and moon), then the heavens above (the place of the celestial waters), effectively a three-level system. But by the time Christianity began, astronomy had been well established and its basic findings more widely known, and thus it was known that the moon is on one level, the sun on another, the planets on yet other levels, and the stars beyond (as Paul was aware: 1 Cor. 15.41), which is what expanded the levels imagined for heaven to at least seven.

The structure of heaven is debated in the Talmud.56 But the general opinion resolved there is that there are either two heavens (the firmament and the ‘heaven of heavens’ above it) or seven heavens, which were interpreted in different ways. In one scheme, the first heaven is just the sky (or the lower part thereof); the second is the firmament separating that sky from the other heavens and containing all the stellar objects (such as moon, sun, and stars); the third is where millstones grind heavenly grain into manna; the fourth contains ‘the heavenly Jerusalem and the Temple and the Altar’, where the archangel Michael (‘the great Prince’) pays cult to God; the fifth is where the angelic host resides; the sixth contains warehouses of hail and snow and rain; and the seventh is where reside the souls of the righteous dead and the souls of those yet to be born, as well as a magic water that resurrects the dead.

So says the Talmud. But the actual contents of each heaven could vary from account to account. 1 Enoch and 2 Enoch both incorporate a ­seven-level heaven in their accounts; as did the Ascension of Isaiah (as we saw in Chapter 3, §1), where again there are seven heavens, and the firmament is beneath them (holding them up), consisting of all the air above the earth and its ceiling (7.9-13; 10.27-31), and the distance between the earth and the top of this firmament is vast (7.28). Likewise among the Dead Sea Scrolls, the ‘Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice’ (4Q400-407 and 11Q17) also describe seven ascending levels of heaven, with different temples and thrones and angels in each.57 Similarly, the first-century Testament of Levi (the third book of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs) gives a different account of the seven heavens and what’s in them. Yet that’s just another example of a great many narratives that can be found in early Christian and Jewish literature.

So this notion of seven heavens, with the heavenly firmament at the bottom separating the earth from the higher heavens, had certainly become a fundamental Christian doctrine.58 It was clearly a component of Christian belief even from earliest times. Paul assumes Jesus will descend ‘from heaven’ (ouranos) and then snatch us up ‘into the clouds’ (nephelai) to meet him in the ‘air’ (aēr, meaning the terrestrial part of the atmosphere, i.e., the firmament); thus he distinguishes heavens above from air below (1 Thess. 4.16-17). And Paul mentions (without assuming anyone would challenge him or even think twice about it) that he knows a man (probably himself) who traveled up to ‘the third heaven’ (2 Cor. 12.2-4), where he says the garden of Eden was located (a common belief in Jewish cosmology of the time: Element 38).

Element 35: Popular cosmology of the time also held that the sub-heaven, the firmament, was a region of corruption and change and decay, while the heavens above were pure, incorruptible and changeless. This view was most widely popularized by Aristotle and then by philosophers after him who adopted it, though many did not, and it remained a debated topic in science well into the Roman era. Nevertheless, it was such a good fit for religious beliefs of the time that theologians clung to Aristotle’s original scheme.59

This was especially popular among those who favored Platonism in their construction of the universe. For example, Plutarch confidently asserts that ‘this terrestrial universe’, or the perigeios [‘the stuff around the earth’], ‘and the moon along with it is irregular and variable and ever changing’, whereas ‘this is not true’ of the rest of the universe (the regions above the moon).60 The same view of things is affirmed by the famous pre-Christian author Cicero, Paul’s predecessor, and by the Jewish theologian Philo, Paul’s contemporary.61 It is repeated or assumed in countless cases across pagan, Jewish and Christian literature of the period.

Paul clearly embraced this view himself, and assumed his Christian congregations did as well. For example, in 1 Cor. 15.40-50, Paul divides the world into the region of decay (the ‘terrestrial’ world, the epigeia, the ‘earthly’ places, meaning ‘on or above the earth’) and the region of ­indecay (the ‘celestial’ world, the epourania, the ‘heavenly’ places, meaning ‘in the heavens’), which distinction is also reflected in 2 Cor. 5.1-5. This is the same division of worlds that Plato, Philo and Plutarch described. As Philo attests, this notion had already been assimilated in pre-Christian Jewish thought.62

Element 36: Because of this division between the perfect unchanging heavens and the corrupted sublunar world, most religious cosmologies required intercessory beings, who bridge the gap between those worlds, so God need not descend and mingle with corruption. This concept can already be seen in the cosmology of Plato.63 It only became increasingly popular thereafter. Thus, Plutarch tells us that there are ‘holy demons [daimones], guardians of men’ which ‘interpret and serve, being intermediary between gods and men, since they send up above the prayers and requests of men, and take back down to us revelations and gifts of blessings’, and thus act as intermediaries, intercessory beings, between men and gods.64 Plutarch also says, ‘it is not the gods . . . but demons [daimones], the ministers of the gods, who are in charge of oracles’ in temples, because the gods themselves are too lofty to descend and deal with men.65

This view had become fully assimilated by many sects in Judaism.66 Thus, in the Ascension of Isaiah (see Chapter 3, §1), we also hear of mediator beings who had to travel up and down through the heavens to carry gifts and communications between men and God, even needing passwords to ‘open’ the gates from one heaven to the next. The very same concept was taught in Mithraism.67 The Jewish theologian Philo provides the obvious explanation: God does not condescend to lower himself to the sublunar world, so he sends angels and intermediaries to help and communicate with mankind, and it is these beings who deliver revelations and commandments, and the most important of these intermediary beings was the ‘divine Logos’ (see Element 40; see also my discussion of the equivalence of angels and mediary gods in Chapter 4, §3; and in Element 11).68

Thus, as Origen says of Jacob’s dream in Gen. 28.12, ‘a divine vision was presented to the view of our prophet Jacob—a ladder stretching to heaven, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon it, and the Lord supported upon its top’, which he says tells us there are indeed many heavens and beings that travel between God and man.69 This is the same view reflected in Jn 1.51, ‘And he said to him, “Truly, truly, I say to you, you shall see the heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man”’. The same notion is represented again in the fact that it is the Holy Spirit that descends at Jesus’ baptism (Mk 1.10), while God does not deign to descend himself, but only shouts from his station above (Mk 1.11). Jesus was clearly regarded as one of those beings. Romans 8.34; 1 Jn 2.1; and Heb. 7.25 all establish that Jesus’ role was to advocate on our behalf in the presence of God, one of the common roles of an intermediary deity; in 1 Thess. 4.16 Jesus (not God himself) ‘descends’ from heaven to collect us; in Heb. 4.14 (with 8.1-5 and 9.11-24) we’re told Jesus ‘passed through the heavens’ for us, descending to effect his death and ascending to accomplish its effects, which is also affirmed in Eph. 4.8-10. For similar reasons Mithras was called the ‘Mediator’ (mesitēs).70 Accordingly, Jesus was also called the ‘Mediator’ (mesitēs).71

Irenaeus further explains Jesus’ role as a mediator deity:

The baptism of our resurrection proceeds through these three points: God the Father, bestowing on us resurrection through His Son, by the Holy Spirit. For as many as carry the Spirit of God are led to the Logos, that is to the Son; and the Son then brings them to the Father; and the Father then causes them to possess incorruption. Without the Spirit it is not possible to behold the Logos of God, nor without the Son can any draw near to the Father—for the knowledge of the Father is the Son, and the knowledge of the Son of God is through the Holy Spirit; and, according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Son ministers and dispenses the Spirit to whomsoever the Father wills and in whatever way He wills.72

This was not out of line with Jewish theology of the time, which had many similar notions of mediator beings negotiating between earth and heaven and God and man.73 In the Ascension of Isaiah, for example, a mediator being (an angel) must descend to carry Isaiah through the many heavens and back again, and another mediator being, Jesus, must descend and ­reascend to accomplish his tasks on God’s behalf.

As Paul regarded Jesus to have been a preexistent being who humbled himself, died and then was exalted ‘very high’ (Phil. 2.6-8), he clearly understood Jesus in the same sense as the intermediary beings common throughout Jewish and pagan theology. It was through Jesus that God accomplished all things, even creation itself (1 Cor. 8.6), and now our present salvation (see again Element 10). Jesus is thus the intermediary agent of God’s will from above. And this was a common concept in both pagan and Jewish religious thought.

Element 37: The lowest heaven, the firmament, the region of corruption and change, was popularly thought to be teeming with invisible spirits (pneumata or psychai) and demons (daimones or daimonia), throughout the whole space, who control the elements and powers of the universe there, meddle in the affairs of man, and do battle with one another. In pagan conception some of these demons were evil and some were good, and the good demons were often intermediary deities (per the previous element). In Jewish conception all the demons were evil, defying the will of God; and they did the bidding of fallen angels who also set up residence in the firmament, who were once intermediary deities serving God but who were cast down and took up residence in the lower realm. And the leader of these fallen angels was Satan, also known by many other names (e.g. the Devil, Belial, Beelzebul, Lucifer, Sammael, or just the Adversary, the literal meaning of the word Satan).

Satan had once been God’s servant but was often at odds with him (e.g. Job 1.6–2.7; Zech. 3.1-2; 1 Chron. 21.1). Then in the intertestamental literature, under influence from Zoroastrianism, which also had an Adversary, who represented evil and darkness and waged war against the God of good and light, Jewish theology began to convert their Adversary into the same role. Stories were then developed of a time when Satan rebelled and was cast down from heaven by God, trapped in the lower realm, where he then set up dominion. Many of these stories stemmed from associating the Serpent with Satan and then interpreting the Genesis story of the Serpent’s fall (Gen. 3.1-19) as the story of Satan’s fall. For example, Wis. 2.24 says, ‘it was by the envy of the Devil that death came into the world’, a reference to the Genesis tale (in which it is by the wiles of the ‘Serpent’ that death comes into the world). Christians adopted this view (Heb. 2.14). This led to ‘reinterpreting’ Satan’s role in stories such as that of Job, which in cosmic history occurred after Satan’s fall.74

Many angels were cast down along with Satan, who then took sexual liberties with the first human women (the progeny of Adam and Eve), and one of the products of these unions were the demons (malevolent spirits), a notion arising from the interpretation of a curious story told in Gen. 6.1-8. These demons and fallen angels then brought abundant evil into the world, requiring God to drown everyone in the great flood. A version of this story is told in 1 Enoch and 2 Enoch, for example, and another in the book of Jubilees, and different versions appear in various other places (e.g. it is assumed in Philo’s treatise On the Giants that the angels mating with human women in the Genesis tale are demonic beings, and we likewise hear of the same in Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching 18). But the flood only destroyed all flesh, not the demons or fallen angels. Thus, the firmament still came to be dominated by countless demons, invisible malevolent spirits, who were ruled in turn by the fallen angels, who had set up their own thrones, dominions and principalities in the firmament in mockery of the heavenly thrones, dominions and principalities occupied by obedient angels appointed by God (as, e.g., those arrayed in the fourth heaven according to the Testament of Levi). And these ‘demonic’ angels were ruled in turn by Satan, the ‘prince [archōn] of demons’ (Mk 3.22; Mt. 12.24; and Lk. 11.15).75

As we hear in the books of Enoch:

One from the order of the archangels deviated, together with the division that was under his authority. He thought up the impossible idea that he might place his throne higher than the clouds which are above the earth, and that he might become equal to my power. And I hurled him out from the height, together with his angels. And he was flying around in the air, ceaselessly, above the abyss.

And so, likewise, the division of angels under his command who rebelled with him (2 Enoch 29.4-5).76

This demonological view of the universe was fundamental to Christianity’s understanding of why the world needed Christ’s sacrifice and how that event functions soteriologically. Everything that was wrong with the world was due to these demonic beings and their influence and power in the sublunar realm, separating man from God (particularly by infecting and corrupting the Jewish and pagan elite, among whom were the very priests charged with mediating between man and God).77 So these forces had to be magically defeated, and God had to be reconnected with men directly through a new backchannel that bypassed all demonic and angelic power and influence.

These were not novel ideas. The pagan world was awash with similar thinking. It was commonly thought that ‘the whole air [aēr] is full of [invisible] souls which are called demons [daimones] and [some of these are] heroes’, that is demigods, and these are the beings that send men dreams and revelations (i.e., intermediary beings: see Element 36).78 Thus, for example, Plutarch tells us that Isis and Osiris were originally ‘great demons’ [daimones], which he explains are neither gods nor men but something in between, being divine but also incarnate, which come in varying degrees of good and evil. As a result, ‘there are great and strong beings in the atmosphere’ [the periechōn, ‘the surrounding (air)’] that are evil and delight in blasphemies and other perversions of religion and are the cause of all manner of bad things that happen from the forces of nature, but there are also ‘holy demons, guardians of men’ which serve men and gods as intermediaries.79 And these beings, though usually immortal, are capable of suffering and dying (because of their dual nature).80 Accordingly, for their heroic service (enduring suffering and trials), Plutarch says, ‘Isis and Osiris were transformed through their virtue from “good demons” into “gods”, just as later Hercules and Dionysus were’, and now they have supreme power over all domains, above and below. But to renew and maintain his control over the universe, periodically Osiris descends into the firmament, where he acquires a body that is then killed (in a struggle with the demons there), and with the assistance of Isis he is resurrected and reascends to heaven in his immortal divine body (see again Elements 11 and 31).81

In the popular cosmology of the educated, which was more informed by the sciences of the time, the realm of the dead was also transferred from an ‘underworld’ (which made less sense now that it was known that the earth is a sphere) to the ‘firmament’. Plutarch, for example, explains that ‘Hades’ is actually the region between the earth and the moon, which is filled with all manner of souls and spirits, including the souls of the dead, which ascend as high as their virtue allows—sins being imagined as weighing souls down (as in Egyptian mythology, discussed in Element 11); while virtuous souls, accordingly, were so light that they float all the way to the top; some even live on the moon (like a cosmic Isle of the Blessed).82 The heavy souls, meanwhile, weighed down by their sins, become (in this scheme) evil demons.83 This is why the sublunar realm was peopled with demons. Evil beings could not even ascend as high as the moon, much less to realms above.84

Jewish demonology was structured similarly, but was more faithful to the original Zoroastrian picture of a cosmos at war between sons of light and sons of darkness, with a supreme evil deity (Satan) in charge of the latter. As we saw in chapter 3 (§1), the Ascension of Isaiah 7.9-10 says Isaiah was carried up by an angel and together they ‘ascended to the firmament’ where they saw Satan and his hosts ‘and a great struggle was taking place there, and the angels of Satan were envious of one another’. And likewise 10.29-31 says, ‘the firmament’ is ‘where the prince of this world dwells’ along with countless demons, which he calls ‘the angels of the air’, which all ‘struggle with one another in envy . . . plundering and doing violence to one another’.

Another version of this pre-Christian Jewish demonology is articulated by Philo:

Those beings, whom other philosophers call demons, Moses usually calls angels. And they are souls hovering in the air. And let no one suppose that what is here stated is a fable, for it is necessarily true that the universe must be filled with living things in all its parts, since every one of its primary and elementary portions contains its appropriate animals and such as are consistent with its nature—the earth containing terrestrial animals, the sea and the rivers containing aquatic animals, and the fire such as are born in the fire (but it is said, that such as these last are found chiefly in Macedonia), and then also the heaven containing the stars: for there are entire souls pervading the universe, being unadulterated and divine. . . . It is therefore necessary that the air also should be full of living beings. And these beings are invisible to us, inasmuch as the air itself is not visible to mortal sight. But it does not follow, because our sight is incapable of perceiving the forms of souls, that for that reason there are no souls in the air. But it follows of necessity that they must be perceived by the mind, in order that like may be seen by like. . . .

Some of these souls have descended into bodies, and others have not thought it worthwhile to approach any one of the portions of the earth, and these, when hallowed and surrounded by the ministrations of the Father, the Creator has been accustomed to employ as hand-maidens and servants in the administration of mortal affairs. But those having descended into the [lower world] as into a river, at one time are carried away and swallowed up by the voracity of a most violent whirlpool, and at another time, striving with all their power to resist its impetuosity, they at first swim on the top of it, and afterwards fly back to the place from which they started. . . .

If, therefore, you consider that souls, and demons, and angels are things differing not only in name, but also in reality, you will then be able to discard that most heavy burden, superstition. But as men in general speak of good and evil demons, and in like manner of good and evil souls, so also do they speak of angels, looking upon some as worthy of a good appellation, and calling them ambassadors of man to God, and of God to man, and sacred and holy on account of this blameless and most excellent office. But others, again, you will not err if you look upon as unholy and unworthy of any address.85

Thus we have a scheme of intermediary beings (per Element 36) and invisible creatures of varying kinds, in which some have become corrupted by their interaction with the world below, becoming unholy angels, or demons, or evil spirits.

It is in the context of all the above that Christianity in general, and passages in the NT in particular, must be understood. As Paul says:

The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons [daimonia], and not to God. And I would rather you not have communion with demons. You cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of demons. You cannot partake of the table of the Lord, and of the table of demons (1 Cor. 10.20-21).

For Paul, these demons were real beings meddling in the world and corrupting and misleading mankind. Those called ‘gods’ and ‘lords’ and worshiped as such by the pagans were all in fact evil demons (1 Cor. 8.5). This notion was pervasive in early Christianity. For example, ‘some shall fall away from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits [pneumata] and the teachings of demons [daimonia]’ (1 Tim. 4.1), and those who ‘believe God is One do well; for the demons [daimonia] also believe, and shudder’ (Jas 2.19). Thus we are told we must shun the ‘wisdom that is not a wisdom that comes down from above, but is earthly, sensual, demonic’ (Jas 3.15), where the term for ‘demonic’, daimoniōdēs (‘of demons’) is chosen precisely because it is assumed that demons reside in the realm of the earthly, and not in the realm ‘above’ it from where true wisdom descends.

In Rom. 8.38, we also hear that Christians are opposed by and must overcome ‘angels’ [aggeloi] and ‘principalities’ [archai] and ‘powers’ [duna­meis], which does not mean temporal human powers (those threats he already enumerated in v. 35), not only because ‘angels’ clearly are no such thing, but also because human powers are not typically described in these terms. There was no such office in the Roman Empire as a ‘principality’ (archē), and the term was at that time rarely used in that way; and ‘powers’ for Paul typically meant supernatural powers, powers over the universe, not political power (e.g. 1 Cor. 12.28-29; 2 Cor. 2.12; Gal. 3.5). We also know these terms were widely used in Jewish apocrypha to refer to the demonic powers holding the sublunar world in thrall.86 These terms were also used for God’s authorities as well (e.g. Col. 1.16; Eph. 1.20-21). Thus, ‘principalities’ meant angels assigned certain domains by God, or fallen angels assigned certain domains by Satan (or having seized those domains, by one device or another; for the world of the fallen was not as orderly and obedient). Many other angels were then subordinate to those princes. ‘Powers’ then meant spirits with control over the forces of the universe, which could again mean holy spirits (or simply the Holy Spirit), which were the ‘powers’ by which Christians effected miracles (most commonly, power over demons, to expel them from their abodes), or unclean spirits, demons, who similarly could effect miracles, also having seized power over aspects of the sublunar world (or been assigned such power by fallen angelic princes).

As Plutarch explains (see Element 14), in the common demonological worldview, the ‘elements’ and powers of the universe were not identical to the demons (the ‘divinities’) named after them, but the demons were the cosmic beings in control of those elements and powers—unlike what the ‘scientists’ say, which (Plutarch explains) is that these personifications are mere allegorical fictions, and all that really exist are the mindless elements and forces of nature (a view too atheistic for Plutarch). Anyone who accepted a demonological theory (as Plutarch did) was by definition rejecting that scientific worldview. The Christians were most definitely demonologists. Thus, when Paul says Jesus must destroy ‘every principality’ [archē] and ‘every authority’ [exousia] and ‘power’ [dunamis], the most important of which is Death itself [Thanatos], he does not mean human government officials but the demonic powers that were in a state of rebellion against God, and thus were Christ’s ‘enemies’ (1 Cor. 15.24-28).87 This for the same reason as in Romans, but all the more so as Paul elsewhere says all human authorities are God’s ministers, and thus not his enemies (Rom. 13.1-7), so he clearly cannot mean human authorities here (see Chapter 11, §8).

The only term used to describe these ‘enemies’ that Paul ever uses to refer to human authorities is the generic ‘authority’ [exousia]. Otherwise when he speaks of human leaders he uses archōn, ‘principal’, as in ‘first in rank’, not archē, ‘principality’, and he never speaks of them as ‘powers’. In Rom. 13.1-7, for example, Paul is certainly speaking of human authorities, which he says Christians should always obey. The terms he uses here are exousiai hyperechousai, ‘those holding higher authority’, and archontes, ‘principals’ (or ‘princes’), and he says none would have authority [exousia] if God had not put them there—in fact, he says, they should be regarded as the ministers of God, and so opposing ‘the authorities’ is tantamount to opposing God. But we know the same terms could also be used to refer to the demonic kingdom. It simply depended on context. Likewise, since angels could be assigned ‘authority’, just as human officials could (e.g. 1 Pet. 3.22), again which kind of ‘authority’ you meant depended on context.

The same follows for archōn, ‘principal, prince, headman’. This is evident in Eph. 2.2, which was forged in Paul’s name but clearly by someone of his sect, and relatively early in the development of the church. There we have the statement that before baptism each Christian ‘once walked according to the fashion [aiōn] of this world [kosmos houtos], according to the prince [archōn] of the domain [exousia] of the air [aēr], the spirit [pneuma] who is now working in the sons of disobedience’. Here, just as ‘authority’ is clearly being used of a supernatural dominion and not a human office, so also the word archōn is used to refer to a celestial being, Satan. Thus it, too, could be used of nonhuman authorities without need of explanation. And here we also have a clear expression of common Judeo-Christian demonology: Satan rules over the firmament, the entire ‘domain of the air’, which was considered ‘this world’ (as opposed to the other, heavenly world above).

We should understand the same when Paul speaks of ‘this world’ as that which ‘we ought not conform ourselves to’ (Rom. 12.2), which is soon to ‘pass away’ (1 Cor. 7.31), and from which comes a ‘wisdom’ that is ‘folly to God’ (1 Cor. 3.19), and in which sinners live (1 Cor. 5.9-11). We can be certain of this, because Paul himself said that this part of the universe was under the dominion of Satan, whom he calls ‘the god of this world’, who, Paul says, is actively blinding mankind so they can’t see the divine light radiating from Jesus (2 Cor. 4.4).88 Paul frequently references Satan as their principal enemy, who presently ruled all flesh but whom God would one day destroy.89 Satan likewise has his own angels, which he sends down to torment us (2 Cor. 12.7).

This was always how Christians understood Paul. As Origen explains, when Paul uses these terms in such contexts, he means demonic powers. For there are ‘spirits of wickedness, or malignant spirits, or unclean demons’ who have made themselves into ‘principalities’ and ‘powers’ and ‘rulers of the darkness of the world’.90 The Acts of John (v. 98) likewise says that among ‘the devils and Satan’ and their violent deeds plaguing us there are ‘powers [dunameis], authorities [exousiai], principalities [archai]’, and ‘demons’ [daimones] (presumably without special powers or dominion), as well as ‘feats [energeiai], boasts [apeilai], and spirits [thumoi]’, which terms probably all refer to different kinds of spirits (miracle-working spirits, boastful or threatening spirits—and angry spirits, the thumos being typically regarded as the seat of anger). And in the Christian expansion of the Ascension of Isaiah we hear again of ‘the prince of this world, and of his angels, authorities and powers’ (1.4) and that ‘Beliar, the angel of lawlessness, is the ruler of this world’ (2.4), and ‘Beliar the great ruler, the king of this world, will descend, having ruled the world since it came into being; indeed, he will descend from his firmament in the likeness of a man’ to kill and persecute (4.2), along with other ‘princes and powers of that world’ (10.15).91

Accordingly, we read in Eph. 6.11-12 that we need the ‘armor of God’ to resist the ‘wiles of the Devil’, because ‘we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities [archai], against authorities [exousiai], against the rulers [kosmokratores] of the darkness of this [world], against spiritual wickedness in the heavenly places [epourania]’. Likewise, Eph. 3.10 says the success of the church will demonstrate the wisdom of God ‘to the principalities [archai] and powers [dunameis] in the heavenly places’. Here, in both passages, these terms are certainly referring to demonic princes and authorities, not human ones. Another forgery in the name of Paul, but again from the same sect and period, says Christ has ‘cast off the principalities [archai] and authorities [exousiai] and made a public example of them, freely triumphing over them’ (Col. 2.15), again using this terminology for demonic agents.92

In Gal. 4.3-9, we also hear of ‘elements of the cosmos’ [stoicheia tou kosmou] enslaving people (before baptism freed them), and these ‘cosmic elements’ we’re told are ‘in their nature not gods’, because they are ‘poor and weak’, yet some people want to turn back and be their slaves again even after knowing the true god. It is generally agreed that Paul does not mean here mindless elements but elemental spirits, those who, as Plutarch explained, control and rule over the elements and whom philosophers mistakenly think are mere allegories for the elements, but as Plutarch insists, are actually the demons in control of those elements.93 This is fairly clear from Paul’s language, since one does not become a ‘slave’ of mindless natural elements or consider them ‘gods’, nor does one say they are ‘not gods by nature’ merely because they are poor and weak—rather than, say, because they are in fact mindless forces.

So likewise we can understand Col. 2.8-10, where we are warned not to be deceived or live according to the ‘elements of the cosmos’ [stoicheia tou kosmou] but to live instead ‘according to Christ’. Again, the elemental spirits are here understood to be the beings opposed to Christ, who deceive us (and thereby deceived men into promoting ‘philosophies’ and ‘traditions’ that are not according to Christ), because Christ alone ‘is the head of all principality [archē] and authority [exousia]’. Deception, after all, is the particular activity of Satan and his hosts (e.g. 2 Cor. 11.3, 14; Gal. 1.8-9), who tempt us thereby to sin (e.g. 1 Cor. 7.5; 2 Cor. 2.11). That Colossians associates subservience to the ‘elements of the cosmos’ (2.8, 20) with the ‘worship of angels’ and the receiving of visions (2.18) verifies the point.94

Learning all of this was once a component of the secret teaching given to Christians of varying ranks (Element 13).95 It’s unlikely that Paul came to be completely reinterpreted by all later Christians. We have seen enough evidence that Paul does in fact mean supernatural powers and princes when he speaks thereof, inhabiting and traversing the firmament, and all later Christian interpreters understood him to mean that. It was clearly a fundamental component of Christian teaching in all documents post-dating Paul. And from the preponderance of evidence here, we should conclude it was certainly a fundamental component of Christian teaching in Paul—and therefore in the original Christian church as a whole, as he clearly felt it required no defense or explanation in his correspondence.

Element 38: (a) In this same popular cosmology, the heavens, including the firmament, were not empty expanses but filled with all manner of things, including palaces and gardens, and it was possible to be buried there. (b) In this worldview everything on earth was thought to be a mere imperfect copy of their truer forms in heaven, which were not abstract Platonic forms but actual physical objects in outer space.

This cosmological view is explicit in Hebrews:

According to the law almost everything is cleansed by blood, and apart from the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness. So it was necessary that the copies of the things in the heavens should be cleansed with these [i.e., with Jewish blood rites]; but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ entered not into a holy place made with hands built to look like the true one, but into heaven itself, now to appear before the face of God on our behalf (9.22-24).

Here we have multiple heavens (plural) in which reside the true versions of everything (including the temple itself), and of which the things on earth are only imperfect copies. The celestial temple is ‘not made with hands’ because it was made by God, just like our celestial bodies will be (2 Cor. 5.1). We see this already in the Dead Sea Scrolls, where the ‘Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice’ (4Q400-407 and 11Q17) describe seven ascending levels of heaven, several of which have more perfect ‘copies’ of the temple and the holy of holies (the inner chamber of the temple), and in yet higher ones ‘angels offer pure and perfect sacrifices’. There are even versions of earthly things in the firmament, as we learn in the Ascension of Isaiah 7.10, which says, ‘as it is above, so is it also on the earth, for the likeness of that which is in the firmament is also on the earth’. Although those things would not be the perfect models, which resided only in the perfect heavens above, but half-corrupt imitations, in between the models above and their earthly copies below.96

Thus, Heb. 12.21-22 says that when Moses ascended the mountain to receive the commandments he beheld the true ‘Mount Zion and the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem’ inhabited by ‘innumerable angels in festal gathering’ and ‘the assembly of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven’ and ‘the spirits of just men made perfect’ (the teleioi, the same term used for higher ranking Christians: Element 10) and, of course, God. And God told Moses to make everything in the earthly temple according to the pattern of the true version he saw in heaven (Exod. 25.40). Thus Heb. 8.5 says the earthly priests ‘serve a copy and a shadow of the heavenly sanctuary, for when Moses was about to erect the tabernacle, he was instructed by God, saying, “See that you make everything according to the example that was shown to you on the mountain”’. It is therefore in this context that we must understand sayings such as ‘whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven’ (Mt. 16.19; again in 18.18). This is a reference to everything having its (superior) double in heaven.

We know Paul shared this view. In 2 Cor. 12.2-4, he says a man (possibly Paul himself) ‘was taken as far up as the third heaven’, where ‘Paradise’ (paradeisos) was located. The notion that Paradise (meaning the Garden of Eden) was located in the third heaven is also explained in the apocryphal Revelation of Moses, and likewise assumed in 2 Enoch, and is a part of the same cosmological tradition.97 As Irenaeus says, Paradise was ‘a place better than this world, excelling in air, beauty, light, food, plants, fruit, water, and all other necessaries of life’.98 In other words, the perfect versions of all these things, of which their counterparts in the earthly realm were but poor imitations. The OT describes only one singular ‘Paradise’ (the same word used by Paul, according to the Septuagint text of Gen. 2.8–3.24) and that was ‘in Eden’, and in that Paradise God specially made its own trees and plants and a river and angelic beings, all in its own soil, and also versions of every animal. Many later texts of the Bible use the same word to refer generically to gardens, but these would be examples of imperfect attempts to copy the original Garden.

This worldview is also described by Philo, who explains that the air extends from the earth to the moon, and the earth, air, and water all move, mix, and change below the moon, while above all that are the unchanging heavens (see again Element 35), where reside the true models and forms of all things, including the true animals, of which all things below the moon are just imperfect copies. He further explains that the elements below the moon are the perceptible ones, the rest are invisible to the senses, but are seen with the eye of the mind.99 And these perfect versions in heaven are themselves copies of the even-more-perfect ideas of them in the mind of God. Because God made perfect invisible copies of everything in heaven first (including a perfect invisible earth, and a perfect invisible star of which all other stars are copies, and so on), which were themselves copies of their even-truer forms in the mind of God; then God made the material (and thus inferior) copies of all these things, the versions that we know and see.100

For example, Philo says, ‘from the model of the cosmos, perceptible only by the intellect, the Creator made an incorporeal heaven, and an invisible earth, and the form of air and of empty space’, and the latter ‘he called the abyss, for empty space is very deep and yawning with immense width’, and ‘then he created the incorporeal substance of water and of air’ and then from ‘a model of the sun, perceptible only to the intellect’ God then made ‘a star above the heavens, the source of those stars which are perceptible by the external senses’, a ‘universal light’, of which our sun is but a copy.101

The true copies that were first created can only be seen by the mind, in fact only a pure and reverent mind. Philo goes on to explain that the true heaven is incorporeal, but the visible heaven is corporeal and called the firmament. Thus the firmament itself is a copy of the heavens above it. A mind that is separated from the body can rise on wings into the ‘air’ (the region subject to chaos and change) and then to the ‘higher’ firmament, and then to the heavenly bodies (moon, sun and stars), then to the true incorporeal heavens above, where the true versions of all things can be seen; and of these heavens there are many levels, at the top of which is the Great King.102 There were even two Adams, the perfect celestial Adam, and the copy of him, the Adam made of earth who fathered mankind (see Element 39). So ‘the incorporeal world was already completed, having its seat in the divine Logos’ (see Element 40), ‘and the world perceptible by the external senses was made on the model of it’; and the first part of that ‘was the heaven that is more correctly called “the firmament”, because it is corporeal’.103 The idea of all this goes at least as far back as Plato,104 but by Philo’s time it had become more sophisticated, with at least three levels of creation: the perfect ideas in God’s mind, then perfect quasi-physical celestial forms of those ideas, then earthly copies thereof.

This meant there were things in heaven. The Testament of Abraham, for example, says Abraham was shown structures in heaven, including gates and roads and thrones and halls and tables and linens and books with ink and quill and so on, as well as an (apparently) resurrected Adam and Abel observing and judging the souls of the dead. And in fact the Revelation of Moses says Adam was buried in Paradise, literally up in outer space, in the third heaven, complete with celestial linen and oils.105 Thus human corpses could be buried in the heavens. Because there was obviously soil up in Paradise—in fact, not only is all manner of celestial vegetation planted in it, but when Adam is buried in it, he is buried in the same place from which God took the clay of which Adam was made. In many other Jewish apocrypha there are accounts of all manner of solid structures in all other levels of heaven, too, so tombs and graves obviously can exist there as well. Thus, according to the Revelation of Moses, Adam is cast down from Paradise, residing on earth below for the remainder of his life; but in death his body is carried back up to the heavens for burial. Abel is likewise buried there, and later so is Eve, and many others among the righteous dead.106 This also means the original Tree of Life is in outer space (being in the very Paradise which is located in the third heaven), just as the true Temple and Altar of God are in outer space.

Element 39: (a) In this cosmology there were also two Adams: one perfect celestial version, of which the earthly version (who fathered the human race) is just a copy. And (b) the first Christians appear to have connected their Jesus Christ to that original celestial Adam.

In Philo’s scheme, the first Adam was an invisible perfect man, having no gender and being immortal and imperishable, and this is what explains there being two creation accounts in Genesis (Gen. 1-2.3 vs. Gen. 2.4-25): the first related to the creation of the true man, and the second related to the creation of his mortal copy.107 Although Philo thinks a lot of the creation account is allegorical (for him there was no Paradise and no Serpent, for example),108 it is clear other Jewish theologians disagreed with him (as we’ve seen ample evidence of: see Elements 37 and 28). And as we saw, even Philo clearly imagines a real cosmos with a real heavens with perfect versions of things, of which the things below are imperfect copies—and the things in the heavens can be seen only by higher, spiritual senses (the pure intellect), unlike ordinary ‘material’ things that are seen by our ‘external’ (material) senses.

In response to the question of why God put the ‘material’ Adam in Paradise but didn’t do the same for the perfect heavenly Adam, Philo answers that ‘some persons have said, when they imagined that Paradise was a garden, that because the man who was created was endowed with senses, therefore he naturally and properly proceeded into a sensible place’, whereas ‘the other man, who is made after God’s own image, being appreciable only by the intellect, and invisible, had all the incorporeal species for his share’; but Philo thinks rather that all this Paradise stuff is allegorical and not literally meant.109 However, it’s clear that Philo was dissenting from a view other Jews held, and the view of those others was that there were two Paradises, the material one and the heavenly one, or possibly more than two, many levels or ‘emanations’, from the perfect Paradise on high, to the more material Paradise in the third heaven, to the many gardens on earth, which are all copies of those.

Of the two Adams, Philo also says, ‘there are two kinds of men, the one made according to the image of God, the other fashioned out of the earth’, because ‘the image of God is the mold for all other things, and every imitation aims at this, of which it is an imitation’.110 And, therefore, ‘the races of men are twofold: for one is the heavenly man, and the other the earthly man’ and ‘the heavenly man, as being born in the image of God, has no participation in any corruptible or earthlike essence’, whereas ‘the earthly man is made of loose material . . . a lump of clay’.111

This doctrine obviously predates Philo, and Philo has simply made his own modifications to it, because the same tradition was also shared by Paul and thus evidently influenced the earliest Christian theology.112 Philo’s language of ‘the heavenly man’ and ‘the earthly man’, ‘the first man’ and ‘the second man’, and the idea of there being two Adams, is paralleled in (but adapted differently by) Paul.113 We see this, for example, in 1 Cor. 15.45-49 (to be read with 15.21-24). Philo says the heavenly man is imperishable and immortal and the earthly man is ‘by nature’ mortal and perishable, exactly in agreement with Paul. Both also call the earthly Adam the ‘first man’. Paul then calls Jesus the ‘last Adam’, but describes him in terms identical to ­Philo’s ‘second’ man (who in order of creation was really the first).114 Notably, Philo’s ‘celestial’ Adam can be seen only by the eye of the intellect, just as Origen says the body of the resurrected Jesus was invisible to the external senses and could be seen only with spiritual vision.115 Origen also says that this invisible resurrection body was the original ‘mold’ for the body of flesh that Jesus had previously worn, and thus his fleshly body was only an earthly copy of his true, original (and final) body. Paul describes similar notions in 2 Corinthians 5, where it appears our true bodies (of which our present bodies are copies) already await us in heaven.

We have already seen that Paul’s Jesus was a preexistent celestial being (Element 10). And here we see that this idea of a preexistent heavenly man predates even Christianity. So when Paul describes Jesus as the ‘man of heaven’, he likely has in mind the same cosmic being. As Philo explains, the perfect celestial man created in Gen. 1.27 is the actual ‘image’ of God (and the earthly Adam is just a copy of that image), and this sounds exactly like Jesus, who was also the ‘image’ of God (of whom the Christians themselves are copies: Rom. 8.29; 1 Cor. 15.49; 2 Cor. 3.18; thus qualifying 1 Cor. 11.7). Paul flat out says Christ ‘is the image of God’ (2 Cor. 4.4); and another Pauline author says Christ ‘is the image of the invisible God’ and ‘the firstborn of all creation’ (Col. 1.15), which explicitly connects Paul’s Christ with Philo’s primordial Adam, the celestial one, who was in fact the firstborn of all creation. We must conclude Paul agreed, since he clearly understood Jesus to be the first created being: as it is through Jesus that God created everything else (1 Cor. 8.6), and Paul explicitly calls Jesus God’s firstborn (in Rom. 8.29).

So even if Paul is identifying this preexistent being with a historical person, he is clearly adding onto that person the identity of a celestial being already conceived by Jews before Christianity began. One might even suggest that the simpler explanation is that Paul is talking about the same celestial man, and adding onto that other ontological identities (like ‘messiah’), rather than starting with a historical man and equating him with a preexistent heavenly being. But we cannot conclude on this evidence alone as to which hypothesis is the more likely. What distinguishes Christianity’s talk of the ‘two Adams’ from Philo’s talk of the ‘two Adams’, apart from Philo’s own Platonizing tendencies, is that Christianity claimed a special fate for the celestial Adam (he descended from the heavens to die and rise from the dead), and placed it as a historical event—presumably a recent historical event, portending that the ‘end was nigh’ (since Christ’s resurrection was imagined by Paul to be the ‘firstfruits’ of the general eschatological resurrection: 1 Cor. 15.20). But apart from that, the Christians appear to have been working from the same core Jewish doctrine that there was a perfect celestial Adam, firstborn of all creation, and (somehow) that man turned out to be Jesus.

Element 40: In fact, the Christian idea of a preexistent spiritual son of God called the Logos, who was God’s true high priest in heaven, was also not a novel idea but already held by some pre-Christian Jews; and this preexistent spiritual son of God had already been explicitly connected with a celestial Jesus figure in the OT (discussed in Element 6), and therefore some Jews already believed there was a supernatural son of God named Jesus—because Paul’s contemporary Philo interprets the messianic prophecy of Zech. 6.12 in just such a way.116 This is the prophecy about a high priest crowned king in heaven named ‘Jesus Rising’, God’s ‘servant’, who will ‘rise’ from below and be given godly authority and somehow be involved in cleansing the world of sin.

As discussed in Element 6, in Zechariah 6 we have a man named Jesus being crowned king, ‘rising’ from his place below, and building up God’s house, which is a feasible description of our Jesus; and this same Jesus appearing in Zechariah 6 also appears in Zechariah 3, where he is given supreme authority over God’s domain (just as our Jesus was), and somehow ends all sins in a single day (just as our Jesus does), and this same Jesus is in both passages called a high priest (as was our Jesus). Discussing this Jesus figure in Zechariah, Philo argues:

‘Behold, the man named Rising!’ is a very novel appellation indeed, if you consider it as spoken of a man who is compounded of body and soul. But if you look upon it as applied to that incorporeal being who is none other than the divine image, you will then agree that the name of ‘Rising’ has been given to him with great felicity. For the Father of the Universe has caused him to rise up as the eldest son, whom, in another passage, he calls the firstborn. And he who is thus born, imitates the ways of his father.117

In the same book, Philo says that even if no one is ‘worthy to be called a Son of God’, we should still ‘labor earnestly to be adorned according to his firstborn Logos, the eldest of his angels, the ruling archangel of many names’.118 Elsewhere Philo adds that ‘there are two Temples of God, and one is this cosmos, wherein the High Priest is his Firstborn Son, the divine Logos’ (whom Philo elsewhere identifies as the primordial ‘image of God’).119 And Philo also says this ‘divine Logos’ is the being whom God used ‘as an instrument’ to create the universe, and the one whom God appointed the Lord over all creation.120 We know Jesus was also called the firstborn of God, the Logos, and God’s high priest in the heavens, and the one through whom all things were made, and who was appointed Lord of the universe, and was the true image of God; and Christians were also called upon to try and emulate him and adorn themselves like him, just as Philo is calling us to do.121 This is far too improbable to be a coincidence. Philo and Christianity must have this notion from a common tradition preceding both.122

Of course, our Jesus is only explicitly called ‘the Logos’ in Jn 1.1, a very late document (see Chapter 7, §4). But he is recognized by Paul as the ‘firstborn’ son of God (Rom. 8.29), and the ‘image of God’ (2 Cor. 4.4), through whom God created all things (1 Cor. 8.6), and therefore a preexistent being (evident also in Phil. 2.6-8 and 1 Cor. 10.1-4).123 It’s likely Paul just never had occasion to use the title of ‘Logos’ to describe Jesus (just as Philo doesn’t trouble himself to mention it every time he speaks of the same being). Because otherwise these certainly appear to be the same man. Just because this one connection is first explicitly stated in the Gospel of John does not mean its authors introduced it. Likewise, in Hebrews Jesus is not only the firstborn son of God, but also God’s high priest in the heavens and again the image of God, the supreme of all angels, a preexistent being through whom God created all things (Hebrews 1 and 8), all just like Philo’s celestial Jesus.124 And Col. 1.12-20 says its Jesus is the firstborn of all creation, the image of God, through whom God created all things, too. So it cannot be a coincidence that Philo says his ‘Logos’, ‘the firstborn son of God’, God’s incorporeal high priest in outer space, is also none other than ‘the image of God’, and God’s agent of creation, again connecting this ‘Logos’ creature to Paul’s Christ, who is also the ‘image’ of God and God’s ‘firstborn son’ and also a preexistent being of the highest rank—since Paul says it is Christ, and no other being, through whom God created all things.

This also suggests Philo is saying this firstborn Logos is in fact the true Adam (as discussed in Element 39), which is corroborated by Philo’s explanation elsewhere that the earthly Adam was made in the image of the second Adam in heaven, the divine Logos, who was in turn the image of God; and we know (from the previous element) that this celestial man who was the image of God and of whom the earthly man is a copy is indeed that first-­created Adam.125 Likewise, Philo calls this high priest and divine Logos ‘the man for real’ of whom the earthly priests are but a copy, again connecting this divine being with the ‘true Adam’ in outer space.126 This also explains why this firstborn celestial son is called the Logos (meaning ‘Reason’). In every passage where Philo explains that the first-created Adam is the ‘image’ of God, he further explains that this is because the image of God is not the human body but the intellect—hence ‘reason’ is the image of God. Therefore it would be obvious that any incorporeal being created as the true ‘image’ of God would be called (indeed would be) Reason, and therefore the Logos. We cannot therefore see this as a late development in Christology, but as in fact already a pre-Christian feature of Jewish theology. If it was known to Philo, it had to have been known to Paul.

Jesus therefore must have been known as the Logos even in Paul’s time. It’s clear in Paul that the first Christians regarded Jesus to be the preexistent ‘image of God’ through whom God created all things (2 Cor. 4.4; 1 Cor. 8.6); and that can only ever have been understood to be the Logos, not only as the Reason which was and necessarily had to be the ‘image’ of God (unlike the human body, which obviously could not), but also as the Word (the second meaning of Logos) by which God created all things (Gen. 1.3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, 24, 26). Even on these considerations the probability that Paul would understand Jesus in any other way is vanishingly small. But the fact that Paul also understood Jesus to be the firstborn son of God as well as the preexistent image of God only further lines this creature up with Philo’s Logos, who is similarly identified. It is even further in support of this conclusion that pagan theology had a similar concept—the savior god Osiris was also called the Logos and the one through whom all was created and governed—thus demonstrating the notion was ubiquitous (and might even have been a common element of mystery religion).127

I have heard doubts whether Philo (or his source) was aware of the whole sentence he quotes from Zechariah and thus of the name ‘Jesus’ being in it. But such doubts are unwarranted. Nearly the whole sentence in Zechariah, in the Greek translation quoted by Philo, reads:

You shall make crowns, and set them upon the head of Jesus the son of Jehovah the Righteous, the high priest, and say to him, ‘Thus says the almighty Lord, “Behold, the man whose name is Rising [anatolē]” and he shall rise up [anatelei] from his place below and shall build the house of the Lord, and receive power, and sit and rule upon his throne’ (Zech. 6.11-13).

The whole sentence (of which Philo quotes only the part here in bold thus identifies the man spoken of as both God’s son and high priest, and in the very same sentence names him Jesus. This creates a series of coincidences far too improbable to imagine on any other conclusion than that Philo and Paul were talking about the same figure: Jesus the Son of Jehovah the Righteous, the image of God, God’s agent of creation, God’s high priest and firstborn son (see Elements 6 and 10).

Paul identifies his Jesus with all the same attributes (except the detail of his being high priest, which we find in Hebrews), which is a very unlikely coincidence: two cosmic men named Jesus assigned all the same unusual attributes; and two of those attributes (sonship and high priesthood) are stated in the same sentence in Zechariah that Philo quotes from, a quote about a man Philo himself then links to Philo’s own notion of God’s firstborn son and high priest, another improbable coincidence—unless Philo (or his source) was well aware of the rest of the sentence and taking it into account in his interpretation. Philo even makes use of the same pun (between the noun and verb forms of anatolē) in his (or his source’s) interpretation that the sentence in Zechariah plays on. Indeed, it ought to be absurd to suggest that Philo, a very erudite biblical scholar, had never read Zechariah and thus didn’t know the remaining content of this passage, or where the line even came from. Thus we can safely conclude Philo (or his source) was aware of the fact that this cosmic firstborn son was named Jesus. Because denying that (no matter by what excuse) requires asserting a series of improbable coincidences, whereas affirming it does not.

There is another significance to all this. Philo says of the earthly high priest that he wears ‘an emblem of that Logos which holds together and regulates the universe, for it is necessary that [the earthly high priest] who is consecrated to the Father of the Universe should have as his paraclete His son, the most perfect in virtue, to procure forgiveness of sins’.128 Notably the Gospel of John, which explicitly calls Christ the Logos, also calls the Holy Spirit the ‘paraclete’ whom Christ will send (Jn 14.6, 26; 15.26; 16.7). The word paraklētos most commonly meant a ‘legal advocate’, and so in the epistle 1 John we’re told that ‘if any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous’ (1 Jn 2.1), this time calling Christ himself a paraclete, and also connecting him to the ‘Father’ of the Universe and with supreme virtue and with his role in ‘procuring’ forgiveness of sins (Paul also calls Jesus our ‘advocate’ in Rom. 8.34, but using a different word).

From Philo we can see that there is nothing novel about any of this. ­Philo’s remarks prove that some Jews already believed that God had a firstborn son in heaven, a preexistent being through whom God created the universe, the very image of God, the supreme of all beings next to God, whose name could already be identified as Jesus (per Philo’s explanation of Zechariah 6), and who advocates on our behalf to procure forgiveness of sins, and that all earthly priests were but a copy of him. Not only is this clearly the same deity as Jesus in Christian documents such as the canonical book of Hebrews (see Chapter 11, §5),129 but it is clearly the same deity worshiped by Paul and all Christians he had any communication with. It is therefore, so far as we can tell, the same deity Christianity began with. Any theory of the origins of Christianity must take this into account.

Element 41: (a) The ‘Son of Man’ (an apocalyptic title Jesus is given in the Gospels) was another being foreseen in the visions of Enoch to be a preexistent celestial superman whom God will one day put in charge of the universe, overthrowing all demonic power, and in a text that we know the first Christians used as scripture (1 Enoch).130 (b) According to that scripture, this ‘Son of Man’ will in the appointed day reveal divine secrets to mankind, when also his name will be revealed; and it is implied that he may be the Christ (Jesus likewise was regarded as holding the divine secrets and revealing them).131 (c) But his identity has been kept secret so evildoers will not know him when the time comes (just like Jesus).132 (d) Yet he already sounds in many respects like the same being as the primordial Adam (Element 39) and Logos (Element 40). The fact that at Qumran he was already fully equated with Melchizedek (see following element) only confirms all these figures were at times thought to be the same.133

Element 42: There is a parallel tradition of a perfect and eternal celestial high priest named Melchizedek, which means in Hebrew ‘Righteous King’. We have already seen that a celestial Jesus was already called Righteous and King by some pre-Christian Jews. And a connection between the Christ and the Melchizedek figure was probably made before Christianity, as the very Dead Sea scroll that appears to link the dying Christ of Daniel 9 to the dying servant of Isaiah 52–53 is specifically a pesher on this Melchizedek figure, and by the most obvious interpretation it states that its dying Christ (the Anointed in the Spirit) is Melchizedek. (See Elements 40 and 41, with Elements 5 and 6.)

Unfortunately this scroll is so badly damaged we can’t be certain if the Christ spoken of there (the one who was probably imagined as dying to atone for the sins of the elect: see Element 5) is meant only to be someone who prepares the way for Melchizedek or is said to be Melchizedek, who would then come and judge all creation.134 Scholars are divided on that. I’m fairly certain that they are the same figure, but making the case for that involves too lengthy an argument for too uncertain a conclusion for my present purposes. Either way, in 11Q13 Melchizedek is certainly a savior figure, a divine being of some kind, who lives in outer space, presumably visits earth in some capacity, and defeats Satan and his angels. He is also somehow involved in ‘liberating the captives’ and forgiving the sins of the elect through some special (and final) Day of Atonement.

What else do we hear about this mysterious Melchizedek figure? Philo tells us ‘God made Melchizedek, the King of Peace’, into ‘his own high priest’, referring to Gen. 14.18, where the mysterious Melchizedek, ‘king of Salem’ (which means ‘King of Peace’), is also a ‘priest of the Most High God’, and appears and brings to Abram ‘bread and wine’ and blesses him.135 We never hear about this Melchizedek otherwise, neither before this nor after (apart from one mysterious reference implying he was an eternal priest in Ps. 110.4), which inspired esoteric speculation in the Jewish apocrypha about who he might be, and how there could have been a priest of Jehovah before there were even Jews (Abram does not get circumcised nor christened ‘Abraham’ nor even begin to father the Jewish people until Genesis 17). The general theme of most speculations and traditions was that Melchizedek must have been a supernatural being who, as the ultimate high priest (serving in heaven for all eternity), was in some fashion the ultimate agent of atonement.136 For example, in 2 Enoch, Melchizedek is ‘miraculously born before the flood and would come again at the end of time’, and the Melchizedek pesher says that when he does come he will cancel all sins in a single day, and possibly do so by his death (or through the death of some other Christ).137

Of course, in Jewish understanding, all kings (e.g. 1 Sam. 15.17) and all high priests were Christs (Lev. 4.5, 16; 6.22), thus, being both, Melchizedek would be understood as a Christ, and thus passages about ‘the’ Christ could easily be connected to him in the pesherim, particularly once he evolved into a salvific, apocalyptic figure, as he clearly had become by the time of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Once you see him as having the attributes of the Christ, the fact that he was already a Christ would automatically warrant linking him to messianic passages in the scriptures, and this is exactly what the scribes at Qumran appear to be doing. And the Christians seem to have done so as well. Crispin Fletcher-Louis, for example, argues that there is evidence in the Gospel of Mark indicating that ‘Jesus’ thought he was the high priest Melchizedek.138 Yet we could just as easily use all his same evidence to argue that Mark is depicting Jesus as such, in his characteristically veiled way.

However, unlike 11Q13, the book of Hebrews argues that Jesus is Melchizedek’s replacement. In this account we’re told Melchizedek ‘is first, by translation of his name, King of Righteousness, and then he is also King of Salem, that is, King of Peace’, just as Philo said, but more importantly, ‘he is without father or mother or genealogy, and has neither beginning of days nor end of life, but being like the Son of God, he continues a priest forever’.139 The author then goes on to explain that Melchizedek was the eternal high priest of the old covenant, and Jesus is the eternal high priest of the new covenant. Thus we’re told that ‘when another priest arises in the likeness of Melchizedek, one who has become a priest not according to a legal requirement concerning bodily descent but by the power of an indestructible life’ (7.15-16) then ‘a former commandment is set aside because of its weakness and uselessness (for the law made nothing perfect)’ and ‘a better hope is introduced’ in its place, which, unlike other priestly appointments, came about by a divine oath, as (we’re reminded) scripture has said, ‘The Lord has sworn and will not change his mind, “Thou art a priest forever”’ (Heb. 7.18-22; 5.6), quoting Ps. 110.4 (‘The Lord has sworn and will not change his mind, “Thou art a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek”’).

We have already seen that an eternal high priest in the heavens was also known as the Logos, named Jesus, the firstborn son of God, and God’s agent of creation (see Element 40). And our Jesus seems to do all the things that Melchizedek does in 11Q13. So they seem to be the same creature. That contradicts the notion of Jesus replacing him. There cannot be two high priests in the celestial temple, so if Melchizedek ‘continues a priest forever’ and never dies, how can he have been replaced? Where did he go? Perhaps there were esoteric answers to those questions at one point. We might note that Melchizedek is not called the high priest forever, just a priest forever. Perhaps, then, his replacement was only a demotion, becoming Jesus’ subordinate in the celestial temple hierarchy.

The most we can make out is that Hebrews says we needed a new eternal high priest in the heavens, even though we had one already, because a switch at the helm was needed in order to inaugurate a new covenant. So to accomplish that, all the roles and properties assigned to Melchizedek were transferred to Jesus, one way or another. However, existing tradition already declared Jesus, the eternal firstborn son of God, high priest. So the sect that became Christianity must have adopted a doctrine whereby that appointment hadn’t happened yet, but was something yet to happen. Before that, the Logos was the agent of creation but otherwise without assignment, waiting for the day God could bring his secret plan to fruition. In the meantime, Melchizedek held the post of celestial high priest. Otherwise we would have to suppose Hebrews is concealing a secret doctrine that Jesus actually was Melchizedek and was either hiding under that name until his resurrection or was then renamed ‘Jesus’ and given new powers (see Chapter 11, §4). Only one or the other can explain what Hebrews says, given what we know of prior Jewish Melchizedek tradition.

Element 43: (a) Voluntary human sacrifice was widely regarded (by both pagans and Jews) as the most powerful salvation and atonement magic available. (b) Accordingly, any sacred story involving a voluntary human sacrifice would be readily understood and fit perfectly within both Jewish and pagan worldviews of the time.

Of course, Jews and pagans both embraced a value for martyrdom as a morally praiseworthy end of a just man.140 The most beloved martyr in pagan imagination was Socrates, unjustly executed by the state on a false charge of challenging state religion (but in reality, for preaching wisdom that would lead to the salvation of the community as well as individual souls); and he voluntarily went to his death, to prove he was a just man. Judaism also had a tradition of beloved martyrs well before Christians, and pagans had their own martyr tradition as well.141 The Acts of the Pagan Martyrs (or Acts of the Alexandrians), for example, is a collection of pagan martyrologies dating from the early Roman Empire. Thus, self-sacrifice was not a shameful end but a heroic one that could inspire admiration and emulation, and execution by the state was often the cause of death for these beloved heroes. And in accord with this, the ‘suffering righteous man’, even to the extent of being humiliated and executed though innocent, was also a beloved hero-type in Jewish literature and imagination.142 Many pagans held a similar view (see Element 46). All of which is important, because that which was regarded as heroic would never be regarded as embarrassing.

Even more importantly, ‘substitutionary sacrifice’ was also a well-known religious concept within both pagan and Jewish theology. The idea of a hero standing in for his nation or people (and thus ‘substituting’ for it or them) and voluntarily exchanging his death for their salvation (he dies so they may live) was a common motif in Greco-Roman culture.143 A prominent example in Roman patriotic history was the legendary general Publius Decius Mus, who fulfilled a formal religious ritual in Roman culture called the devotio, in which a hero is anointed to sacrifice himself in a battle in exchange for the victory of his army (and hence, in consequence, the victory, liberty and survival of the Roman people collectively), which is basically what Jesus does (or was understood to have done).144 Decius gave his life ‘as though sent from heaven as an expiatory offering for all the wrath of the gods, who would avert the disaster from his own troops and take it to the enemy’.145 Ancient Greek myth had its equivalent: Codrus, King of Athens, voluntarily gave his life to ensure the salvation of his people in fulfillment of a prophecy that if he gave his life, they would be saved; and ‘so the Athenians, by the power of a leader offering himself to death for the salvation of the fatherland, were freed from war’.146 The Jews embraced the same value system—the Maccabean literature, for example, includes a tale of the seven martyrs who, by giving their lives, save the land, literally atoning for the sins of Israel, and thus becoming a ‘ransom for the sin of our nation’.147 In fact, Jewish use of human sacrifice as atonement magic appears several times in the OT.148

In this system of understanding, the more awful and shameful the manner of death, the more heroic and powerful it was. This thinking dates at least as far back as Plato, who confronts the logic of the nihilist Glaucon in relating the legend of Gyges, who upon acquiring a ring of invisibility was able to do anything without detection and thus seized supreme power by murder and other sins. And so, Glaucon argued, no one is really just; they only wish to seem just, because that’s all that is useful. Glaucon then argues that the only way to know if a man is truly just is to take everything away from him and treat him completely as an unjust man, despised by everyone, and punished to the utmost, including torments and, finally, crucifixion (the Jewish model for the very same notion appears in the book of Job). If a man, after all this, remains just to the end, only then will we know he was a just man—although Glaucon argues that such a man would by the end conclude justice was something not worth all that he suffered, and therefore one ought to be un-just, and, like Gyges, merely conceal one’s crimes.

The answer then made to Glaucon is that the gods will always know, and therefore the just will have their reward. That this misses his point is not addressed in the dialog, illustrating that sometimes theoretical analysis in antiquity was not always very sophisticated. And in the same way, in the final analysis Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross was not awesome at all but trivial, as he knew all along he would be resurrected and glorified (and thus he was not in fact sacrificing anything); so the fact that Christians never noticed this flaw in their logic should thus not surprise us, as Plato never noticed it either. They were as philosophically naive as he was, and remained so for nearly two thousand years. So we cannot object to this argument by claiming they would have noticed its flaw; because they didn’t.

To fully understand the point, Glaucon’s argument should be read in full:

The just man would be a simple and noble man, who . . . does not wish to seem but actually be good. So we must deprive him of the seeming. For if he is going to be thought just he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice’s sake or for the sake of the gifts and honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart. Though doing no wrong, he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice, by not softening because of this ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, that so, both men [i.e., this man, and another who gets to merely seem just] having reached the limit, the one of injustice, the other of justice, we may pass judgement which of the two is the happier. . . . What they will say is this: that such being his disposition, the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified, and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire.149

This, of course, is the opposite logic embraced by the Christians; it’s the kind of ‘human wisdom’, the wisdom of clever words, that Paul vehemently denounces. So we can expect someone of his disposition to flip Glaucon’s argument upside down: if a man remained just all the way to that horrible end, all the way to the cross, and still he deemed that outcome best, then Glaucon’s nihilistic reasoning would be refuted, and by his very own premises. And then Glaucon’s intellectual opponents would be ‘vindicated’, as this just man is rewarded after death by God, being exalted to the highest.

This completely explains the moral logic of the Christian creed that Paul repeats to the Philippians (see Chapter 11, §4): in perfect accord with the lesson Plato was teaching in his dialogue (which lesson later became a stock element of Stoic philosophy), Jesus is given the opportunity to seize all power (‘equality with god’), just like Gyges, but unlike Gyges, Jesus rejected it (Phil. 2.6), and took the other path: he became nothing, a slave to the elements, a mortal, accepting humiliation (tapeinoō) and death, ‘even death on a cross’ (Phil. 2.7-8; see also Gal. 3.13), and ‘therefore God highly exalted him’ (Phil. 2.9). This is Plato’s moral philosophy in a nutshell: this is a stock example of the just and wise man known throughout pagan philosophy—not always accepted, but known; and among those yearning most for morality and justice, it was not just known but admired and praised. It was therefore not a radical idea. In fact, it is simply a merging of a popular philosophical idea (the just man enduring the cross) with a popular religious idea (the suffering savior god). It was already the standard trope in all the mystery religions that it was by suffering some ordeal (often death) that the god procured salvation for his adherents (Element 31). And as we saw earlier, legendary kings and generals and martyrs readily volunteered to fulfill that role, too. And they were valorized for it.

In Jewish religion, the sacrificial narrative of Abraham and Isaac was a primary model: the firstborn son being sacrificed, but a substitute is made available instead, explaining why animals and not people are sacrificed to god. Thus ‘almost all the law codes in the Pentateuch include a law concerning sacrifice or redemption of the first-born of humans and animals’.150 In this matrix of reasoning, Jesus’ crucifixion and atoning death was a natural extension of both Jewish and pagan traditions of human sacrifice, of ‘beloved sons’ in particular, to procure salvation for the nation or kin group.151 Jesus’ sacrifice, in fact, is based on the Isaac story, which had already been rabbinically linked with Passover. In legend both events occur on the same day, and the Isaac narrative is explicitly represented as the original Passover in texts such as Jubilees 17–18.152 Thus, in Galatians 3 and 4, Paul links Jesus with both Isaac and the Passover lamb.153 And we know that Paul (and later Christians) explicitly linked Christ’s death with the Passover sacrifice (see Element 18).

Both narratives involve substitutionary sacrifice, but the Jesus sacrifice reverses the Isaac sacrifice. In the Isaac story, in place of the singular sacrifice of Abraham’s beloved firstborn son, animals must be slain every year in perpetuity. The one equals the other. Logically, therefore, a singular sacrifice of God’s beloved firstborn son would be a sufficient substitute for all animal sacrifices in perpetuity. Therefore, if you wanted to be rid of those animal sacrifices (in other words, if you wanted to be rid of the otherwise divinely ordained temple cult and all the corrupt political and economic powers that controlled it, as many Jews did: Element 28), logic would compel you to look for a singular human sacrifice to accomplish that, and it would have to be the most powerful sacrifice imaginable, which to any Jew would be the sacrifice of God’s firstborn son, which we’ve already seen some Jews already believed existed (Element 40) and was already named Jesus (Element 6). The problem of the temple cult that the Jews faced therefore entailed a solution that is essentially the core teaching of Christianity. It would therefore not be a wholly radical step for any Jew to propose that solution, but in fact entirely in accord with much Jewish thinking at the time.154

3. Elements of Literary Context

Element 44: In Jewish and pagan antiquity, in matters of religious persuasion, fabricating stories was the norm, not the exception, even in the production of narratives purporting to be true. In fact, the persuasive power of representing a story as true was precisely why fabricated stories were often represented as true. We therefore must approach all ancient religious literature from an assumption of doubt, and must work to confirm any given story or account as true, not the other way around. Because prior probability always favors fabrication in that genre.

That this is true becomes obvious the moment all ancient religious literature is examined together as a complete set: the number of fictional treatises posing as factual in that set is vast; the number of honest factual narratives is comparatively few. This is already provable from Christian literature alone. But first I will focus on Jewish and pagan literature—in other words, everything besides Christian literature—in order to establish the literary context in which Christian literature must be understood. Then I will show how Christian literature fits exactly the same trend.

First, the Jewish apocrypha: even the Maccabean literature contains a lot that is dubious and is hardly trusted as more than historical fiction; but collections like the Enochic literature are obvious wholesale fabrication.155 The book of Tobit, the Ascension of Isaiah, the Revelation of Moses (and countless other Revelation texts—the Jews invented a vast library of apocalyptic literature), Joseph and Aseneth, the Testimonies of the Twelve Patriarchs, the haggadic midrashim (such as, but not only, the Midrash Rabbah)—are all fiction posing as fact. And that’s pretty much the whole of Jewish faith literature.156 It’s long been known that most of the OT is fiction (Exodus, Job, Ruth) or forgery (Daniel, Deutero-Isaiah, Deutero-­Zechariah).157 Indeed, it’s not like any non-fundamentalist scholar thinks the Elijah–Elisha narrative in the Kings literature is more than minutely factual at best, as if anyone actually had reliable sources for any of it.158 Likewise Philo’s biographies of biblical characters (e.g. Life of Moses; On Joseph; etc.), or stories added (or perhaps even invented) by Josephus about them (in the Jewish Antiquities). One of the most astonishing examples is the first-century collection called the Biblical Antiquities, once attributed to Philo, but whose actual authors are unknown. This is basically a whole second Bible, in which often minor characters in the OT are picked out and given embellished background stories and adventures, none of which based on a lick of fact.159 This is essentially identical to what Philo and Josephus do for the more famous figures; and so, too the haggadic midrashim—from the Midrash Rabbah to the often wild legends scattered throughout the Talmud, not just about biblical characters, but about rabbis as well, only some of which are likely to be true.160 It’s all of the same piece: this is what Jewish faith literature looked like. Fake stories, passed off as fact. That was the norm.161

This was equally true of pagan faith literature (already partly explored in Element 14). Of course the so-called novels were all religious narratives (and they do not actually say they are fiction), as were all the tragedies dramatizing mythology, and even some comedies poking fun at religion; yet all these texts were fiction. The entire corpus of mythology (stories of gods, heroes and sages) and paradoxography (collections of incredible tales) in antiquity was certainly not based in fact (hardly at all). Yet these were the standard modes of writing faith literature in pagan cultures. In Hebrew culture the standard model for the same thing was the historical narrative: Exodus, Daniel, Ruth, Job, the Elijah–Elisha narrative in 1 and 2 Kings—this was what Jewish ‘mythology’ looked like, which is why it is fallacious to assume all mythology looks the way Greeks and Romans wrote it, since every culture has its own way of composing its myths. But myths they are. And the models can even change over time. As pagan literature came to revere the historical narrative as well, the trend of representing mythology in poetry and drama began to decline and in its place arose a new trend of representing mythology in prose history and biography, which looked exactly like actual history and biography, yet was complete fabrication (see my discussion of ‘myth’ as a quasi genre in Chapter 10, §2).

A classic example of this trend is seen in the phenomenon of euhemerization (Element 45). Thus, ‘lives’ of nonhistorical demigods were written, as if they actually existed and could be placed in history, and one could argue about which stories about them were true and which false, even though in fact they never existed at all (and so all the stories about them were false). A good example of this is Plutarch’s biography of Romulus: this was a Roman adoption of a Greek demigod who later was associated with some of the founding legends of the Roman people (his Greek origins by then completely forgotten: Element 47). Yet Plutarch saw fit to write a straightforward historical biography about him, in which he ponders what stories are true and what false, and includes this alongside biographies of actual persons such as Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar, written in exactly the same style. In the same fashion, historians like Livy or Dionysius would include mythological figures in their otherwise straightforward histories as if they actually existed. In fact, representing myth as fact became so popular, a trend arose of ‘inventing’ sources to cite as one’s authorities, thus completing the representation that myths were actual histories. This is how myth began to look under the Roman Empire. When we collect all of this pagan faith literature together, we see exactly the same outcome: almost all of it is fabricated, yet passed off as true. This was the norm.162

Even outside of faith literature, standards and practices were not as we would wish them to be. What were represented as sober histories were not consistently honest or reliable. A good story often trumped any interest in what actually happened.163 And speeches and sayings were routinely invented for historical figures (and obviously for nonhistorical figures as well), based on the reasoning that ‘it’s what they must have said’.164 Or, of course, what an author wants them to have said. Much of the development in the Gospel tradition exemplifies this; but it’s evident also in the Jewish apocrypha, and even the later Jewish canon: Deuteronomy was not written by Moses nor were the words in it spoken by either him or God; and ­Daniel is likewise a total fabrication (Element 7). Pagans, not embracing the same concept of authoritative ‘scripture’, had less pressing need to ‘attribute’ sayings to authorities in this way, although they did so. This is almost certainly the case for the many collections of sayings attributed to particular ‘sages’ in Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of Eminent Philosophers (in the first half of Book I), but it is most clearly exemplified in the practice of forgery: attempting to give authority to a system of statements by attributing them to a respected philosopher (such as Aristotle) or scientist (such as Galen).165 Letters were similarly forged often enough to become their own genre.166 As were fake histories and documents of all kinds.167 So when Christians started doing the same, they were taking up a venerable tradition.

Finally, the most startling example of this problem is that the standard method of constructing biographies of revered men was intrinsically fabricatory. A great deal of ancient biography, even of real people, was constructed of myth and fiction, frequently telescoping things a person said (or wrote) into entire fake stories about things they did (or that were done to them), even in the most incredible ways. This has been shown for the ancient biographies of historical poets and philosophers, whose entire biographies are almost wholly made up, based loosely on their writings, rather than any kind of biographical sources. For example, Euripides’ marital troubles were invented based on things different characters say about marriage in his plays, and not on anything that had anything to do with the actual Euripides or sources about his life. Most biographies of philosophers and poets in antiquity were of this type: inventions passed off as facts.168 And in the case of non-existent persons (like Romulus or Moses), this was again the norm. They would get complete biographies, with origins and deaths and adventures and quips and teachings and family and friends, including siblings with names, a home town, the whole shebang. All invented. There was nothing exceptional or unusual about this at all. This is what typically happened. It therefore cannot be regarded as improbable.

Thus we must heed, and can now understand the serious force, of the words of James Crossley on this matter:

People could in fact create stories grounded in lives of figures who may have been deemed historical actors who really did live, breathe and die (e.g., [Jubilees], [Genesis Apocryphon], [Joseph and Aseneth], Midrashic and haggadic literature, etc.), yet such stories could hardly be said to give genuine historical insight as to what really happened millennia ago when Moses was supposed to receive the Law, when Abram went down to Egypt, or when Joseph wed Aseneth (etc.), if indeed these events did happen. To give another particularly relevant example, the traditions surrounding the book of Esther are chaotic, going off in all kinds of directions and are frequently contradictory. These are not assimilated into one Jewish theology and the inconsistencies are not the reason they are assumed to be historically inaccurate. But historically inaccurate they are and it is hardly going too far to assume something similar was happening in the Gospel traditions, a point that should not have to be made. Moreover these Jewish stories continued to have a powerful emotive effect and needed to be defended in the light of different contexts.

Thus, Crossley concedes, people often invented these things because they needed to believe them (or needed others to believe them), and therefore had to represent them as factual.169 This is obvious in ‘the expanded Jewish stories of, for example, Moses, Abraham, Joseph, Elijah and numerous rabbis’. In some cases the reasons for fabrication are unclear, seeming only to make great heroes seem greater, or to tell stories through them that then carried more telling weight, or simply because it sounded right. But many examples ‘which cannot be historically accurate, rewrite stories of figures in the past to justify a belief in the present’. Indeed, that was a routine practice. Hence, ‘it follows that it is perfectly possible for the Gospel writers to do the same’. They are certainly in the same boat, because often ‘historically inaccurate storytelling was done for fairly recent figures’, too. ‘Stories of rabbis are one example’, and another ‘is the rapid emergence of miraculous and legendary traditions surrounding pagan figures, such as Alexander or Augustus, even within their own life times’.

Thus, Crossley concludes:

It [should] seem blindingly obvious that people invent stories and the sifting of fact from fiction or fiction from fact has been one of the most notable features in the history of critical biblical scholarship. . . . [So] if we are going to take Christianity seriously in its Jewish and pagan contexts then we must expect the Gospel writers to make up stories just as Jews and pagans did. Historically speaking it is extremely unlikely that the Christians behind the Gospel traditions were immune to this standard practice.170

He is entirely correct. In fact, our conclusion must be even stronger than this: for when we look at all faith literature together, most of it by far was fabricated to a great extent, and most was fabricated in its entirety. This leaves us with a very high prior probability that Christian literature will be the same.

And we can confirm this to be the case. If we exclude devotional and analytical literature (e.g. apologies, commentaries, instructionals, hymnals) and only focus on ‘primary source documents’ about earliest Christianity, we find that most Christian faith literature in its first three centuries is fabricated—indeed, most by far. We’ll see some examples in Chapter 8. But the most obvious category is the Christian apocrypha and pseudepigrapha: hundreds of forged documents, from faked letters of Paul to Seneca, to faked letters of Clement of Rome (and by that I mean beyond 1 Clement, if that is even authentic), more faked letters from Peter and Paul than are even in the NT (e.g. 3 Corinthians, 3 and 4 Peter, etc.; for the fact that there are already forged letters in the NT, see Chapter 7, §3), even faked letters from Jesus (several in Revelation already; another, from Jesus to Abgar, is reproduced in Eusebius), and fabricated Gospels and Acts and Apocalypses far outnumbering the canonical ones, as well as countless legends and tales passed off as fact (in the commentaries of Papias and Hegesippus, e.g.: see Chapter 8, §§7 and 8), and countless other fictions (the Epistle of Barnabas, e.g.; or the Decree of Tiberius, cited as authoritative proof that Emperor Tiberius converted to Christianity).171

There were in fact over forty different Gospels written, of which even fundamentalists agree only the canonical four are in any way authentic (while most mainstream scholars entertain the possibility that only one or two of those are, at best), plus over half a dozen different Acts.172 Examples of this fabricatory activity in early Christian faith literature are vast in quantity.173 This was clearly the norm, not the exception. Most of what Christians wrote were lies. We therefore should approach everything they wrote with distrust. (See also Chapter 7, §7; and Chapter 8, §§3 and 4.)

Element 45: A popular version of this phenomenon in ancient faith literature was the practice of euhemerization: the taking of a cosmic god and placing him at a definite point in history as an actual person who was later deified. We already noted Plutarch’s criticism of the trend (which he frowns upon, but in so doing concedes its popularity) in Element 14.174

Euhemerus was a Greek writer of the early third century bce, who wrote a book called The Sacred Scriptures in which he depicted an imaginary scholar discovering that Zeus and Uranus were once actual kings. In the process Euhemerus invents a history for these ‘god kings’, even though we know there is no plausible case to be made that either Zeus or Uranus was ever a real person. Yet the idea caught on; biographies and histories of nonexistent people proliferated, and ancient literature flowered with attempts to assign mythic heroes and gods to real historical periods and places.175 Even before that there were attempts to develop a ‘historical’ Hercules to justify territorial disputes in the Peloponnesus, and afterwards the origin of Rome was explained by appealing to an eponymous godman named ‘Romulus’. And many other uses were found for the procedure, as we saw for inventing King Arthur, Ned Ludd, Abraham, Moses, and other national heroes I explored in Chapter 1 (§4). There was nothing at all unusual about doing this.

Element 46: Ancient literature also proliferated a variety of model ‘hero’ narratives, some of which the Gospel Jesus conforms to as well, and one of these hero-types was widely revered among pagans: the pre-Christian narratives of the life and death of Socrates and Aesop. These match those of Jesus in the following respects:

1. They all came from a humble background (Socrates was the son of a stonemason; Aesop was a slave).

2. Yet all were exalted as a moral hero and an exemplary man, who was in the right, and whose teachings one ought to follow.

3. And that despite all of them having opposed and denounced the established religious authorities and having challenged the received wisdom of their people.

4. All attacked the sin and greed of the religious and political elite.

5. All attended the parties of sinners and ate and drank with them.

6. Yet all consistently denounced sinners, and sought to reform them.

7. All taught with questions, parables and paradoxes.

8. All taught to love truth, despise money and have compassion on others.

9. All taught that they wanted to save everyone’s soul.

10. All were despised by some and beloved by others for their teachings.

11. All were publicly mocked in some way.

12. All were renowned to be physically ugly or deformed.176

13. All were executed by the state for blasphemy, a crime they did not commit.

14. All were actually executed for speaking against the sin and greed of the authorities.

15. All voluntarily went to their deaths, despite all having had the power to escape.

16. All prophesied God’s wrath would befall their killers; and all were right.

17. All were subsequently revered as martyrs.

18. And all at the outset had been given a gift of the spirit from God.177

The fact that this was a recognized and widely revered hero narrative puts the lie to any claim that Christians were in any way radical in conforming their Jesus to it. In fact, even if Jesus existed, we still must worry about how much of his narrative is being forced into this model for that very reason, and therefore still not historically true.

We can add to all this that ‘Socrates, like Jesus, turned the other cheek and forgave the enemies who had caused his death’.178 We can likewise add that Aesop and Jesus were both itinerant preachers in a peripheral region who ended up in a central holy city and were both plotted against and executed by its priests (Delphi for Aesop; Jerusalem for Jesus). Likewise, for Aesop a ‘gospel’ was written about his birth, life, teachings and death, and many different redactions were then made of it, just as happened for Jesus.

We’ve also noted already the connections between the Gospel Jesus and the Cynics (Element 32). It is therefore significant that Socrates was the spiritual founder of the Cynics, Diogenes the Cynic having been the student of one of Socrates’ pupils, Antisthenes, and Cynicism remaining more faithful to the original teachings of Socrates than any other subsequent sect (including Platonism), and Diogenes in fact believing this was the case.179 And Aesop fulfilled in his life and death many of the values espoused by Socrates and the Cynics. It is therefore not likely an accident that a Jewish religion espousing values well in tune with the Cynics would revere as their founding hero someone who corresponds exactly to the Aesop–Socratic dying-hero type that was also promoted and revered by the Cynics.

Socrates we can be certain was a historical person (see Chapter 8, §2). But Aesop is not likely to have been.180 There is no strong evidence that Aesop ever actually lived (he is supposed to have flourished in the seventh century bce), much less wrote the fables attributed to him.181 But even if either is true, the biographies written about him are still unlikely to have any basis in fact, and no historian today believes they are. Aesop was more likely invented to place a name to a growing collection of fables passed down from numerous oral sources. Historical facts were then invented about him, and then detailed biographies were written, in some respects similar to the Gospels. If that’s what happened, then Aesop would be an example of a mythical person who ‘became’ the historical author of a collection of parables he didn’t in fact write (which are often similar in moral and symbolic purpose to the parables of Jesus), and then about whom fictional biographies were written, which were then passed off as fact. It’s easy to see how this could happen for Aesop. So in principle the same could have happened for Jesus.

Element 47: Another model hero narrative, which pagans also revered and to which the Gospel Jesus also conforms, is the apotheosis, or ‘ascension to godhood’ tale, and of these the one to which the Gospels (and Acts) most conform is that of the Roman national hero Romulus. I discussed this already in Chapter 4 (§1), and the points made there should be considered a component of the element here.

The more general point is that this narrative concept of a ‘translation to heaven’ for a hero (often but not always a divine son of god) was very commonplace, and always centered around a peculiar fable about the disappearance of their body. All these fables were different from one another, and therefore those differences are irrelevant to the point: all still shared the same core features (see my discussion of how syncretism works in Element 11). And when it comes to the Romulus fable in particular, the evidence is unmistakable that Christianity conformed itself to it relatively quickly—even if all these attributes were accumulated over time and not all at once.

Romulus, of course, did not exist. He was invented, along with legends about him (largely put together from previous Greek and Etruscan mythology), much later in Roman history than he is supposed to have lived.182 His name was eponymous (essentially an early form of the word ‘Roman’), and his story was meant to exemplify ideal Roman aspirations and values, using a model similar to Greek tragedy, in which the hero sins in various ways but comes to self-understanding and achieves peace by the time of his death. He otherwise exhibits in his deeds the ‘exemplary qualities’ of Rome as a social entity, held up as a model for Roman leaders to emulate, such as ending ‘the cycle of violence’ initiated by his sin and pride by religiously expiating the sin of past national crimes in order to bring about a lasting peace.183 His successor, Numa, then exemplified the role of the ideal, sinless king, a religious man and performer of miracles whose tomb was found empty after his death, demonstrating that he, too, like his predecessor Romulus, rose from the dead and ascended to heaven.184

The idea of the ‘translation to heaven’ of the body of a divine king was therefore adaptable and flexible, every myth being in various ways different but in certain core respects the same. But the Gospels conform to the Romulus model most specifically.185 There are twenty parallels, although not every story contained every one. In some cases that may simply be the result of selection or abbreviation in the sources we have (and therefore the silence of one source does not entail the element did not then exist or was not known to that author); and in some cases elements might have been deliberately removed (or even reversed) by an author who wanted to promote a different message (see discussion in Chapter 10, §2, of how mythmaking operated in antiquity). For example, the ‘radiant resurrection body’ (probably the earlier version of Christian appearance narratives) was later transformed into a ‘hidden-god narrative’ (another common trope both in paganism and Judaism) as suited any given author.186

But when taken altogether the Romulus and Jesus death-and-resurrection narratives contain all of the following parallels:

1. The hero is the son of God.

2. His death is accompanied by prodigies.

3. The land is covered in darkness.

4. The hero’s corpse goes missing.

5. The hero receives a new immortal body, superior to the one he had.

6. His resurrection body has on occasion a bright and shining appearance.

7. After his resurrection he meets with a follower on a road from the city.

8. A speech is given from a summit or high place prior to ascending.

9. An inspired message of resurrection or ‘translation to heaven’ is delivered to a witness.

10. There is a ‘great commission’ (an instruction to future followers).

11. The hero physically ascends to heaven in his new divine body.

12. He is taken up into a cloud.

13. There is an explicit role given to eyewitness testimony (even naming the witnesses).

14. Witnesses are frightened by his appearance and/or disappearance.

15. Some witnesses flee.

16. Claims are made of ‘dubious alternative accounts’ (which claims were obviously fabricated for Romulus, there never having been a true account to begin with).

17. All of this occurs outside of a nearby (but central) city.

18. His followers are initially in sorrow over the hero’s death.

19. But his post-resurrection story leads to eventual belief, homage and rejoicing.

20. The hero is deified and cult subsequently paid to him (in the same manner as a god).

Romulus, of course, was also unjustly killed by the authorities (and came from a humble background, beginning his career as an orphan and a shepherd, a nobody from the hill country), and thus also overlaps the Aesop–Socratic type (see Element 46), and it’s easy to see that by combining the two, we end up with pretty much the Christian Gospel in outline (especially when we appropriately Judaize the result: Elements 3-7, 17-20, and 39-43). Some of the parallels could be coincidental (e.g. resurrected bodies being associated with radiance was itself a common trope, both within Judaism and paganism), but for all of them to be coincidental is extremely improbable.187 The Christian conception of Jesus’ death and resurrection appears to have been significantly influenced by the Roman conception of Romulus’s death and resurrection.

Even if we discounted that for any reason, the Romulus parallels definitely establish that all these components were already part of a recognized hero-type, and are therefore not surprising or unusual or unexpected. The story of Jesus would have looked familiar, not only in the same way all translation stories looked familiar even when different in many and profound ways, but also in the very specific way that among all such tales it looked the most like the story of Romulus, which was publicly acted out in passion plays every year. And this was the national founding hero of the Roman Empire. What better god’s tale to emulate or co-opt?

Element 48: Finally, the most ubiquitous model ‘hero’ narrative, which pagans also revered and to which the Gospel Jesus also conforms, is the fable of the ‘divine king’, what I call the Rank–Raglan hero-type, based on the two scholars who discovered and described it, Otto Rank and Lord Raglan.188 This is a hero-type found repeated across at least fifteen known mythic heroes (including Jesus)—if we count only those who clearly meet more than half of the designated parallels (which means twelve or more matches out of twenty-two elements), which requirement eliminates many historical persons, such as Alexander the Great or Caesar Augustus, who accumulated many elements of this hero-type in the tales told of them, yet not that many.

The twenty-two features distinctive of this hero-type are:

1. The hero’s mother is a virgin.

2. His father is a king or the heir of a king.

3. The circumstances of his conception are unusual.

4. He is reputed to be the son of a god.

5. An attempt is made to kill him when he is a baby.

6. To escape which he is spirited away from those trying to kill him.

7. He is reared in a foreign country by one or more foster parents.

8. We are told nothing of his childhood.

9. On reaching manhood he returns to his future kingdom.

10. He is crowned, hailed or becomes king.

11. He reigns uneventfully (i.e., without wars or national catastrophes).

12. He prescribes laws.

13. He then loses favor with the gods or his subjects.

14. He is driven from the throne or city.

15. He meets with a mysterious death.

16. He dies atop a hill or high place.

17. His children, if any, do not succeed him.

18. His body turns up missing.

19. Yet he still has one or more holy sepulchers (in fact or fiction).

20. Before taking a throne or a wife, he battles and defeats a great adversary (such as a king, giant, dragon or wild beast).

and

21. His parents are related to each other.

22. He marries a queen or princess related to his predecessor.

Many of the heroes who fulfill this type also either (a) performed miracles (in life or as a deity after death) or were (b) preexistent beings who became incarnated as men or (c) subsequently worshiped as savior gods, any one of which honestly should be counted as a twenty-third attribute.189 Of these qualifying features, Jesus shares all three. Likewise, many who fit this hero type ‘fulfilled prophecy’, and although that was commonly the case for heroes generally (far beyond the specific hero-type described here), it is another feature Jesus shares in common with them, and which honestly should be counted as a twenty-fourth attribute.190 But I shall work from the traditional twenty-two.

The fifteen people who score more than half of those twenty-two features, in order of how many they score (from most to least) is as follows:191

1. Oedipus (21)

2. Moses (20)

3. Jesus (20)

4. Theseus (19)

5. Dionysus (19)

6. Romulus (18)

7. Perseus (17)

8. Hercules (17)

9. Zeus (15)

10. Bellerophon (14)

11. Jason (14)

12. Osiris (14)

13. Pelops (13)

14. Asclepius (12)

15. Joseph [i.e., the son of Jacob] (12)

This is a useful discovery, because with so many matching persons it doesn’t matter what the probability is of scoring more than half on the Rank–Raglan scale by chance coincidence. Because even if it can happen often by chance coincidence, then the percentage of persons who score that high should match the ratio of real persons to mythical persons. In other words, if a real person can have the same elements associated with him, and in particular so many elements (and for this purpose it doesn’t matter whether they actually occurred), then there should be many real persons on the list—as surely there are far more real persons than mythical ones. The number of real persons in the course of antiquity must number in the hundreds of millions, whereas the number of mythical persons invented over that same course of time will be in the thousands at most. Certainly, by any calculation the latter could not possibly outnumber the former—and even if they were equally numerous, then half the names on the list should be actual persons. But this is not the case. No known historical persons are on the list.192 Only mythical people ever got fitted to this hero-type.193 Yet every single one of them was regarded as a historical person and placed in history in narratives written about them.

Therefore, whether fitting more than half the Rank–Raglan criteria was always a product of chance coincidence or the product of causal influence, either way we can still conclude that it would be very unusual for any historical person to fit more than half the Rank–Raglan criteria—because if it were not unusual, then many historical persons would have done so. But not even one did. We might not know the cause of this fact, but a fact it is nonetheless, and a fact we can make use of (as I will in §3 of the next chapter).

Jesus scores twenty out of twenty-two, according to Matthew’s Gospel (and whether these attributes were original or lately appended to his legend won’t matter, as I’ll explain in §4 of the next chapter; but note that even in Mark’s Gospel, Jesus scores a 14, and even that would place him well above the bottom of the list). The first nineteen hardly require defense (e.g. his father is the heir of King David; he is seized by the authorities, abandoned by his followers, and driven from Jerusalem to his execution; strange things happen at his death, and the death itself is a strangely sudden expiration; he dies atop the hill named Golgotha; etc.).194 The remaining hit (number 20) may not be as obvious, but he scores it: just as Oedipus confronts and defeats the riddling Sphinx, Jesus confronts and defeats the temptations of the Devil (also known as the Adversary, and as a Serpent or Dragon, and ‘Prince of the World’), in both cases before going to claim their kingdom (of course, even in earliest Christian tradition Satan is the power whom Jesus most decisively defeats so as to effect the salvation of the faithful ever after).195

The only two elements Jesus does not score are the last I’ve listed: we cannot establish (21) that his parents were originally imagined as related or (22) that he ever married (much less the daughter of his predecessor). However, the peculiar absence of that last element practically advertises the fact that he does merit that element allegorically: from the earliest time Jesus was imagined to have taken the ‘church’ as his bride, which was indeed understood to be the ‘daughter’ of his predecessor (the nation of Israel).196 So in all honesty we could assign him that element as well. But as it is not ‘literal’ I will leave his score at twenty.197 Nevertheless, even then he is nearly the highest scoring person in history, next only to Oedipus; and if we granted that last element, he would be tied even with him for highest score.

Jesus might even have outranked Oedipus. A later tradition held that indeed his parents were relatives, and it is possible that had been a tradition from very early on that just wasn’t recorded in our Gospels.198 However, by the time we hear of this detail, Jesus was being transformed into a different character. For example, Infancy Gospels were then being written about him, introducing narratives of his childhood. If we scored on attributes all the way into the late second century, this would remove one element (‘we hear nothing of his childhood’), and add another (‘his parents were related to each other’), keeping his score the same.199 However, since the Infancy Gospels clearly are discordant with the early mythology of Jesus and are an entirely new phenomenon, whereas the possibility of his parents being related might actually have been imagined much earlier,200 he might have scored the full twenty-two points, making him a better fit for the Rank–Raglan hero-type than any other man in history. And even without these assumptions, he still ranks among the highest. That is a stunning fact, which must be considered, and accounted for.

4. Conclusion

The point of this and the previous chapter has been to summarize all the facts we must take into account, as being in our total background knowledge, when assigning all probabilities going forward. In my experience, a great deal of what has been surveyed up to this point remains unknown even to many experts in the study of Jesus. This is why I took the trouble to survey so much. Because all of it must be taken into account by anyone who wishes to reconstruct the historical Jesus or the origins of Christianity. It is equally crucial to understanding how to evaluate and interpret the evidence for or against the historicity of Jesus—and how to estimate the prior probability of either. And to that question I now turn.


1. See, in general, Richard Ascough, ‘Historical Approaches’, in Dictionary of Biblical Criticism and Interpretation (ed. Stanley Porter; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 157-59; with Stephen Hunt, ‘Anthropology and Interpretation’, in Dictionary (ed. Porter), pp. 12-14, and Stephen Hunt, ‘Socio-Scientific Approaches’, in Dictionary (ed. Porter), pp. 337-40.

2. Jewish sovereignty was briefly returned to Herod Agrippa I by Emperor Claudius between 41 and 44 ce. But between 6 and 36 ce there was no evident prospect of this happening, and even when it did, it was so short lived as to be inconsequential.

3. See, e.g., George Nickelsburg, ‘First and Second Enoch: A Cry against Oppression and the Promise of Deliverance’, in The Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Amy-Jill Levine, Dale C. Allison Jr and John Dominic Crossan; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 87-109.

4. See, e.g., Jonathan Klawans, ‘Moral and Ritual Purity’, in The Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Levine, Allison and Crossan), pp. 266-84 (which corroborates some of the following elements as well).

5. See R.G. Hamerton-Kelly, ‘Sacred Violence and the Messiah: The Markan Passion Narrative as a Redefinition of Messianology’, in The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity (ed. James Charlesworth; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 461-93; and Margaret Barker, The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian Liturgy (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2003). Although I don’t agree with Barker’s every theory, such as that Jesus was an actual high priest (since he could more easily have been a Platonic ideal of one, as Hebrews 9 implies: see Chapter 11, §5), she collects considerable evidence of interest on the subject of the temple’s importance and Christianity’s solution to the problem it posed.

6. It should not have to be stated, but the objection that no Jew would countenance the drinking of blood is of no relevance to the symbolic drinking of blood; symbolic cannibalism is not really cannibalism. By analogy, Christian baptism was a symbolic death (e.g. Rom. 6.4 and Col. 2.12), and yet no Jews objected to it on the grounds that it was murder.

7. The need of an immortal, incorruptible ‘high priest’ to replace the existing priestly class is expressed in Heb. 7.25-27 and Hebrews 9 (see Chapter 11, §5).

8. See my discussion in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 225-30 (to which can be added such examples as Ignatius, To Polycarp 6, and the logic behind Wis. 5.17-22, which clearly influenced 1 Thess. 5.8-9 and Eph. 6.12-17).

9. Many elements of this are supported by Mark Strauss, Four Portraits, One Jesus: An Introduction to Jesus and the Gospels (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), pp. 366, 368-70, 376; Marcus Borg, Jesus: Uncovering the Life, Teachings, and Relevance of a Religious Revolutionary (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2006), pp. 225-60; and Bruce Malina, The Social Gospel of Jesus: The Kingdom of God in Mediterranean Perspective (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001); and Bruce Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 3rd edn, 2001), as well as his Social Science Commentary series on the NT—although caution in employing Malina is warranted, as he over-simplifies a great deal, but as long as you allow for unstated complexities and exceptions at every point, most of what he argues can be validly applied to the origins of Christianity, and corroborates the analysis given here.

10. D. Mendels, ‘Pseudo-Philo’s Biblical Antiquities, the “Fourth Philosophy”, and the Political Messianism of the First Century c.e.’, in The Messiah (ed. Charlesworth), pp. 261-75, argues the authors of the Biblical Antiquities rewrote and expanded various OT stories in order to communicate values contrary to those of the Zealots regarding the solution to Judea’s social problems, illustrating that Christians weren’t the only ones looking for an alternative. That Christians and Zealots might both stem (at least in significant part) from the same sect (the Essenes, who were in turn regarded as deriving their views from the Samaritans), see Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 109, 200 n. 23, 201 nn. 26-28, 31, and Element 33 below.

11. I.C. Jarvie, The Revolution in Anthropology (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1964), p. 50.

12. Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of ‘Cargo’ Cults in Melanesia (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 2nd edn, 1968), treats the entire Cargo Cult phenomenon (see pp. 75-92 for the ‘Vailala Madness’). For a more first-hand account of that: F.E. Williams, ‘The Vailala Madness in Retrospect’, in Essays Presented to C.G. Seligman (ed. E.E. Evans-Pritchard et al.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1934), pp. 369-79. On other Cargo Cults see G.W. Trompf, Cargo Cults and Millenarian Movements: Transoceanic Comparisons of New Religious Movements (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1990); Peter Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo: A Study of the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964); Kenelm Burridge, Mambu: A Study of Melanesian Cargo Movements and their Ideological Background (New York: Harper & Row, 1960). Wikipedia maintains an informative page on the cargo cults, both individually and collectively: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cargo_cult. There are also some relevant similarities in modern UFO cults: Christopher Partridge (ed.), UFO Religions (New York: Routledge, 2003).

13. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, pp. 90-91.

14. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, ‘Financial Aspects of the Resurrection’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 393-409.

15. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, p. 228.

16. See Element 20. That Paul’s variant would inevitably prevail over the original one by making this unifying goal easier to achieve is a fact I discuss in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 51-52.

17. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, pp. 228-29.

18. Jarvie, The Revolution, pp. 51, 72.

19. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, p. 230.

20. See my discussion of this fact, and the relevant scholarship confirming it, in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 219-45.

21. Essentially the same conclusion is reached by James Crossley, Why Christianity Happened: A Sociohistorical Account of Christian Origins (26–50 ce) (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006).

22. Cargo Cults integrated elements of Christianity and otherwise secular but ‘Western’ cultural objects and ideas (Jarvie, The Revolution, pp. 64-66); even modern apocalyptic Islamic extremism integrates Western (often fascist) political philosophy, tactics and technologies, as well as mythologies (e.g. conspiracy theories), to become something new. This is always claimed to be a ‘return’ to the ‘true’ faith, in defiance of historical fact. Thus, what is actually new could always be sold as old: see Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 129-34. Notably, the availability of guns and explosives has made it seem like military victory is still possible (because immediate engagements produce terrorizing results that seem to vindicate the perpetrators’ righteousness) and therefore Islamic extremists remain militarized. I suspect if it were not for those technologies, they would have become demilitarized, like early Christianity, the Cargo Cults and other millenarian movements in the same mold, except where it has actually succeeded (e.g. Iran).

23. In connection with this fact, I discuss how this element caused such movements to be led by prophets rather than ‘politicians’ (or philosophers) in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 259-96. I would add a final necessary causal ingredient, that of a cultural framework in which such movements make sense (such as has been provided by Middle Eastern cultures, Jewish and pagan, since long before the rise of Christianity, and long since: Element 10, and the remaining elements in this chapter). By contrast, e.g., Tibet has no comparable cultural framework, and thus (to my knowledge) has not developed a millenarian movement of this Western type (but martyrdom movements of a different kind), despite otherwise being locked in nearly the same socio-political conditions.

24. See Zeev Safrai, ‘The Gentile Cities of Judea: Between the Hasmonean Occupation and the Roman Liberation’, in Studies in Historical Geography and Biblical Historiography (ed. Zecharia Kallai, Gershon Galil and Moshe Weinfeld; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000), pp. 63-90; Louis Feldman, Judaism and Hellenism Reconsidered (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Jonas Greenfield, ‘The Languages of Palestine, 200 bce–200 ce’, in Al Kanfei Yonah: Collected Studies of Jonas C. Greenfield on Semitic Philology, Vol. I (ed. Shalom Paul, Michael Stone and Avital Pinnick; Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 376-87; D. Flusser, ‘Paganism in Palestine’, in The Jewish People in the First Century, Vol. II (ed. Shemuel Safrai and Menahem Stern; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974–76), pp. 1065-1100, and (in the same volume) G. Mussies, ‘Greek in Palestine and the Diaspora’, pp. 1040-64; Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1974); Morton Smith, Palestinian Parties and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and Morton Smith, ‘Palestinian Judaism in the First Century’, in Israel: Its Role in Civilization (ed. Moshe Davis; New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 67-81.

Even Mark Chancey, in The Myth of a Gentile Galilee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), confirms there were plenty of Gentiles in Galilee as well (predominately in its cities and cities adjacent), just not ‘as many’ as some scholars have claimed (note, e.g., his discussion of pagans in Samaria, pp. 153-55, and his overall conclusion, pp. 155-82). But influence only requires a presence, not a huge one. Contact is contact. Likewise, see discussion of the Gentile presence in Judea before and after the Hasmoneans (and one must remember that influences that had already been integrated with various sects of Judaism before the Hasmoneans would have remained after them) in Jack Pastor, Land and Economy in Ancient Palestine (New York: Routledge, 1997).

Ironically, attempts to deny this also confirm it: in the Christian apologetic treatise by Paul Eddy and Gregory Boyd, The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), pp. 101-32 extensively documents and thus concedes the vast presence of foreign influences throughout the whole of Palestine; the authors then try to insist that all Jews in Palestine were completely resistant to all these influences in almost every respect, which is an absurd notion, and a conclusion they completely fail to prove (the fallacies of argument from ignorance and false generalization are rife throughout, especially in repeatedly leaping from premises about ‘most’ to conclusions about ‘all’, and in mistaking opinions for facts).

25. See Konstantinos Staikos, The History of the Library in Western Civilization, Vols. I and II (Athens: Kotinos Publications, 2004). I will discuss Greco-Roman libraries as standard urban features in Richard Carrier, Science Education in the Early Roman Empire (in review).

26. On the previous Jewish syncretism with Zoroastrianism see Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 85-99. On other examples of ongoing Jewish syncretism: Lars Hartman, ‘Into the Name of the Lord Jesus’: Baptism in the Early Church (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997), pp. 3-8; M.L. West, The Orphic Poems (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 33-35; and Carl Holladay, Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors, Volume IV: Orphica (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996); Stanley Rosenbaum, Understanding Biblical Israel: A Reexamination of the Origins of Monotheism (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002); and Mark Smith, The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Polytheistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

27. On the influence of pagan mystery religion see Element 10; on the influence of pagan philosophy see Element 32. Note that early Christian (as also Jewish) art was also highly syncretistic, adopting pagan and Jewish motifs as Christian symbols, or merging pagan, Jewish and Christian motifs into new hybrid symbols: Thomas Mathews, The Clash of Gods: A Reinterpretation of Early Christian Art (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Fred Albertson, ‘An Isiac Model for the Raising of Lazarus in Early Christian Art’, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 38 (1995), pp. 123-32; Robin Margaret Jensen, Understanding Early Christian Art (New York: Routledge, 2000). On syncretism in Jewish art: Joseph Gutmann, Ancient Synagogues (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981); Othmar Keel and Christoph Uehlinger, Gods, Goddesses, and Images of God in Ancient Israel (trans. Allan Mahnke; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996); Leonard Rutgers (ed.), What Athens Has to Do with Jerusalem: Essays on Classical, Jewish, and Early Christian Art and Archaeology in Honor of Gideon Foerster (Leuven: Peeters, 2002); Steven Fine, Art and Judaism in the Greco-Roman World: Toward a New Jewish Archaeology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

28. On the requirements of a valid argument from silence see Carrier, Proving History, pp. 117-19. The premise is also dubious, since we actually do have archaeo­logical evidence of pagan influence on Second Temple Judaism in the Dead Sea Scrolls. See, e.g., Matthew Goff, ‘Gilgamesh the Giant: The Qumran Book of Giants’ Appropriation of Gilgamesh Motifs’, Dead Sea Discoveries 16.2 (2009), pp. 221-53; and John J. Collins, Daniel: A Commentary (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 395-97, where clear pagan influences on the book of Enoch are identified—and yet nearly a dozen manuscripts of Enoch were recovered from Qumran: Jozef Milik (ed.), The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments of Qumran Cave 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). And Enoch was a seminal text in the origin of Christianity.

29. Some people have a hard time grasping the fact that parallels can entail influence even when many differences remain. One of my readers suggested I make this point with West Side Story: it’s ‘nothing’ like Romeo and Juliet, taking place in twentieth-century America, with Latin gangs fighting Anglo gangs, who fight with fists and knives and not swords, and they aren’t families, just gangs, and no one is named Romeo or Juliet—yet to claim West Side Story was not influenced by Romeo and Juliet would be absurd: it’s a deliberate emulation! This is the case with all acts of mythmaking and syncretism: the variants of a theme will obviously differ in countless ways, but the parallels that remain are too specific and numerous to exist by coincidence. Direct emulation and borrowing are simply by far the most likely hypothesis in such a case (see Carrier, Proving History, pp. 192-204).

30. On the inevitably pagan nature of all Greek education in antiquity (and the failure of any group, Jews and Christians included, to develop any sanitized alternative), see Raffaella Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), with Harry Gamble, Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 6-7; Gerard Ellspermann, The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers toward Pagan Literature and Learning (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1949), pp. 1-3; Hénri Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (New York: Sheed & Ward, 3rd edn, 1956), pp. 314-29; Yun Lee Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Boston: Brill, 2001), pp. 405-32; see also my discussion in Chapter 9 of my forthcoming Science Education in the Early Roman Empire.

Though very conservative Jews (who should not be conflated with all Palestinian Jews) distinguished learning Greek from studying Greek philosophy (b. Sotah 49b; see E.A. Judge, ‘The Reaction against Classical Education in the New Testament’, Journal of Christian Education 77 (1983), pp. 7-14 [9]), some philosophy and religion inevitably were taught when studying under an ordinary grammarian (who used pagan books to instruct by and gave commentary and glosses on their content, such as a passage’s meaning and significance); thus, avoiding the philosophy schools could not have prevented exposure to philosophy. And not all Palestinian Jews were archconservatives anyway. Even at Qumran we have undeniable evidence of advanced Greek writing and education: see Matthew Richey, ‘The Use of Greek at Qumran: Manuscript and Epigraphic Evidence for a Marginalized Language’, Dead Sea Discoveries 19 (2012), pp. 177-97. Considerably more evidence of this has been recovered from Masada and Jericho (180).

31. For this and other aspects of Christianity that only make sense as localized cultural diffusion, see Carrier, ‘Christianity’s Success Was Not Incredible’, in End of Christianity (ed. Loftus). For the entire background of pagan resurrected gods and heroes—not all of whom were paid cult as savior gods, but still refuting any notion that ‘resurrection’ was a novel or foreign concept in pagan culture, see Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 85-127.

32. Justin Martyr, Apology 1.21, 22.

33. See, for another example, Tertullian, Prescription against Heretics 40.

34. Previous attempts to deny that these were dying-and-rising gods have been thoroughly refuted by Tryggve Mettinger in The Riddle of Resurrection: ‘Dying and Rising Gods’ in the Ancient Near East (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2001); and Tryggve Mettinger, ‘The Dying and Rising God: The Peregrinations of a Mytheme’, in Ethnicity in Ancient Mesopotamia (ed. W.H. van Soldt; Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2005), pp. 198-210. For Inanna specifically (and likely Tammuz as well), see Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 17-20; and Pirjo Lapinkivi, The Neo-Assyrian Myth of Ištar’s Descent and Resurrection (Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, 2010). For Baal specifically, see M.S. Smith, The Ugaritic Baal Cycle, Vol. I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); and M.S. Smith and W. Pitard, The Ugaritic Baal Cycle, Vol. II (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2009). For Marduk specifically, see Tikva Frymer-Kensky, ‘The Tribulations of Marduk: The So-Called “Marduk Ordeal Text”’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 103 (January–March 1983), pp. 131-41, but only in light of the further analysis and evidence in Mettinger.

35. Zechariah 12.11 also mentions ‘the mourning of Hadad-Rimmon in the valley of Megiddo’, this being a known epithet of the Ugaritic Baal at the time, who became the resurrected savior god of the Greco-Roman-era mystery cult of Jupiter Dolichenus.

36. It has long been suspected that the complete cycle traded resurrections between Inanna and Dumuzi (as Origen’s comment implies), and recent discoveries have supported this conclusion: see Benjamin Foster, ‘Descent of Ishtar to the Netherworld’, in Before the Muses: An Anthology of Akkadian Literature (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 3rd edn, 2005), pp. 498-505, where recovered fragments imply a period of rejoicing after mourning the death of Dumuzi (Tammuz), which would indicate he, too, recovered from his death. A similar cycle of mourning and rejoicing over the death and ‘revival’ of the god Attis would develop later (see later note).

37. Contrary to claims that Christianity was booming in its first two centuries, it was in fact an extremely small fringe cult until the later third century: I survey the evidence and scholarship on this point in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 407-47, to which can now be added the analysis of Adam Schor, ‘Conversion by the Numbers: Benefits and Pitfalls of Quantitative Modeling in the Study of Early Christian Growth’, Journal of Religious History 33 (December 2009), pp. 472-98 (and note that Schor’s models even presume the incredibly implausible starting point of one thousand Christians in 40 ce, and yet still don’t get a significantly different result).

38. Lucian, On the Syrian Goddess 6 (written c. 160 ce), which records, like Origen, that national ceremonies of mourning for his death are followed the next day by celebrations of his returning to life and ascending into outer space. For pre-Christian evidence of this same Adonis cult see Stephanie Lynn Budin, The Myth of Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 94-99.

39. For Romulus and Osiris, see Chapter 4 (§1 and Element 11, respectively); for the antiquity of Osiris as a dying-and-rising savior god, see Bojana Mojsov, Osiris: Death and Afterlife of a God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 38-53 and S.G.F. Brandon, The Savior God: Comparative Studies in the Concept of Salvation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963), pp. 17-36 (with an introductory discussion of the role of Isis on pp. 1-16); this is undeniably confirmed in pre-Christian texts: see following notes. For Zalmoxis, see Herodotus, Histories 4.94-96, with Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 86-87, 100-105. For many other examples of resurrected gods and heroes in pagan tradition see Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 85-90. Dionysus (aka Bacchus) was likewise killed (torn apart) and resurrected (‘born again’ from a piece of his corpse), but as a baby: Justin Martyr, Apology 1.69; Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris (= Moralia) 35.364f; Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 5.75.4; see also Richard Seaford, ‘Dionysiac Drama and the Dionysiac Mysteries’, Classical Quarterly 31 (1981), pp. 252-75 (260-68); and M.L. West, The Orphic Poems (Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 140-43, 161-63. There is no evidence that Mithras was a ‘resurrected’ savior (his ‘passion’ procuring salvation probably involved some other ordeal than his death; for discussion and scholarship on Mithraism see Chapter 4, Element 11; although some form of resurrection belief was involved in the cult: Tertullian, in Prescription against Heretics 40, mentions ‘an image of a resurrection’ being featured in it). It is difficult to reconstruct the belief system of early Attis cult. The evidence is either scattered or late; and from what we do have, it seems his ordeal might have been the periodic return to life of an eternally preserved corpse, which would be an example of a variant of the same mytheme, but one too far removed from the norm to make an ideal example: see Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, Soteriology and Mystic Aspects in the Cult of Cybele and Attis (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), pp. 26-63; and Maria Grazia Lancellotti, Attis, between Myth and History: King, Priest, and God (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 142-64.

40. Pyramid Texts 1684a-1685a and 1700 (= Utterance 606; cf. also Utterance 670). Translation (here and following) from Samuel Mercer, The Pyramid Texts (London: Longmans, Green, 1952).

41. Pyramid Texts 1363a-b (= Utterance 553).

42. Pyramid Texts 207b-209a and 2010b-2011a (= Utterance 676).

43. Plutarch uses cognates of anabiōsis (‘return to life’) and paliggenesis (‘born again’) in On Isis and Osiris (= Moralia) 35.364f, which are undeniably clear in their meaning (other tales as well, Plutarch says, agree with ‘what is said of the dismember­ments, returns to life and rebirths of Osiris’). On Paul’s view of the resurrection of Jesus, as being in a different body than was buried, see Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 105-55 (see in particular 1 Cor. 15.35-38 in conjunction with 2 Cor. 5.1-4).

44. Plutarch, On the E at Delphi (= Moralia) 9.388f-389a.

45. The component of vanishing corpses as a mytho-type for translation to heaven is demonstrated to have been a commonplace in pagan literature of the time in Richard C. Miller, ‘Mark’s Empty Tomb and Other Translation Fables in Classical Antiquity’, Journal of Biblical Literature 129 (2010), pp. 759-76. He shows this theme was so distinctive of pagan tradition (as opposed to Jewish literature) that it is unlikely to have come from anywhere else. That translation to heaven was almost always understood by pagans to be bodily (typically by the assumption of a new, indestructible, divine body) see Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 110-13, 137-39, 212 nn. 169-70, particularly in regard to Philo, who often uses words such as ‘incorporeal’ to refer to what he actually means are physical bodies of astral material.

46. Popular philosophy’s influence on Paul: Stephen Finlan, The Apostle Paul and the Pauline Tradition (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), pp. 26-28; and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), along with the debate between Engberg-Pedersen, John Levison and John Barclay in the Journal for the Study of the New Testament 33 (2011), pp. 406-43, which collectively only confirms the influence of pagan philosophies, debating only to what extent Paul modified their ideas by combining them with Jewish ones (to create something new and different, the very definition of syncretism).

47. Francis Gerald Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992); and Francis Gerald Downing, Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches (London: Routledge, 1998); and L.E. Vaage, ‘Jewish Scripture, Q and the Historical Jesus: A Cynic Way with the Word?’, in The Sayings Source Q and the Historical Jesus (ed. A. Lindemann; Leuven: University Press, 2001), pp. 479-95; all in light of, e.g., Strauss, Four Portraits, One Jesus, pp. 366-68; and William Arnal, The Symbolic Jesus: Historical Scholarship, Judaism and the Construction of Contemporary Identity (London: Equinox, 2005), pp. 17-25 (who makes the quite correct point that being influenced by Cynicism does not make someone a Cynic, much less non-Jewish, and therefore most criticisms of the Cynic-influence hypothesis are based on fallacious black-and-white thinking that has no place in serious scholarship); see also William Arnal, Jesus and the Village Scribes: Galilean Conflicts and the Setting of Q (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), pp. 52-59 (whose criticism is not against there having been Cynic influence, but against certain implausible theories that have been built on this premise). On Cynicism in general: William Desmond, Cynics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); and William Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty: Origins of Ancient Cynicism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). On what ‘Cynic influence’ looked like in other movements, useful for finding and understanding the same influence within Christianity and Judaism: James Francis, Subversive Virtue: Asceticism and Authority in the Second-Century Pagan World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

48. For translations of the extant lectures of Rufus see Cora Lutz, Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947); and Cynthia Ann Kent King, Musonius Rufus: Lectures and Sayings (Charleston, SC: Createspace, 2011). For some of the similarities (and differences) between Rufus and Jesus see Richard Carrier, ‘On Musonius Rufus: A Brief Essay’, at The Secular Web (1999), http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/musonius.html. His teachings on charity, paci­fism, forgiveness, and brotherly love are surveyed in Discourses 10, 14 and 19, and exem­plified in stories told about him by others (collected in Lutz).

49. On this general problem of ignorance, see Carrier, Proving History, pp. 129-34. For sources on the Galilean sect: Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 109, 200-201 n. 24.

50. Connections with the Pharisees: Harvey Falk, Jesus the Pharisee (New York: Paulist Press, 1985); Hyam Maccoby, Jesus the Pharisee (London: SCM Press, 2003). Connections with the Essenes and/or Qumran sect (which are far too numerous to be coincidental): James Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls (New York: Doubleday, 1992); Joseph Fitzmyer, The Dead Sea Scrolls and Christian Origins (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000); C.D. Elledge, The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005); James Charlesworth (ed.), The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Vol. III [= The Scrolls and Christian Origins] (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006).

Note that the association of the Dead Sea Scrolls with a community at Qumran has been questioned (and with it the conclusion that they all derive from a single sect) but the scrolls appear coherent enough that they likely derive from the same sect even if stashed there by refugees and not by inhabitants of Qumran (on the ongoing controversy see wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qumran). Likewise the similarities between the Qumran sect and what is independently known of the Essene sect have been questioned, but we know there were at least six and possibly nine different sects of Essenes (and therefore no such thing as a ‘normative’ Essene sect), and the similarities at Qumran are sufficient to adduce a high probability that the sect represented at Qumran was either Essene or heavily influenced by Essenes: on both points see sources and scholarship cited in Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 109, 200-201 nn. 23, 25, 27.

The Therapeutae sect also bore similarities to both Christians and Essenes: Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, pp. 109, 200 n. 22; with Joan Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria: Philo’s ‘Therapeutae’ Reconsidered (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 31-32. And as the Essenes were then regarded as a sect of the Samaritans (Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, pp. 200-201 nn. 23, 27, and 28), we might also find connections between Samaritanism and Christianity: see R.T. Anderson, ‘Samaritan Literature’, in Dictionary of New Testament Background (ed. Craig Evans and Stanley Porter; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), pp. 1052-56; and in the same volume, H.G.M. Williamson and C.A. Evans, ‘Samaritans’, pp. 1056-61. On the Baptist cult (also known as the Hemerobaptists) see sources and scholarship cited in Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, pp. 108, 199 n. 18; and Joan Taylor, The Immerser: John the Baptist within Second Temple Judaism (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997); on this sect’s possible connections with Christianity: Clare Rothschild, Baptist Traditions and Q (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005); and Lars Hartman, ‘Into the Name of the Lord Jesus’: Baptism in the Early Church (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997), pp. 9-35. On possible links between Essenes, Zealots and Christianity: S.G.F. Brandon, Jesus and the Zealots (New York: Scribner, 1967); and now Reza Aslan, Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth (New York: Random House, 2013).

On the myriad links claimed between Christianity and Judaism in general (and some sects in particular) see John Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus (4 vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1991-2009); Geza Vermés, Jesus the Jew (London: Collins, 1973); Geza Vermés, The Religion of Jesus the Jew (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), and Geza Vermés, Jesus in his Jewish Context (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003); Bruce Chilton, Rabbi Jesus (New York: Doubleday, 2000); E.P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1985); Donald Hagner, The Jewish Reclamation of Jesus: An Analysis and Critique of Modern Jewish Study of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Academie Books, 1984); and James Charlesworth (ed.), Jesus’ Jewishness: Exploring the Place of Jesus within Early Judaism (New York: Crossroad, 1991).

51. See, e.g., the analysis of 4Q525 and others in Craig Evans, ‘The Recently Published Dead Sea Scrolls and the Historical Jesus’, in Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluations of the State of Current Research (ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig Evans; Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 559-61; and in Craig Evans, ‘Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls from Qumran Cave 4’, in Eschatology, Messianism, and the Dead Sea Scrolls (ed. Craig Evans and Peter Flint; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 91-100. For other examples see Peter Flint, ‘Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls’, in Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Levine, Allison and Crossan), pp. 110-31.

52. That the distance to the moon had to be in the hundreds of thousands of miles was argued (then famously) by Aristarchus and later proved by the (equally famous) astronomers Hipparchus and Posidonius over a century before the dawn of Christianity (as reported in, e.g., Cleomedes, On the Heavens 1.7; 2.1; and 2.3; and Pliny the Elder, Natural History 2.21.85). On this kind of knowledge being routine among the well-educated of the time, see my future books Science Education in the Early Roman Empire and The Scientist in the Early Roman Empire.

53. See James Tabor, Things Unutterable: Paul’s Ascent to Paradise in its Greco-Roman, Judaic, and Early Christian Contexts (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 63-68, 116-21.

54. Genesis 1.1 (‘In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth’) is a summary heading of what’s about to be described, not the first action God took, as is clear from the fact that God does not name the Heavens until he separates it out of the primordial waters (in Gen. 1.2-8), and God does not name the Earth until he makes it appear (in Gen. 1.9-10) out of material already present (Gen. 1.2). See following note.

55. On the cosmology of Genesis and its cultural background see Edward Babinski, ‘The Cosmology of the Bible’, in Christian Delusion (ed. Loftus), pp. 109-47 (119-33 for the biblical account).

56. b. Ḥagigah 12b.

57. See Daniel Stökl ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity: The Day of Atonement from Second Temple Judaism to the Fifth Century (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), p. 85.

58. For example, Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 4.25 and 7.10 (§57.5); Origen, On the First Principles 2.11.6-7; Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching 9.

59. Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2 (see also 1.3.270b) and Meteorology 1.2–1.3; etc. Plato had already voiced something like it before Aristotle turned it into a more intelligible theory (e.g. Plato, Phaedrus 246d-247d).

60. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 45.369c-d and 48.370f–49.371c. The same is assumed throughout his astrophysical treatise On the Face That Appears in the Orb of the Moon.

61. Cicero, On the Republic 6.17; Philo, On the Life of Moses 2.118-27; and Philo, On the Creation of the World 36.

62. Besides the evidence in elements to follow (36 through 39), see Margaret Barker, The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian Liturgy (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2003), pp. 207-10.

63. Plato, Symposium 202e-203a.

64. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 25.360d-27.361e (especially 25.360d-e and 26.361b-c).

65. Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles 16.418e.

66. See Jonathan Knight, Disciples of the Beloved One: The Christology, Social Setting and Theological Context of the Ascension of Isaiah (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), pp. 91-127.

67. See Marvin Meyer, ‘The Mithras Liturgy’, in The Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Amy-Jill Levine, Dale Allison Jr and John Dominic Crossan; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 184-85.

68. Philo, On Dreams 1.68-71. This is also the consistent thesis of Philo’s treatise On the Giants.

69. Origen, Against Celsus 6.21.

70. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 46.369e.

71. 1 Timothy 2.5 (‘there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus’); Heb. 8.6 (‘But now has [Christ] obtained a more excellent ministry, given that he is also the Mediator of a better covenant, which hath been enacted upon better promises’); 9.15 (Christ ‘is the Mediator of a new covenant’); 12.24 (‘and to Jesus the Mediator of a new covenant’). The ‘Mediator’ mentioned in Gal. 3.19-20 might also mean Jesus (if the unspoken assumption, or perhaps secret teaching being hinted at, is that Jesus was secretly the Lord who communicated the first law to Moses), but in any event that passage entails belief in mediator beings generally.

72. Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching 7.

73. Alex Jassen, Mediating the Divine: Prophecy and Revelation in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Second Temple Judaism (Boston: Brill, 2007); and Loren Stuckenbruck, Angel Veneration and Christology (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1995).

74. See, e.g., Michael Stone, ‘The Fall of Satan and Adam’s Penance: Three Notes on the “Books of Adam and Eve”’, Journal of Theological Studies 44 (April 1993), pp. 143-56.

75. Evidence of this pre-Christian Jewish demonology is surveyed extensively in Dale Basil Martin, ‘When Did Angels Become Demons?’, Journal of Biblical Literature 129 (2010), pp. 657-77; Martin may be a little over-fastidious in his treatment of the vocabulary (I believe the language and concepts were more fluid than he assumes), but that won’t matter for our purposes, since in English we can define ‘demon’ to mean any of these dark powers without distinction (see Chapter 4, §3), unless greater precision is, for whatever reason, both possible and necessary. At any rate, that this demonology of fallen angels and their progeny was a doctrine prevalent in the Dead Sea Scrolls is demonstrated in J.A. Sanders, ‘Dissenting Deities and Philippians 2.1-11’, Journal of Biblical Literature 88 (September 1969), pp. 279-90. For additional evidence and discussion of this intertestamental development see Archie Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6:1-4 in Early Jewish Literature (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2nd edn, 2013), and George Nickelsburg, ‘The Experience of Demons (and Angels) in 1 Enoch, Jubilees, and the Book of Tobit’, PSCO Minutes [Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins] (March 10, 1988), http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/psco/year25/8803a.shtml.

76. This is an example of reading Satan’s fall out of Isa. 14.12-15, which speaks of ‘Lucifer’ trying to set up his abode in heaven and being cast down by God. This is probably the verse being referenced in Lk. 10.18 (implying Jesus was present when that happened). Tertullian, Against Marcion 2.10, also read the vision regarding the king of Tyre in Ezek. 28.11-19 as being in fact about Satan and his fall from the Garden. See also Origen, On the First Principles 1.5.5 and Against Celsus 6.44.

77. See my analysis in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 148-54.

78. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 8.32 (8.30 for the invisibility of these souls and of the aithēr, ‘ether’, above the firmament).

79. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 25.360d–27.361e (especially 25.360d-e and 26.361b-c). On some demons being good and others evil, see also Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles 16.418e and 17.419a.

80. Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles 17.419b-e and 19.420a-b.

81. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 27.361e and 30.362e.

82. Plutarch, On the Face That Appears in the Orb of the Moon 27.942f and 27.943c. For further evidence of the widespread nature of this view and its origins see Plutarch, Moralia, Volume XII (trans. Harold Cherniss and William Helmbold; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 195-96 (note d) and 201 (note c).

83. Plutarch, On the Face That Appears in the Orb of the Moon 29.944a–30.944e; see also Moralia, Volume XII (1957), pp. 211 (note f ) and 212 (note b).

84. On Plutarch’s demonology and its ultimate origins in Zoroastrian demonology (which was the same source from which Jewish demonology developed) see J. Gwyn Griffiths, Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1970), pp. 18-33, 56, 383-87 (Griffiths traces it to the syncretism of Xenocrates, a pupil of Plato and Aristotle and eventual head of Plato’s Academy).

85. Philo, On the Giants 6-16.

86. See G.H.C. MacGregor, ‘Principalities and Powers: The Cosmic Background of Paul’s Thought’, New Testament Studies 1 (1954), pp. 17-28; Bo Reicke, ‘The Law and This World according to Paul’, Journal of Biblical Literature 70 (1951), pp. 259-76. Though this interpretation was opposed by Wesley Carr, Angels and Principalities: The Background, Meaning, and Development of the Pauline Phrase hai archai kai hai exousiai (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), he is pretty much alone, and could only reach his conclusions by engaging in specious argumentation that ignores the rest of Jewish and Christian literature and relies on assuming all passages arguing against him are conveniently ‘interpolations’. Accordingly, his methods and analysis were thoroughly refuted by Walter Wink, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984). The current view is best represented by Wink and by George H. van Kooten, Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School: Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of the Greek Texts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 95-103. See also Alan Segal, ‘Ruler of This World: Attitudes about Mediator Figures and the Importance of Sociology for Self-Definition’, in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, Vol. II, Aspects of Judaism in the Graeco-Roman Period (ed. E.P. Sanders; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1981), pp. 245-68, 403-13; and Alan Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Also of interest is Clinton Arnold, Powers of Darkness: Principalities and Powers in Paul’s Letters (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992). Although Arnold and Wink are true believers (they think demons are real), their scholarship remains apt.

87. So, e.g., Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching 85 and 96. A similar line-up appears in 1 Pet. 3.22, where Jesus is put in charge of a celestial array of ‘angels [aggeloi], authorities [exousiai], and powers [dunameis]’.

88. Paul could also mean ‘the god of this age’, the word aiōn meaning ‘era’, but often indicating the temporal realm; but since Paul certainly does not mean Satan ruled over the heavens, he clearly is referring to the sublunar domain (which would be dissolved in the end); Ignatius, Ephesians 17 and 19; Magnesians 1; Trallians 4; and Romans 7 also call Satan ‘the prince of this world’ (combining the language of Ephesians and 2 Corinthians). The same term is used for Satan in Jn 12.31; 14.30; and 16.11.

89. Rom. 16.20; 1 Cor. 5.5; 7.5; 2 Cor. 2.11; 11.13-15; 1 Thess. 2.18. See also 2 Thess. 2.3-10; Eph. 4.27; 6.11; 1 Tim. 1.20; 3.6-7; 5.15; 2 Tim. 2.26; Jas 4.7; 1 Pet. 5.8; 1 Jn 3.10, 5.19; Jude 9; and of course this is the standard doctrine throughout the Gospels and Revelation.

90. Origen, On the First Principles 1.8.4.

91. Note that (as I’ve abundantly shown) at this point in history Satan and his demons were thought to live in the sky (hence in outer space); the notion of either inhabiting (and ruling) a subterranean hell would not arise for many more centuries; that notion began originally as a doctrine about their ultimate fate after Jesus returns (e.g. Rev. 20), which later became conflated with a separate tradition that God’s own angels (not demons) will carry out future punishments in a subterranean hell (e.g. Apocalypse of Peter).

92. The word apekduomai, ‘take off from oneself’, is frequently translated here as ‘despoil, disarm’ in modern Bibles, but that actually makes little sense. In normal use, that word would mean ‘take off for oneself’, which would have to mean he took the principalities and powers for himself, but this sentence is about the beings, not their offices, so that translation cannot be correct; it confuses what is actually being said here. This word usually refers to undressing oneself (e.g. Col. 3.9), and thus is surely meant here to say that Christ freed himself from their power (casting off their authority over him).

93. See Reicke, ‘The Law and This World according to Paul’. See Testament of Solomon 34 for a later example of demons referring to themselves as ‘elements’ (we would now say ‘elementals’).

94. See the analysis of Andrew Lincoln, ‘The “Philosophy” Opposed in the Letter [to the Colossians]’, in The New Interpreter’s Bible: New Testament Survey (ed. Fred Craddock; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2005), pp. 242-47.

95. For example, Ignatius, Trallians 5; Smyrnaeans 6; and the Syriac Ephesians 3.9. And in Origen’s introductory textbook for new initiates, although by his time much of the doctrine seems to have been lost (as he professes not to know certain things that were clearly known to Paul and his congregations): Origen, On the First Principles 1.5.2.

96. For examples of other objects and structures in the heavens (roads, houses, pens, scrolls, chariots) see, again, Babinski, ‘Cosmology’, in Christian Delusion (ed. Loftus) along with Jaco Gericke, ‘Can God Exist if Yahweh Doesn’t?’, in End of Christianity (ed. Loftus), pp. 131-54 (esp. pp. 144-49).

97. Revelation of Moses 37.4-5; 40.1-2. This text is otherwise known as the Greek edition of the Life of Adam and Eve, an early-first-century Jewish document, possibly translating an even earlier account in Hebrew or Aramaic. See also 2 En. 8.1–9.1 [redaction A and B] and 42.3 [redaction A].

98. Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching 11.

99. Philo, On the Life of Moses 2.118-27.

100. Philo, On the Creation of the World 29-31, 36, 70-71.

101. Philo, On the Creation of the World 29, 31.

102. Philo, On the Creation of the World 70-71.

103. Philo, On the Creation of the World 36.

104. Plato, Phaedrus 246d-247d.

105. Revelation of Moses 32–41 (esp. 32.4, 37–40); see also Tabor, Things Unutterable, p. 116. Obviously the canonical NT book of Revelation likewise depicts heaven as full of places, structures and objects.

106. Revelation of Moses 21.6.

107. Philo, On the Creation of the World 134-36.

108. Philo, On the Creation of the World 153-65.

109. Philo, Questions and Answers on Genesis 1.8.

110. Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.4-5.

111. Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 1.31.

112. See Stephen Hultgren, ‘The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine of the Two Adams in 1 Corinthians 15.45-49’, Journal for the Study of the New Testament 25 (2003), pp. 343-70 (note that even Hultgren misses some of the evidence I include here); and Stefan Nordgaard, ‘Paul’s Appropriation of Philo’s Theory of “Two Men” in 1 Corinthians 15.45-49’, New Testament Studies 57 (2011), pp. 348-65.

113. See Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 110-50.

114. Hultgren, ‘The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine’, pp. 344-46, 350.

115. Origen, Against Celsus 2.64-67.

116. Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 62-63.

117. Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 63.

118. Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 146-47.

119. Philo, On Dreams 1.215; see also Philo, On the Giants 52. That the ‘divine Logos’ is the ‘image of God’ is also explicitly declared in Philo, On the Creation 31 as well as in Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 62, 97 and 147; On Dreams 1.239; 2.45; The Special Laws 1.81; On Flight and Finding 101. That this is an intermediary being (per Element 36), see Philo, Who Is the Heir of Things Divine? 205-206. For more sources on this Jewish doctrine of the ‘Logos’ as a divine being, which Christianity simply co-opted, see Daniel Boyarin’s commentary in Amy-Jill Levine and Marc Zvi Brettler (eds.), The Jewish Annotated New Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 546-49.

120. The one through whom the universe was created: Philo, On Allegorical Interpretation 3.96 and The Special Laws 1.81. That over all the universe ‘God put in charge his own true Logos, his firstborn Son, who is to take charge of his sacred flock, like the prefect of a great king’, see Philo, On Agriculture 50-52. Curiously, Philo immediately goes on to say that we can know this is true because ‘it is written, ‘Behold, I am he and I will send my messenger [lit. “my angel”] into your presence, who shall guard you on the road’, which is a partial quotation of Exod. 23.20 (concluding ‘and bring you to the place which I have prepared’), which happens to be the very scripture with which Mark begins his Gospel: ‘The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God: as it is written in the prophets: “Behold, I send My messenger into your presence, who shall prepare the road for you”’ (Mk 1.2), which Mark alters at the end to mean John the Baptist, but the original scripture clearly indicates (just as Philo understood it to) that the messenger (lit. ‘angel’) is the one who will protect us and bring us to salvation (and, according to Philo, that was the ‘firstborn son of God’, the Logos), not the one who will ‘prepare’ the way for him. I can only speculate, but must wonder: is it possible that in the original text (whatever may have been Mark’s source), the Gospel began with this verse referring to Jesus (and thus quoting Exodus correctly), and that this was altered by Mark so as to fit John the Baptist into the story (where evidently he had not been before)? Unfortunately we cannot know for sure.

121. That we ought to imitate Christ: 1 Cor. 11.1; Rom. 8.29; 1 Cor. 15.49; 2 Cor. 3.18.

122. See Hultgren, ‘Origin of Paul’s Doctrine’, pp. 350-54.

123. See Sean McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). McDonough provides a considerable survey of relevant background knowledge establishing the very early development of the Christian doctrine of Christ as the agent of Creation (which is only corroborated by the evidence I survey here and in Element 10), although I believe his analysis of the Gospels has things the wrong way around (e.g. Mark was not inspired to believe Jesus is the Creator by any actual historical reports; rather, Mark is inventing narratives that cast Jesus in the role of Creator: see, e.g., on how this would have originated the idea that he was a carpenter or the son of a carpenter, in Chapter 10, §4).

124. Jesus is God’s ‘eternal high priest’ in later Christian thought as well (e.g. Polycarp, Philippians 12).

125. Philo, Questions and Answers on Genesis 2.62.

126. Philo, On Dreams 1.215 (ho pros alētheian anthrōpos).

127. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 54.373b; 67.377f (Osiris is also called ‘the first’ and ‘the lord’, 2.351f-352a). The idea of a divine ‘Logos’ was a widespread cross-cultural theological meme in antiquity: see Glenn Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.16.2 (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1978), pp. 1310-32.

128. Philo, On the Life of Moses 2.134-35. In On the Life of Moses 2.99, Philo also says God has two ‘powers’, the one that is called God (the Creator), and the one that is called Lord (the king and judge); it’s reasonable to see how God could assign the second power to a subordinate (Jesus), thereby making him Lord. There are numerous passages in Paul that would confirm this theological model, but it’s not important to the present discussion.

129. As Hugh Anderson concludes for the book of Hebrews, its ‘author shared the same thought world as Philo, and that he drew on the same Greek rhetorical and philosophical sources for much of his vocabulary and many of his ideas is irrefutable’: Hugh Anderson, ‘The Jewish Antecedents of the Christology in Hebrews’, in The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity (ed. James Charlesworth; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 512-35 (518).

130. 1 Enoch 39, 45-46, 48-49, 51-53, 55, 61-62, 69, 71. See Carrier, Proving History, pp. 150-51; and for detailed inquiry into the apocalyptic Son of Man concept and its Jewish origins see (and compare): Maurice Casey, ‘Son of Man’, in The Historical Jesus in Recent Research (ed. James Dunn and Scot McKnight; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), pp. 315-24; Thomas Kazen, ‘The Coming of the Son of Man Revisited’, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 5 (June 2007), pp. 155-74; Mogens Müller, The Expression ‘Son of Man’ and the Development of Christology: A History of Interpretation (Oakville, CT: Equinox, 2008); Larry Hurtado and Paul Owen (eds.), Who Is This Son of Man? The Latest Scholarship on a Puzzling Expression of the Historical Jesus (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2011); Leslie Walck, The Son of Man in the Parables of Enoch and in Matthew (London: T. & T. Clark, 2011). See also John Gager, ‘The Gospels and Jesus: Some Doubts about Method’, Journal of Religion 54 (July 1974), pp. 244-72 (264-66); Edwin Broadhead, ‘Reconfiguring Jesus: The Son of Man in Markan Perspective’, in Biblical Interpretation in Early Christian Gospels. Vol. 1, The Gospel of Mark (ed. Thomas R. Hatina; New York: T. & T. Clark, 2006), pp. 18-30; and Daniel Boyarin, The Jewish Gospels: The Story of the Jewish Christ (New York: The New Press, 2012).

131. 1 Enoch 46; 48.5-6, 11; 68.38. Jesus: Ignatius, Philadelphians 9; Col. 2.2-3. See also Rom. 16.25-26; 1 Cor. 2.7-10 and 4.1; Eph. 1.3-10 and 3.1-5; Col. 1.26-27.

132. 1 Enoch 61.10-18. Jesus: Phil. 2.5-11 (cf. 1 Cor. 2.7-9).

133. J. Harold Ellens, ‘The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Son of Man: An Assessment of 11Q13’, Henoch 33 (2011), pp. 77-87.

134. 11QMelchizedek (11Q13); for text, translation and notes see John Sietze Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran: A History of Interpretation (Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 277-91; and Alex Jassen, Mediating the Divine: Prophecy and Revelation in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Second Temple Judaism (Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 90-95; on the debate over whether Melchizedek is the Christ in this passage, see Lara Guglielmo, ‘11Q13, Malchî Sedek, Co-Reference, and Restoration of 2 18’, Henoch 33 (2011), pp. 62, as well as Jassen, p. 93 n. 31; and Bergsma, p. 289; Guglielmo and Bergsma make far more convincing arguments. See also Florentino García Martínez and Eibert J.C. Tigchelaar (eds.), Qumranica minora, Vol. II (Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 18-20 and 98-108 (esp. pp. 100-102, with the note in Element 5 on the two-messiah tradition at Qumran).

135. Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 3.79-89; §82 seems to imply that Melchizedek is the Logos (particularly in light of 80-81 before it) but not explicitly enough to be certain. See also Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 4.25; and Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 1.180.

136. Stökl ben Ezra, Impact of Yom Kippur, pp. 90-92.

137. Charles Gieschen, ‘The Different Functions of a Similar Melchizedek Tradition in 2 Enoch and the Epistle to the Hebrews’, in Early Christian Interpretation of the Scriptures of Israel: Investigations and Proposals (ed. Craig Evans and James Sanders; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), pp. 364-79 (378-79).

138. Crispin Fletcher-Louis, ‘Jesus as the High Priestly Messiah: Part 1’ and ‘Part 2’, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 4 (2006), pp. 155-75 and 5 (2007), pp. 157-79.

139. Hebrews 7.1-3 (in its full context: 7.1–9.28). Earlier in Hebrews (Heb. 5–6) the authors explain that what they mean by connecting Jesus to Melchizedek involves matters crossing too much into secret teachings that the letter’s recipients might not be ready to hear; it’s possible this latter part of the letter constitutes that advanced teaching (which only those of sufficient rank would proceed to), unless something else even more esoteric was being hinted at there.

140. See Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 24-34, 221-31, 240-45 and following note.

141. Robert Doran, ‘Narratives of Noble Death’, in The Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Levine, Allison and Crossan), pp. 385-99, esp. 389-92 (Jewish martyrs) and 392-99 (pagan martyrs); and Jarvis Williams, Maccabean Martyr Traditions in Paul’s Theology of Atonement: Did Martyr Theology Shape Paul’s Conception of Jesus’s Death? (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2010), pp. 27-63.

142. See Carrier, Proving History, pp. 131-34, 141.

143. Several examples are documented in Doran, ‘Narratives of Noble Death’, pp. 385-99 (387-88 on Decius); and Walter Burkert, Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 59-77 (and its connection with animal sacrifice: pp. 54-55).

144. Hendrik Simon Versnel, ‘Two Types of Roman devotio’, Mnemosyne 29 (1976), pp. 365-410; and Hendrik Simon Versnel, ‘Self-Sacrifice, Compensation and the Anonymous Gods’, in Le sacrifice dans l’antiquité (ed. Jean Pierre Vernant et al.; Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1980), pp. 135-94.

145. Doran, ‘Narratives of Noble Death’, p. 388; Livy, From the Foundation of the City 8.9–8.10.

146. Doran, ‘Narratives of Noble Death’, p. 387; Justin Trogus, Epitome of Pompeius Trogus 2.6.16-21. There were apparently many other examples then widely known: see Stökl ben Ezra, Impact of Yom Kippur, pp. 171-73; and Jennifer K. Berenson Maclean, ‘Barabbas, the Scapegoat Ritual, and the Development of the Passion Narrative’, Harvard Theological Review 100 (July 2007), pp. 309-34 (esp. 313-16).

147. 4 Maccabees 17.20-22; see Stökl ben Ezra, Impact of Yom Kippur, pp. 115-17; Burton Mack, ‘The Christ and Jewish Wisdom’, in The Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity (ed. James Charlesworth; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 192-221 (206); and Jintae Kim, ‘The Concept of Atonement in the Fourth Servant Song in the LXX’, Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism 8 (2011–2012), pp. 21-33; and Jintae Kim, ‘The Concept of Atonement in Early Rabbinic Thought and the New Testament Writings’, Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism 2 (2001–2005), pp. 117-45. That this thinking had influenced the development of early Christianity is argued in Jarvis Williams, Maccabean Martyr Traditions.

148. King David resorted to human sacrifice, crucifying the sons of Saul at the beginning of the harvest, to appease the Lord and atone for the sins of Israel in order to persuade Jehovah to end a famine (and it worked: 2 Sam. 21.1-14; it might not be a coincidence that the ‘seven sons’ here slain correspond to the ‘seven sons’ slain in 4 Maccabees; notably in 2 Samuel the atonement sacrifice occurs the day after Passover, exactly when Jesus is killed; that being the day when the barley harvest begins, the first of the harvests: Deut. 16.9-10; Lev. 23.11). A plague had similarly been lifted by Aaron and Moses by performing a human sacrifice to appease Jehovah (spearing an interracial couple and crucifying apostate leaders: Num. 25.1-8), an act which again atoned for the sins of Israel (Num. 25.13). On human sacrifice in the OT and ancient Israelite religion generally see End of Christianity (ed. Loftus), pp. 146-47, 186-88; Christian Delusion (ed. Loftus), pp. 226-27.

149. Plato, Republic 2.361b-362a.

150. Karin Finsterbusch, ‘The First-Born between Sacrifice and Redemption in the Hebrew Bible’, in Human Sacrifice in Jewish and Christian Tradition (ed. Karin Finsterbusch, Armin Lange and K.F. Diethard Römheld; Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 87-108 (87); see, e.g., Deut. 15.19-22 and 14.22; Num. 18.16; Exod. 13; 22.29-30; etc. The underlying religious logic of sacrificing people or animals manifested a primitive concept of ‘redirected vengeance’ to expiate divine anger: see René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (trans. Patrick Gregory; Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); and Yitzhaq Feder, Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical Ritual: Origins, Context, and Meaning (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011).

151. Jon Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Trans­formation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993).

152. Levenson, Death and Resurrection, pp. 176-77 (with much more evidence throughout pp. 173-99).

153. Levenson, Death and Resurrection, pp. 210-19. The connections with the Isaac narrative are more obvious (e.g. Gal. 3.16; 4.28, etc.); the connections with the Passover narrative appear by allusion in Paul’s slavery and freedom metaphor (vs. turning back to the material world: cf. Exod. 16.1-3; Num. 14.1-4), in Gal. 4.3, 8-9; in the contrast made between Sinai and Jerusalem (Gal. 4.25-26); and being saved because you are ‘known’ by God (Gal. 4.9), just as the Israelites are ‘known’ by the Lord and thus passed over (Exod. 12.11-14, 23).

154. Similarly, ‘if Jesus is the true Isaac, and the Church is the body of Jesus’ (as Paul argues in, e.g., Rom. 12.4-5; 1 Cor. 12.27, etc.), then ‘it follows . . . that the Church . . . must see itself in the role of Isaac, that is, as the promised son of the freeborn woman’ in Galatians 4 (Levenson, Death and Resurrection, pp. 212, 217). Jesus therefore is the lamb substituted for Isaac, thereby sparing Isaac, in other words the church. Thus the salvation logic of earliest Christianity made perfect sense within the Jewish worldview no matter which way one looked at it.

155. The fictionality of the Enochic literature is self-evident. On the Maccabean literature as historical fiction: Sara Raup Johnson, Historical Fictions and Hellenistic Jewish Identity: Third Maccabees in its Cultural Context (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); in fact, Johnson concludes, not only is ‘the historical truth of the events’ recorded in 3 Maccabees ‘simply irrelevant’ to its author, except insofar as to make his story seem true (p. 218), but the ‘juxtaposition of history and fiction, combining historical verisimilitude with a remarkable disregard for historical accuracy, [is] characteristic of a wide variety of Jewish Hellenistic texts’ (p. 217).

156. See, e.g., Esther Chazon, Michael Stone and Avital Pinnick (eds.), Pseudepigraphic Perspectives: The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls (Leiden: Brill, 1999); the Sheffield Academic Press series Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (1995–); David Aune, The New Testament in its Literary Environment (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1987); James Charlesworth (ed.), The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (2 vols.; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983–1985); George Wesley Buchanan, Jewish Documents of Deliverance from the Fall of Jerusalem to the Death of Nahmanides (Dillsboro, NC: Western North Carolina Press, 1978); and so on. See also Craig Evans (ed.), The Interpretation of Scripture in Early Judaism and Christianity: Studies in Language and Tradition (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000); and Lawrence Wills (ed.), Ancient Jewish Novels: An Anthology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

157. See, e.g., Israel Finkelstein and Neil Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology’s New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of its Sacred Texts (New York: Free Press, 2001); and Israel Finkelstein and Amihai Mazar, The Quest for the Historical Israel: Debating Archaeology and the History of Early Israel (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007); Thomas Thompson, The Mythic Past: Biblical Archaeology and the Myth of Israel (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Thomas Thompson, Early History of the Israelite People: From the Written and Archaeological Sources (New York: Brill, 1992); and Thomas Thompson, The Historicity of the Patriarchal Narratives: The Quest for the Historical Abraham (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1974); William Dever, What Did the Biblical Writers Know, and When Did They Know It? What Archaeology Can Tell Us about the Reality of Ancient Israel (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2001); Hector Avalos, The End of Biblical Studies (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2007). See also The New Interpreter’s Bible: Old Testament Survey (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006).

158. In fact most of it is probably complete fabrication, stories added century after century as new points needed to be made: see Susanne Otto, ‘The Composition of the Elijah–Elisha Stories and the Deuteronomistic History’, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 27 (June 2003), pp. 487-508.

159. Frederick Murphy, Pseudo-Philo: Rewriting the Bible (New York: Oxford Uni­ver­sity Press, 1993). There are interesting parallels between this work and the canonical book of Acts, the case for which is unfortunately still only accessible in German: Eckart Reinmuth, Pseudo-Philo und Lukas: Studien zum Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum und seiner Bedeutung für die Interpretation des lukanischen Doppelwerks (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994).

160. See, e.g., Alan Avery-Peck, ‘The Galilean Charismatic and Rabbinic Piety: The Holy Man in the Talmudic Literature’, in The Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Levine, Allison and Crossan), pp. 149-65.

161. See, e.g., Jo-Ann Brant, Charles Hedrick and Chris Shea (eds.), Ancient Fiction: The Matrix of Early Christian and Jewish Narrative (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005); A.J. Droge, ‘“The Lying Pen of the Scribes”: Of Holy Books and Pious Frauds’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 15 (2003), pp. 117-47; and Bruce Metzger, ‘Literary Forgeries and Canonical Pseudepigrapha’, in New Testament Studies: Philological, Versional, and Patristic (Leiden: Brill, 1980), pp. 1-22.

162. On all of the above see Alan Cameron, Greek Mythography in the Roman World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Justin Meggitt, ‘Popular Mythology in the Early Empire and the Multiplicity of Jesus Traditions’, in Sources of the Jesus Tradition: Separating History from Myth (ed. R. Joseph Hoffmann; Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2010), pp. 55-80.

163. Even the ancients themselves knew this, and complained about it constantly; and modern historians have long known it and articulated the point extensively. See, e.g., my analysis in Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, pp. 161-81; and Carrier, ‘Why the Resurrection Is Unbelievable’, in Christian Delusion (ed. Loftus), pp. 291-96; and the surveys in Charles Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983); Colin Hemer, ‘Ancient Historiography’, in The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989), pp. 63-100; Averil Cameron (ed.), History as Text: The Writing of Ancient History (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Michael Grant, Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation (New York: Routledge, 1995); John Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

164. See in particular (besides the scholarship in the previous note) F.W. Wallbank, ‘Speeches in Greek Historians’, in Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 242-61; A.B. Bosworth, From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 94-134; Ronald R. Newell, ‘The Forms and Historical Value of Josephus’ Suicide Accounts’, in Josephus, the Bible, and History (ed. Louis Feldman and Gohei Hata; Leiden: Brill, 1989), pp. 278-94; Conrad Gempf, ‘Public Speaking and Published Accounts’, in The Book of Acts in its First Century Setting: I: Ancient Literary Setting (ed. Bruce Winter and Andrew D. Clarke; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), pp. 259-303. See also Fornara, Nature of History, pp. 142-68; Hemer, Book of Acts, pp. 63-100; Grant, Greek and Roman Historians, pp. 44-53; etc.

165. This phenomenon as a whole is surveyed well in Bart Ehrman, Forged (New York: HarperOne, 2011), and Forgery and Counterforgery: The Use of Literary Deceit in Early Christian Polemics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). For the pagan context in particular, see pp. 13-42; the rest surveys countless examples in early Christian history.

166. C.D.N. Costa, Greek Fictional Letters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Patricia Rosenmeyer, Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

167. See, e.g., Erich Gruen, ‘Fact and Fiction: Jewish Legends in a Hellenistic Context’, in Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography (ed. Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey and Erich Gruen; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 72-88.

168. Mary Lefkowitz, The Lives of the Greek Poets (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Mary Lefkowitz, ‘Biographical Mythology’, in Antike Mythen: Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen (ed. Ueli Dill; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 516-31; Janet Fairweather, ‘Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers’, Ancient Society 5 (1974), pp. 231-75; and Janet Fairweather, ‘Traditional Narrative, Inference, and Truth in the Lives of the Greek Poets’, Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar 4 (1983), pp. 315-69; Barbara Graziosi, Inventing Homer: The Early Reception of Epic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ava Chitwood, Death by Philosophy: The Biographical Tradition in the Life and Death of the Archaic Philosophers Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Democritus (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004). See also Bruno Gentili and Giovanni Cerri, History and Biography in Ancient Thought (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1988). This fact is conceded all too briefly by Richard Burridge, What Are the Gospels? A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 138-39.

169. On why passing myths off as facts always conferred a rhetorical advantage and thus would almost always inevitably occur and win out, see Chapter 8 (§12).

170. James Crossley, ‘Against the Historical Plausibility of the Empty Tomb Story and the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus’, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3 (June 2005), pp. 171-86 (178-82).

171. Many examples are collected, discussed or listed in Bart Ehrman, Lost Scriptures: Books That Did Not Make It into the New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Bart Ehrman, Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Price, Pre-Nicene New Testament (e.g. pp. 841-49 [3 and 4 Peter], pp. 885-86 [Letter of Jesus to Abgar], pp. 1141-44 [3 Corinthians]); John Loftus, Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), pp. 167-76; David Trobisch, ‘Who Published the Christian Bible?’, CSER Review 2.1 (2007), pp. 29-30; and, most extensively, F. Lapham, Introduction to the New Testament Apocrypha (London: T. & T. Clark International, 2003); Wilhelm Schneemelcher and R. McL. Wilson (eds.), New Testament Apocrypha, Vols. I and II (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991); and James H. Charlesworth (ed.), The New Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha: A Guide to Publications with Excursuses on Apocalypses (Chicago: American Theological Library Association, 1987). For the ‘Decree of Tiberius’ see Tertullian, Apology 5. The Shepherd of Hermas, which along with Barnabas was once in the orthodox Christian canon, was also likely forged or redacted over time (Price, Pre-Nicene New Testament, pp. 1001-89).

172. Christopher Tuckett, ‘Forty Other Gospels’, in The Written Gospel (ed. Markus Bockmuehl and Donald Hagner; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 238-53; Charles Hedrick, ‘The 34 Gospels: Diversity and Division among the Earliest Christians’, Bible Review 18 (June 2002), pp. 20-31, 46-47; Helmut Koester, ‘Apocryphal and Canonical Gospels’, Harvard Theological Review 73 (January–April 1980), pp. 105-30. None of these lists are complete. See, e.g., Rodolphe Kasser et al., The Gospel of Judas: From Codex Tchacos (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2006); R. Blackhirst, ‘Barnabas and the Gospels: Was There an Early Gospel of Barnabas?’, Journal of Higher Criticism 7 (Spring 2000), pp. 1-22. Among the ‘other’ Acts are the Acts of Peter, Acts of Philip, Acts of John, Acts of Paul, Acts of Thomas, Acts of Pilate and the Acts of Andrew. Note that if we are to presume that four out of forty Gospels were authentic, then the prior probability that any specific Gospel is authentic will be only one in ten at best. For any given Acts, those chances are one in eight. In other words, probably not.

173. Besides the countless examples referenced in the sources in the previous note, see, in general, D.A. Carson, ‘Pseudonymity and Pseudepigraphy’, in Dictionary of New Testament Background (ed. Evans and Porter), pp. 857-64.

174. See, again, Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 22.359e–24.360c and 29.362c.

175. See Jacob Stern, ‘Heraclitus the Paradoxographer: Peri Apistōn, “On Unbelievable Tales”’, Transactions of the American Philological Association 133 (Spring 2003), pp. 51-97 (who treats the entire genre as well as the specific work in the title).

176. That this was believed about Jesus: Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 88; Tertullian, On the Flesh of Christ 9; Clement of Alexandria, The Instructor 3.1; Origen, Against Celsus 6.75; cf. Isa. 52.14; 53.2-3. For Aesop: Lawrence Wills, ‘The Aesop Tradition’, in Historical Jesus in Context (ed. Levine, Allison and Crossan), pp. 222-37 (223); for Socrates: Kenneth Lapin, ‘Picturing Socrates’, in A Companion to Socrates (ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 110-55.

177. Aesop was given a spirit that gave him a supernatural power of speaking; Socrates was given a spirit that spoke to him and counseled him toward wisdom; and Jesus, of course, was given the Holy Spirit.

178. Emily Wilson, The Death of Socrates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 141. Discussing the parallels between Jesus and Socrates: Paul Gooch, Reflections on Jesus and Socrates: Word and Silence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 12-16; James Hankins, ‘Socrates in the Italian Renaissance’, in A Companion to Socrates (ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 337-52 (348); and Wilson, Death of Socrates, pp. 141-69.

179. Socrates’ links to Cynicism: Susan Prince, ‘Socrates, Antisthenes, and the Cynics’, in Companion to Socrates (ed. Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar), pp. 75-92; and Luis Navia, Socrates: A Life Examined (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007).

180. B.E. Perry, Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop (Haverford, PA: American Philological Association, 1936). See the earliest redaction of the Life of Aesop 1-19 for Aesop’s nativity story, and Life of Aesop 91-142 for his passion story (concluding in his death). See also Anton Wiechers, Aesop in Delphi (Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1961); B.E. Perry, ‘Demetrius of Phalerum and the Aesopic Fables’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 93 (1962), pp. 287-346; Leslie Kurke, ‘Aesop and the Contestation of Delphic Authority’, in The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration (ed. Carol Dougherty and Leslie Kurke; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 77-100; Wills, ‘The Aesop Tradition’; and David Watson, ‘The Life of Aesop and the Gospel of Mark: Two Ancient Approaches to Elite Values’, Journal of Biblical Literature 129 (2010), pp. 699-716.

181. All references to him are centuries late and based on legendary assumptions that stem from his later faith narrative, not contemporary documents or witnesses. See previous note for scholarship on the evidence for Aesop and what can be said regarding his historicity. The best case for his historicity is attempted in Nikoletta Kanavou, ‘Personal Names in the Vita Aesopi (Vita G or Perriana)’, Classical Quarterly 56 (May 2006), pp. 208-19, but even she is uncertain of the strength of her case, and she overlooks the fact that her only real argument, that Aesop was a common Thracian slave name (pp. 218-19), could in fact be how the mythic name was assigned to previously anonymous fables: a common slave-type was drawn up, assigned a common slave-name, assigned to the fables, and then a biography built up around the figure thus created.

182. Gary Forsythe, A Critical History of Early Rome (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 93-102; Robin Hard and H.J. Rose, The Routledge Handbook of Greek Mythology (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 600-602; Timothy Wiseman, The Myths of Rome (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2004), pp. 138-48; Dylan Saylor, ‘Dirty Linen, Fabrication, and the Authorities of Livy and Augustus’, Transactions of the American Philological Association 136 (Autumn 2006), pp. 329-88.

183. Rex Stem, ‘The Exemplary Lessons of Livy’s Romulus’, Transactions of the American Philological Association 137.2 (Autumn 2007), pp. 435-71.

184. Hans Dieter Betz, ‘Plutarch’s Life of Numa: Some Observations on Graeco-Roman “Messianism”’, in Redemption and Resistance: The Messianic Hopes of Jews and Christians in Antiquity (ed. Markus Bockmuehl and James Carleton Paget; New York: T. & T. Clark, 2007), pp. 44-62.

185. See the extensive treatment of this point (and discussion of all the heroes who match the type) in Richard Miller, ‘Mark’s Empty Tomb and Other Translation Fables in Classical Antiquity’, Journal of Biblical Literature 129 (2010), pp. 759-76. In the following I have adapted his table of parallels from pp. 772-73, but changing their order.

186. See first note in Chapter 4, §1, and my discussion in Carrier, ‘Spiritual Body’, in Empty Tomb (ed. Price and Lowder), pp. 182-84 (with pp. 154, 190-93).

187. A mathematical objection is sometimes raised here using the Lincoln–Kennedy coincidences as a counter-example (see the analysis at Snopes.com: http://www.snopes.com/history/american/lincoln-kennedy.asp). The reasoning being that clearly there is no causal relation in that case, therefore large lists of coincidences can occur by chance (an example of the multiple comparisons fallacy). However, this is an invalid analogy for two reasons: first, the coincidences in the Lincoln–Kennedy case are all trivial and meaningless and most have no conceptual connection with each other (moreover, some are actually false; the number of ‘true’ coincidences is only fifteen); second, the amount of available data on Lincoln and Kennedy is vast compared to that on Romulus and Jesus or any other ancient person, mythical or historical (due to the enormous disparity in survival of sources and documents from the two periods). Combine those two conditions and the likelihood of a long list of parallels occurring purely by chance is high (since no rules govern which parallels ‘count’ and there are so many data points, so the frequency of random parallels is high). But when neither condition obtains, the frequency is not high. In the Romulus–Jesus case, the probability is extremely low that the filter destroying almost all data about them would just ‘by coincidence’ preserve twenty meaningful and substantial parallels conceptually connected to each of their death-and-resurrection accounts. The Lincoln–Kennedy coincidences, e.g., are often highly likely to occur between any two people (millions of people have the same number of letters in their name, for example); whereas the Romulus–Jesus parallels are not (how many people are hailed son of god? How many have the world covered by a supernatural darkness at their deaths? How many have their corpses conspicuously vanish? How many visit their friends on the road from their city in a resurrected body to commission them to spread their gospel? Etc.). Thus, even with a large database, twenty such parallels would be unlikely; it is only the more so with so small a database. Most of the Lincoln–Kennedy coincidences have, again, no conceptual connection to each other (what has the year of a man’s birth to do with the nature of his death?); but the Romulus–Jesus parallels do (all relate to describing the narratives of their deaths, and the religious aftermath directly connected thereto). Thus, the ability to find connected data points unconstrained by any parameters does not obtain in the latter case, greatly reducing the probability of even trivial parallels, much less substantial ones (e.g. if I get to count any coincidences between two people, I can always find some; but if I am required to find only coincidences pertaining to the accounts of their death, not so much—except insofar as I am counting things that are frequently true of deaths in general, but none of the Romulus–Jesus parallels are such). When we get to the next element (Element 48), the probability of coincidence as explanation plummets (as to get many parallels between any two people is one thing, but to find them across a dozen people is wholly another), and yet in that instance the fact that that probability is extremely low won’t even matter (as I’ll explain in Chapter 6). On the matter of discerning meaningful coincidences generally, see discussion in Carrier, Proving History, pp. 192-204.

188. Alan Segal (ed.), In Quest of the Hero (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

189. See, e.g., Charles Talbert, What Is a Gospel? The Genre of the Canonical Gospels (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1977). Unquestionable miracle workers on the following list are Moses, Jesus, Theseus (who returned from the dead to fight supernaturally in wartime), Dionysus, Hercules (apart from his own supernatural feats in life, as a deity he answered prayers), Zeus, Osiris and Asclepius (the latter three were celebrated miracle-bringing gods), which already is more than half the list (eight in all). Others on the Rank–Raglan list may also have miracle legends associated with them.

190. I thank Loren Petrich and Aaron Adair for pointing this out and providing research confirming it. Those who share this element would include (besides obviously Jesus): Moses (Exod. 1.8-10, 22, and Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews 2.205-208); Oedipus (Sophocles, Oedipus the King 705-25, 785-99, 849-59); Perseus (Apollodorus, The Library 2.4.1-4); Romulus (Livy, From the Founding of the City 1.3-1.5); Theseus (David Kovacs, ‘And Baby Makes Three: Aegeus’ Wife as Mother-to-Be of Theseus in Euripides’ Medea’, Classical Philology 103 [July 2008], pp. 298-304); Jason (Apollonius of Rhodes, Argonautica 1.5); Pelops (‘Pelops’ and ‘Hippodamia’, Oxford Classical Dictionary [ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 1995], pp. 1134, 711); and Hercules (Marco Fantuzzi and Richard Hunter, Tradition and Innovation in Hellenistic Poetry [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004], pp. 125, 205-207). Which is again more than half the list (nine in all). It is entirely possible others on the Rank–Raglan list also met this criterion.

191. These scores are taken from Segal (ed.), Quest, pp. 138-44; except the scoring for Osiris is my own, based on the information in Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris; and I have reduced some scores based on my own examination of the evidence (applying the criteria must be reasonably rigorous to be meaningful: see earlier note on the Lincoln–Kennedy case).

192. For Moses and Joseph, see references in earlier note. The others hardly need a reference. They’ve been recognized as mythical throughout the last century of classical scholarship. Any inquiry into their origins ends the same: they began as deities long before they were translated into men and placed into history (e.g. Hercules, Dionysus, Osiris) or they began as heroic characters in absurdist supernatural dramas that have no plausible claim to historicity (e.g. Jason, Perseus, Bellerophon).

193. Alexander the Great and Mithradates of Pontus are the only historical figures who come close: Alexander scoring items 2-4, 9-10, 12, 16-17 and 22, for only 10 points; Mithradates, items 1-2, 10, 12-14, 16-17, 20 and 22, for likewise 10. They can only be grossly overscored by an inappropriately loose assignment of criteria. One might propose Alexander rates 13, e.g., by scoring items 13, 15, and 18 but (a) Alexander only dealt with occasionally disobedient troops, assassins and rebellions by conquered peoples and he was never in any significant way ‘abandoned’ by the gods or the Macedonians; (b) his cause of death was disputed, not mysterious (and it involved nothing supernatural); (c) his body didn’t vanish, but was taken to Egypt by his general Ptolemy where it remained to be viewed for centuries. In the same respect, contra Adrienne Mayor (The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithradates, Rome’s Deadliest Enemy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010], pp. 371-76), stories of attempts to assassinate Mithradates during his childhood and teen years do not correspond to attempting to kill him ‘as a baby’, and at once disqualify him from the criterion ‘we are told nothing of his childhood’. He was also not explicitly identified as the son of a god; there is no actual evidence his parents were related; a comet corresponding with his conception and birth does not relate to how he was conceived; he was not actually spirited away as a baby or raised in a foreign land (but merely traveled his own land incognito as a teen); having never left his kingdom as a child, he can’t have ‘returned’ to it; wars during his reign disqualify him from ‘reigns uneventfully’, and do not correlate with battling a single great foe before ascending his throne; there was nothing actually mysterious or supernatural about his death; his body never vanishes; and not having vanished, his body can’t ‘yet still have’ a tomb (it is just simply entombed).

194. Note that crucifixion was supposed to take days to kill; thus Jesus’ rapid death is itself mysterious: even Pilate is surprised by it (Mk 15.44), and the centurion amazed by it (Mt. 27.54). It also is accompanied by an abundance of prodigies, establishing it as mysterious and supernaturally potent.

195. For Satan as adversary, serpent, and prince of the world, see Element 37; For Satan as dragon: Rev. 12.9; 20.2; Satan as devouring beast: 1 Pet. 5.8; as prince or ruler, and metaphor of ‘doing battle’ with Satan’: Eph. 2.2; 6.11-12. Satan has a ‘kingdom’ (which would make him a king): Lk. 4.5-6; 11.18. Jesus ‘doing battle’ with Satan: ‘and he was there in the wilderness forty days, tempted by Satan, and was with the wild beasts, and the angels ministered unto him’ (Mk 1.13) is expanded into a more elaborate spiritual battle in Mt. 4.1-11 and Lk. 4.1-13; Satan has power over death, and ‘death’ is the last enemy Jesus will defeat: Heb. 2.14; 1 Cor. 15.25-26; 15.54-57.

196. 2 Cor. 2.2; Eph. 5.22-25; Mk 2.19-20; Mt. 9.15; 25.1-13 (also perhaps 22.1-10); Lk. 5.34-35; Jn 3.27-30; Rev. 19.7-9 and 21.2; and perhaps also implied in Rom. 7.1-6 and Rev. 22.17. Origen explained this concept at length: see R.P. Lawson, Origen: The Song of Songs, Commentary and Homilies (Ancient Christian Writers, 26; London: Longmans, Green, 1957).

197. Attempts to deny this always devolve into specious apologetics. For example, in Richard Horsley, The Liberation of Christmas: The Infancy Narratives in Social Context (New York: Crossroad, 1989), pp. 162-72 (163), it is claimed Jesus can’t be considered a ‘king’ because ‘Jesus explicitly refuses to become a king’ (no citation is given for that assertion), ignoring Mt. 2.2; 21.5; 25.34; 27.11, 29, 37, 42. This is simply denialism. Horsley’s other rejections of the Raglan criteria are similarly baseless. And yet even he concedes Matthew’s nativity account corresponds to the Rank hero type (166-72).

198. The Protevangelion of James explicitly says Mary is, like Joseph, a descendant of David (§ 10.1).

199. It is sometimes suggested that Luke’s introduction of Jesus after his twelfth year counts as a narrative from his childhood (Lk. 2.40-42). But that is most likely intended to be the eve of his bar mitzvah (or its ancient equivalent), which would have occurred upon his thirteenth birthday (the end of his twelfth year), and thus is actually a story about introducing him as a man. See Ivan Marcus, The Jewish Life Cycle: Rites of Passage from Biblical to Modern Times (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2004), pp. 84-105. But counting this as a story of his childhood anyway would still only reduce his score from 20 to 19.

200. Luke has Mary connected by family to a priest and a daughter of Aaron (Lk. 1.5, 36; with Num. 18.1-7), and includes two men named Levi in the ancestry of Joseph (Lk. 3.24, 29), which could imply both were descendants of Levi and therefore relatives.

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