It’s quite common for historical persons to become surrounded by a vast quantity of myth and legend, and very rapidly, too, especially when they become the object of religious veneration. Thus, the fact that this has happened never in itself argues that the person in question didn’t exist. One relatively recent example is the elevation of the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie to the status of a god . . . by people he never asked this favor from and even repeatedly begged to stop. His deification (and continued worship to this day) is the foundation of the modern Rastafarian faith, which claims hundreds of thousands of adherents worldwide. It’s telling that we know he professed to his death his own Christian faith and his continual despair at the fact that he had been elevated into a revered divinity so quickly—despite his protests (and one would think if your own god protested your worshiping him, you’d listen—and yet here we are). Myths and legends about him quickly grew—even within his own lifetime, and all the more rapidly in the two decades after his death in 1975. And yet none had any basis in fact. At all. Yet still they remain the central affirmations of a living faith.
The parallel with Jesus ought to be cautionary: if this could happen to Selassie, it could even more easily have happened to Jesus, there being no universal education or literacy, or even media per se in the ancient world.1 Perhaps Jesus himself continually begged his followers not to worship him. Yet they did anyway. We wouldn’t know, because unlike Selassie, the only records we have of Jesus are written by his devoted worshipers. So perhaps everything told about Jesus is just as made up as everything now told about Selassie. Yet it’s told anyway. And not just told, but believed completely by every adherent of the faith, even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
But not merely the cautionary, but the factual parallels are numerous, too. Edmund Standing summarizes this point elegantly:
Looking at the status of Haile Selassie in the Rastafari religion we find the following: (1) The coming to earth of a messianic figure who was prophesied in the Old Testament; (2) a birth accompanied by miracles; (3) a child with immense divinely given wisdom who possessed miraculous powers; (4) a messiah whose actions were prefigured in Old Testament writings; (5) a man who could perform miracles and in whose presence miracles occurred; (6) a man who was worshiped and held to be divine by thousands who had not even met him; (7) a man who was the incarnation of God and who continues to live on despite evidence of his death; (8) a man who is prayed to and communicated with by his followers; (9) a savior who will one day return to gather up a chosen people who will live under his rule in a kingdom of God. Despite the facts related to the actual historical figure of Selassie, as we see, Rastafarians have built an extensive religious mythology around him, and even did so within his lifetime.
Imagine if, at some point in the future . . . the vast bulk of the historical record was lost . . . [and] that the only records of Selassie’s existence that had survived were the devotional accounts of Rastafarians. [Then . . .] the only story historians would have to work with would be made up of layers of mythology. The story of Selassie, a man who arose in a time in which Ethiopians were excitedly awaiting the coming of a Messiah, would be filled with references to the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies, stories of miracles, tales of God walking the earth, and the denial of the reality of the Messiah’s death. They would read that Selassie is still alive and that part of the proof of this is that followers can ‘communicate in spirit’ with him. As a result of this, surely there would be some who would adopt a ‘mythicist’ position with regard to the historical Selassie.2
And yet, of course, if they did, they would be wrong. Because there really was a Selassie. He just wasn’t anything even remotely like the ‘narratives’ his worshipers wrote and told about him. In the scenario Standing imagines, the truth about the ‘historical’ Selassie would have been completely lost. Fragments of the truth would remain in the surviving devotional texts of his worshipers, but without any independent sources to check them against, we would have no way to know which details were historical and which mythical. We are hardly in any better position with respect to Jesus, for whom all direct sources (if ever there were any) have been completely lost, and all we have are the devotional claims and tales of his fanatical worshipers. This means reconstructing the historical Jesus may simply be impossible.3 But that in no way means there was no historical Jesus.
There are significant differences, however, that break down Standing’s analogy. First are the letters of Paul, which actually precede the Gospels by decades and are the nearest evidence we have to the original Jesus (if such there was), yet these letters only know a cosmic man and contain no real history of him at all (as I will demonstrate in Chapter 11). Second are the methods of the Gospels’ construction, which are so thoroughly mytho-symbolic that their composition actually argues against their containing any true historical data at all (a point I will examine in Chapter 10). And finally, Standing’s assumption that we can expect independent records to have vanished in the case of Jesus is actually not quite as likely as he thinks. If Jesus was as famous as Selassie, it would be strange to hear nothing about him—almost as strange as it would be in Selassie’s case now (as I’ll explain in Chapter 8).
To avoid this oddity we must conclude that the real Jesus was a virtual nobody. But there are still problems with the evidence that suggest he wasn’t even that (as I’ll explain in Chapters 8, 9 and 10). Nevertheless, Standing’s methodological proposals are sound: only if the differences I allege are actually there will the comparison fail. Otherwise, it’s perfectly possible that a real Jesus underlies all the extant myths about him. Just as is the case for Haile Selassie. It’s happened before in Christian tradition, both to real, and to fictional persons (as I suspect any survey of the plethora of saints worshiped in late antiquity and the Middle Ages would discover).4 So which was it for Jesus?
The historicity of Jesus Christ is currently the default consensus. Several respectable books have defended the thesis against detractors.5 But they all suffer from two fatal flaws: by soundly debunking weak versions of mythicism, they fallaciously conclude strong ones needn’t even be examined; and they defend the historicity of Jesus by defending the historicity of particular claims about Jesus using the very methods I and others have proven to be logically invalid across the board.6 By using invalid methods to establish their premises, they thereby arrive at an invalid conclusion, which they then use to invalidly reject alternative theories. This is not the way to defend the historicity of Jesus.
A greater gaffe in defense of Jesus’ historicity is to make claims that are conspicuously opposite the truth of the matter, as when E.P. Sanders boasts that ‘the sources for Jesus are better . . . than those that deal with Alexander [the Great]’.7 A more suicidal remark for his case could hardly be imagined. Unlike Jesus, we have over half a dozen relatively objective historians discussing the history of Alexander the Great (most notably Diodorus, Dionysius, Rufus, Trogus, Plutarch and more). These are not romances or propagandists, least of all fanatical worshipers, or anyone concerned about dogma, but disinterested historical writers employing some of the recognized skills of critical analysis of their day on a wide body of sources they had available that we do not. Which doesn’t mean we trust everything they say, but we still cannot name even one such person for Jesus, and ‘none’ is not ‘more’ than half a dozen.
Lest one complain that these historians wrote ‘too late’, this is actually of minor significance because, unlike Jesus, they still had contemporary and eyewitness sources to work from. In fact, our best historian of Alexander is Arrian, who though he wrote five hundred years later, nevertheless employed an explicit method of using only three eyewitness sources (two of them actual generals of Alexander who wrote accounts of their adventures with him). He names and identifies these sources, explains how he used them to generate a more reliable account, and discusses their relative merits. That alone is quite a great deal more than we have for Jesus, for whom we have not a single named eyewitness source in any of the accounts of him, much less a discussion of how those sources were used or what their relative merits were. Not even for the anonymous witness claimed to have been used by the authors of the Gospel of John, which claim isn’t even credible to begin with (that source is almost certainly fabricated, as I’ll show in Chapter 10, §7), but in any case we’re not told who he was, why we should trust him or what all exactly derives from him.
And that’s not all. We have mentions of Alexander the Great and details about him in several contemporary or eyewitness sources still extant, including the speeches of Isocrates and Demosthenes and Aeschines and Hyperides and Dinarchus, the poetry of Theocritus, the scientific works of Theophrastus and the plays of Menander. We have not a single contemporary mention of Jesus—apart from, at best, the letters of Paul, who never even knew him, and says next to nothing about him (as a historical man), or the dubious letters of certain alleged disciples (and I say alleged because apart from known forgeries, none ever say they were his disciples), and (again apart from those forgeries) none ever distinctly place Jesus in history (see Chapters 7 and 11). The eyewitness and contemporary attestation for Alexander is thus vastly better than we have for Jesus, not the other way around. And that’s even if we count only extant texts—if we count extant quotations of lost texts in other extant texts, we have literally hundreds of quotations of contemporaries and eyewitnesses that survive in later works attesting to Alexander and his history. We have not even one such for Jesus (e.g. even Paul never once quotes anyone he identifies as an eyewitness or contemporary source for any of his information on Jesus).
And even that is not all. For Alexander we have contemporary inscriptions and coins, sculpture (originals or copies of originals done from life), as well as other archaeological verifications of historical claims about him. For example, we can verify the claim that Alexander attached Tyre to the mainland with rubble from Ushu—because that rubble is still there and dates to his time; the city of Alexandria named for him dates from his lifetime as expected; archaeology confirms Alexander invaded Bactria; etc. We also have archaeological confirmation of many of his battles and acts, including the exact time and day of his death—because contemporary records of these exist in the recovered clay tablet archives of Persian court astrologers. None of this is even remotely analogous to Jesus, for whom we have absolutely zero archaeological corroboration (e.g. none of the tombs alleged to be his have been verified as such), much less (as we have for Alexander) actual archaeological attestation (in the form of coins, inscriptions and statues—claims to the contrary are generally bogus, as I’ll discuss in Chapter 7, §2).8
It’s ridiculous to claim the source situation is better for Jesus than for Alexander the Great (or indeed any comparably famous person of antiquity). The exact reverse is the case, by many orders of magnitude. This is not the way to defend the historicity of Jesus.9
We still can’t make the opposite inference from this, though, because obviously Alexander the Great was far more famous and influential in his lifetime than Jesus, even by the most grandiose reports in the Gospels—and their claims in that regard are surely hugely exaggerated as it is (they certainly must be, or else we have a problem, as I’ll explain in Chapter 8). Thus, that we have vastly more evidence for Alexander in no way argues Jesus didn’t exist. It only argues that Jesus was many orders of magnitude less significant in his contemporary historical impact. It entails he was a relative nobody. But plenty of relative nobodies nevertheless existed. And yet that point does not permit the inference that he did exist, either. Possibly is not probably.
Another wrong way to argue the case for a historical Jesus is to simply make things up. We find, for example, Bruce Chilton declaring, in a standard reference in the field no less, that ‘Jesus is acknowledged as a figure of history’ now more than ever due to ‘the unearthing of new information’ consisting of ‘both literary documentation and archaeological evidence’. Yet not even a single item of that new evidence pertains to the historical Jesus—it consists solely of background evidence, such as the Dead Sea Scrolls, almost none of it mentioning or attesting to Jesus (or even, in fact, early Christianity), while the rest consists only of obviously late fictions about him (like the Gospel of Judas). So Chilton’s remark is disingenuous at best, and deceitful at worst (as he does not tell his readers what I just did, thus leaving the uninformed reader to think we’ve discovered new sources mentioning or attesting to Jesus). That is certainly not the way to defend the historicity of Jesus.
Even worse, Chilton then invents an elaborate biography for Jesus involving miraculous knowledge of his private personal and intellectual development, and events and choices in his life, based on nothing but a naive acceptance of uncorroborated claims made in the Gospels, combined with gratuitous assumptions of what ‘must’ have been the case.10 Thus he asserts as if it were a known fact that Jesus was ‘marginalized’ in Nazareth during his youth because he was an illegitimate child, that on childhood trips to Jerusalem Jesus emotionally experienced ‘an excited sense of the vastness of the Israel he was a part of’, that ‘he ran away from his family’ in a fit of religious passion, that after becoming a ‘disciple’ of John the Baptist ‘he learned this master’s kabbalah, the mystical practice of ascent to the divine Throne’, which became ‘a guiding force for the rest of his life’, and sundry other speculations declared as facts, including: Jesus fled to Syria to avoid the clutches of Herod Antipas; Jesus seized the temple with a private army (‘with a large crowd and in force’); and Jesus experienced a temptation ‘in the wilderness’ near ‘Caesarea Philippi’ at the end of his ministry in which he was tempted to raise an armed rebellion against Rome. This last is particularly strange, as Chilton seems confused between the transfiguration, which in the Gospels takes place near Caesarea Philippi (and late in Jesus’ ministry) but involved no temptation, and the Temptation, which in the Gospels takes place in a diametrically opposite time and place—and in neither case is there any mention of raising an armed rebellion against Rome.
This is almost the shoddiest method of doing history conceivable. Yet Chilton insists ‘a historical picture of Jesus . . . involves the literary inference of what he must have taught and done to have generated that movement and its literature’. But such an ‘inference’ as he draws is not history. It’s historical fiction. History concerns not what scholars subjectively think ‘must’ have happened, but what the evidence allows us all to claim actually did happen. It should not surprise historians that there are so many who are ready to doubt the historicity of Jesus, when they see a historical Jesus being defended as speciously as this, even by bona fide experts, in official reference books no less. This only makes the case for (or assumption of) historicity look delusional, not well established. So this is not the way to defend the historicity of Jesus either.
What’s particularly damning about this example is that it’s so myopically foolish. As Helmut Koester observes (ironically in a book edited by Bruce Chilton), ‘the vast variety of interpretations of the historical Jesus that the current quest has proposed is bewildering’, which ought to humble Chilton into seriously doubting his account can be correct, when every expert similarly situated is just as confident in a completely different account.11 Indeed, the diversity and disagreement among bona fide experts on every detail of Chilton’s ‘reconstruction’ of Jesus are broad and profound. That is what an entry on the ‘historical Jesus’ should say. It’s shocking to see the same tendentious presumption, and substitution of speculation for fact, among historicists as historicists claim to find in mythicists. Historicists have a huge plank to remove from their own eye before they can complain of the splinter in anyone else’s. They need to get their own house in order, and scold the likes of Chilton every bit as fervently as they scold mythicists who succumb to the same presumptions and fallacies. His entry should never have passed peer review—at least without requiring an explicit declaration that it’s all tendentious speculation with which almost all scholars would substantially disagree.
Indeed, a common failure in the historicist community is a lack of a cautionary sense of irony. Among the many Jesuses imagined and defended by historians, currently the most popular is the view that Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet (a detail notably nowhere to be found in Chilton’s account). But judging by the book of Daniel, Daniel was an apocalyptic prophet, too, yet we know that book is complete fiction. Thus, finding evidence that the character of Jesus depicted in the Gospels was an apocalyptic prophet is no more a guarantee of his historicity than it is of Daniel’s. Which is to say, no guarantee at all. When we know many of Jesus’ apocalyptic predictions were learned from (perhaps even faked) hallucinations of a bizarre and monstrous Jesus-double in heaven (written up as the book of Revelation), the idea that he ‘must’ have been historical in order to have issued apocalyptic prophecies simply goes out the window. He didn’t even have to be historical to dictate whole letters (Rev. 1.10–3.22), or issue pithy sayings (Rev. 14.13; 19.9; and 21.5). So why are we to assume the Gospels are any more historical than the book of Daniel—which is substantially similar, being a collection of sayings and narratives, involving miracles and interactions with historical persons? Why are we to assume that the sayings attributed to Jesus in the Gospels didn’t come from the very same origin as the sayings attributed to Jesus in the book of Revelation? Yes, we cannot presume they did. But neither can we simply presume they didn’t. A case has to be made. And that case has to be logically valid and sound.
Ultimately, the basic problem is as stated by Rudolf Bultmann in 1941: ‘the Jesus Christ who is God’s Son, a preexistent divine being, is at the same time a certain historical person, Jesus of Nazareth’, the teasing apart of which makes for a complicated task.12 This is the basic problem of historicity: we have no source (none whatsoever) on the latter Jesus. We only have the former. From which we must ‘extract’ the latter by some device. Which has resulted in two general categories of theory: those that hold that the equation between them is true (Jesus of Nazareth really is the preexistent son of God), whose advocates I call the triumphalists, and those that hold that this cosmic Jesus was a legendary development, from the mere man (Jesus of Nazareth) to the more fabulous myth (that the same Jesus is also the Preexistent son of God), whose advocates I call the reductivists. Mythicists, of course, seek to explain the same fact (of the equation of these two persons) by reversing the order of causation, proposing there was a legendary development from the original myth (of a preexistent son of God) to the more earthly man (Jesus of Nazareth). But in either case, whether for the mythicist or the reductivist, the fundamental question is, ‘How did that happen?’
How each reductivist answers that question is what becomes his or her theory of historicity. And as long as any such theory is true, mythicism is false. Likewise, how each mythicist answers that question is what becomes his or her theory of myth. And as long as any such theory is true, historicism is false. So how do we test the one against the other?
As we saw in Chilton’s case, and can see in the case of any other scholar claiming to know things about the historical Jesus, many theories of historicity are too speculative, some even more so than theories of myth, and most are as much as or nearly so. That so many historians defend theories that ‘could’ be true, but for which not enough evidence survives to really know, exposes a serious methodological problem in the field, which I discussed and demonstrated in Proving History. There I (and other scholars I cite) find dozens of contradictory Jesuses proposed. They can’t all be true. And that means odds are none are. That there are so many theories like this is a testament to how easy it is to construct a theory that looks seductively tantalizing and explains all the evidence. Which means the ease of constructing such a theory counts against any such theory being true, not in favor of it. Because the prior probability that any such theory is correct must necessarily be very small—until we can reliably eliminate all competing theories.
To quantify the point, if scholars of equal competence defend from the same exact evidence ten different Jesuses, the initial odds that any one of them is correct can be no better than 1 in 10 (and almost certainly worse than that, since it’s entirely possible none of those Jesuses is correct). This is because a prior probability is the probability we must assign before looking at specific evidence for and against each theory. What happens when we do look at that evidence is accounted for in the consequent probabilities (the probability that we would have the evidence we do if that particular theory were true, in contrast to what that probability would be if some other theory were true). But before we do that, all we have are the competing proposals of roughly equally competent observers from the same body of evidence.
That means it’s not wise to defend the historicity of Jesus by defending a particular theory of historicity. It makes far more sense to class together several (or hopefully all or nearly all) theories of historicity by claims they make in common. For example, if all ten contradictory theories of historicity all make the same claim (e.g. that a man named Jesus who was later called Christ was crucified under Pontius Pilate), then the prior probability of ‘historicity’ per se would not be 1 in 10 but nearly 100%—if, that is, the prior probability of mythicism, and other theories of historicity, were nearly zero. Because the full 100% (the full probability-space) must be apportioned among all logically possible theories. But that means even if the prior probability of myth were as high as, say, 25%, we would still have in this case a prior probability of historicity of 75% (because 100% – 25% = 75%), as long as we stick with that minimum historical claim about Jesus. Otherwise, for each of the ten competing theories of historicity, unless we can demonstrate otherwise, the prior probability of any one of them being true is at best a paltry 7.5% (1/10th of the full 75%), far less than the 25% prior probability for myth (though again, only in this hypothetical scenario). If we classed 3 of the 10 theories together (by, let’s say, the claim that Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet) and insisted on defending only that, then (all else being equal) we’d still have a prior probability of only maybe 25% (1/3rd of the whole 75%), which leaves us with equal odds against myth. So it may be better to drop unnecessary claims like that (no matter how well evidenced they may be) and focus only on what all or most theories of historicity assert in common. Because that will stand the best chance of showing the inadequacy of mythicism (if such can be done).
But trade-offs may be necessary. A simpler theory will always have a higher prior probability, but will be less successful at explaining problematic evidence. To explain such evidence (to make that evidence highly probable on your theory) you often have to add elements to the theory. For example, as I discuss in Proving History, all the ancient accounts we have of how and why Jesus came to be crucified are historically unintelligible.13 Thus, the hypothesis ‘there was a man named Jesus, who was later called Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate’, does not make this evidence very probable at all. Such a fact, had it occurred, would sooner have produced much more intelligible accounts of the how and why of it. Indeed, it should have produced apologetic accounts of those facts in the very Epistles, yet nary a word on this is to be found there (as I’ll show in Chapter 11). Thus, historicists need to ‘dress up’ their theory with a whole series of elaborations, ‘assumptions’ that serve to explain these oddities in the evidence, making them probable again. And these are assumptions—since such details are not present in the sources. Indeed, that’s precisely the problem these assumptions are meant to solve. And as I discuss extensively in Proving History, this procedure of adding ad hoc assumptions to a theory is not illegitimate. It simply has to be accounted for correctly when combining and dividing probabilities.
There are two ways this procedure can go.14 If you have no evidence whatsoever that an assumption you are adding is true (that is, independently of the oddity you are inventing it to explain), but also no evidence it’s false, then you must halve the prior probability. I explain the mathematical reason for this in Proving History, but in short if there is no evidence for or against a claim, then its probability is 50%, which means the probability-space shared by all theories, those with this assumption and those without it, is half occupied by theories with this assumption and half occupied with theories without it. So if our total prior were 75%, the prior probability of a theory with this added assumption being true can only be 37.5% (half of 75%). Which is unlikely to permit the new assumption to make any improvement in the final probability (and thus such assumptions are often not worth adding). On the other hand, if you have evidence that an assumption you are adding is true (again, independently of the oddity you are inventing it to explain), then you’re in a better situation. For example, if given certain background evidence (such as regarding the way early Christians can be independently established to have behaved, or regarding the documented psychology of religious fanatics in general) an assumption is already highly probable, then that probability is substituted for the halving of probability just discussed.
For instance, if it can be independently proven that early Christians interpreted the Old Testament (OT) allegorically 90% of the time in a given context, then a theory that depends on their doing so in a specific case (assuming nothing in that case argues for or against this otherwise) will share 90% of the probability-space with theories that exclude this assumption—not 50%. Hence in the hypothetical scenario at hand, such a theory would have a prior probability of 67.5% (9/10ths of 75%). Or if this subordinate probability were as near to 100% as makes all odds (like the assumption that Christians were human beings essentially biologically the same as other human beings), then the prior probability would effectively just be the full 75%. Conversely, implausible fringe theories, which depend on assumptions that are extremely improbable to begin with, are of such low prior probability that they don’t even show up in the math (also for reasons I explain in Proving History).
This is in effect the role that background knowledge plays in determining probabilities: things that are established as basically certain can safely be assumed without lowering your prior probabilities. Of course this works the other way around, too. If an assumption you propose is actually demonstrably improbable, then you actually lower your theory’s prior probability by less than half. That’s why implausible additions to a theory meant only to rescue that theory from failing to fit the evidence can never logically succeed at that—because they will always lower the prior probability more than they will increase the consequent probability, and thus they will actually lower the posterior probability (the actual probability that your theory is true), instead of raising it as such an addition was supposed to do. In other words, such desperate theories simply become increasingly improbable, and thus unbelievable.
Accordingly, all triumphalist theories can be shown to have vanishingly small prior probabilities. They also happen to do a poor job of explaining the evidence.15 Hence, none are worth any objective historian’s consideration. Perhaps such a hypothesis can still be rationally maintained on evidence other than the historical, but that is of no relevance to historians, who are tasked with determining only what the historical evidence supports. And that will be the only question asked here. That leaves reductivist and mythicist hypotheses.
In Proving History I demonstrated that we can parcel out the entire prior probability-space to just four classes of hypothesis altogether:
1. h = ‘Jesus was a historical person mythicized’
2. ¬h = ‘Jesus was a mythical person historicized’
3. h0 = ‘Jesus was a historical person not mythicized’ (triumphal)
4. ¬h0 = ‘Jesus was a mythical person not historicized’ (postmodern)
As I argued there, the latter two classes of hypothesis, even collectively, consume a vanishingly small piece of the prior-probability-space (certainly less than a one in a million share).16 They can therefore be ignored. That leaves us with bare historicism and bare mythicism. However, both must be more developed than this, not only to make our job easier by ruling out all implausible variations of them, but also to leave us with hypotheses that make more substantial predictions. This will give us in each case a minimal theory, one that does not entail any ambitious or questionable claims (thus keeping its prior probability relatively high), but still leaves us with a theory substantial enough to test (thus keeping its consequent probability relatively high as well).
The minimal Jesus myth theory I will develop in the next chapter. Here I will develop the minimal theory of historicity. It’s important to take note of this step. For it must be made to avoid a common error on both sides of the debate, that of conflating plausible with implausible theories. In general we have those two theories of historicity, the reductive theory (Jesus was an ordinary but obscure guy who inspired a religious movement and copious legends about him) and the triumphalist theory (the Gospels are totally or almost totally true). Either side of the historicity debate will at times engage in a fallacy here, citing evidence supporting the reductive theory in defense of the triumphalist theory (as if that were valid), or citing the absurdity of the triumphalist theory as if this refuted the reductive theory (as if that were valid). The same error occurs the other way around: citing evidence against a hyperbolic theory of myth as refuting a reasonable one, or defending a hyperbolic theory by citing evidence in support of a reasonable one. Both procedures are again invalid.
There were thousands of men named Jesus in Judea in any given generation, so obviously countless historical men of that name ‘existed’ in a trivial sense. It’s even statistically certain that several men of that name were crucified by Romans, even by Pontius Pilate. It’s also statistically likely that several men named Jesus participated in the early Christian movement. If 1 in 26 Jewish men of that time were named Jesus (as the data indicates is close to likely),17 and a hundred men were crucified in Judea in any given year (a number that is arguably unreasonably low), we can be certain Pilate alone (governing ten years) crucified dozens of men named Jesus (unless, of course, crucifixion was actually rare). And if the first Christian congregation consisted of merely two dozen people, probably at least one of those original Christians was named Jesus. Indeed, if we were to believe Acts and accept there were at the cult’s origin 120 followers of Jesus (Acts 1.15), we could be certain there were four or five Jesuses among them.
But none of these men would be Jesus Christ, the man whose existence we are trying to locate. Conversely, it’s very easy to show that the man depicted in the Gospels didn’t exist, not only because they each present quite different men of rather different characters (the Synoptic Jesus is simply nothing like the Johanine Jesus), but also because the Jesus of the Gospels doesn’t behave like a real person at all, nor rarely do any of the people around him in the narrative, nor does much of what he does correspond to things that really happen (as if walking on water were to be believed; or that he could transmute water to wine, but never saw fit to transmute lead to gold for the benefit of the poor), oddities I’ll take more note of in Chapter 10. But showing that the Gospel Jesus didn’t exist does not show Jesus Christ didn’t exist, because it could still be the case that the real Jesus Christ is the one who inspired these unrealistic narratives about him, and that some actual facts about him really are hidden in there somewhere (even if we can never find out which facts those are). We also can’t pick some specific details (like that he employed himself as a faith healer and exorcist), then refute them, and then declare he didn’t exist, because some Jesus Christ might still remain without those specific things being true of him.
For example, there are twelve ‘facts’ about the historical Jesus that are widely regarded as ‘almost’ indisputable:
(1) Jesus was baptized by John the Baptist, (2) he was a Galilean who preached and healed, (3) he called disciples and spoke of twelve of them, (4) he confined his activity to Israel, (5) he engaged in a controversy about the Temple, (6) he was crucified outside Jerusalem by the Roman authorities, (7) his followers continued as an identifiable movement after his death, and (8) some Jews persecuted some members of this new movement . . . [and (9)] Jesus was probably viewed as a prophet by the populace, [10] he often spoke of the kingdom of God, [11] he criticized the ruling priests as part of his Temple controversy, and [12] he was crucified as ‘king of the Jews’ by the Romans.18
But this is not a minimal Jesus, since taking some of these facts away would not result in any scholar concluding that Jesus did not exist. Indeed, many scholars already conclude some of these aren’t true facts about Jesus, yet they still maintain Jesus existed, just as a different kind of fellow than this portrait maintains. Indeed, apart from (7) and (8), which could be true even of a mythical Jesus, every single one of these elements has no support whatever except in the Gospels (and later Christian literature based on them)—and if the Gospels can’t be trusted on any facts (and I’ll show in Chapter 10 they can’t), then they can’t be trusted in these. We should doubt them all.
Indeed, in Chapter 5 of Proving History I demonstrated several of these ‘indisputable’ facts to be very doubtful indeed, and showed how the usual scholarly arguments in defense of all of them are logically invalid. They are all the more questionable given that many (if not all) of them should have been remarked upon in the (authentic) Epistles, but are bizarrely and entirely absent there. No mention is even made there of his having appointed disciples (a problem I’ll explore in Chapter 11). At most we could perhaps get some indirect support for (though nothing like a proof of) item (10) from the Epistles (that Jesus spoke of the kingdom of God), but even that runs into the problem of where it came from—a real Jesus, or a hallucinated one (the problem of Revelation once again), or a fabricated one (like the book of Daniel). This is very much a problem, because the Epistles themselves (apart from those we know are forgeries) do not mention any source but revelation (and claims teased out of the Old Testament), if they ever mention any sources at all for any of the information they convey by or about Jesus (again as I’ll show in Chapter 11).
That leaves only (7) and (8) as having any credible evidence behind them (both directly from the Epistles, and from the whole history of the cult generally), and yet (8) isn’t really a fact about Jesus at all, and (7) can just as well support a hallucinated celestial Jesus as a historical earthly one. From the Epistles we might be able to get back (6) and (10) only by reducing them to the much less ambitious ‘he was crucified (most likely in Roman occupied Judea)’ and ‘he preached something controversial’, both of which we might loosely infer from statements made in the Epistles. But even that would be a stretch, given the ambiguity of what is actually said there. At the very least, he was certainly said to have been killed by the powers that be and hung on a stake. By whom and when then wouldn’t matter so much, nor would it matter whether it was actually he or some of his followers who preached whatever it was that inspired his subsequent deification.
But notice that now we don’t even require what is considered essential in many church creeds. For instance, it is not necessary that Jesus was crucified under Pontius Pilate. Maybe he was. But even if we proved he wasn’t, that still does not vindicate mythicism. Because the ‘real’ Jesus may have been executed by Herod Antipas (as the Gospel of Peter in fact claims), or by Roman authorities in an earlier or later decade than Pilate (as some early Christians really did think). Some scholars even argue for an earlier century (and they have some real evidence to cite). I’ll say more about these possibilities in Chapter 8 (§1). My point at present is that even if we proved the founder of Christianity was executed by Herod the Great (not even by Romans, much less Pilate, and a whole forty years before the Gospels claim), as long as his name or nickname (whether assigned before or after his death) really was Jesus and his execution is the very thing spoken of as leading him to the status of the divine Christ venerated in the Epistles, I think it would be fair to say Jesus existed, that his historicity is established and the mythicists are then simply wrong. I would say this even if Jesus was never really executed but only believed to have been. Because even then it’s still the same historical man being spoken of and worshiped.19
This gets us down to just three minimal facts on which historicity rests:
1. An actual man at some point named Jesus acquired followers in life who continued as an identifiable movement after his death.
2. This is the same Jesus who was claimed by some of his followers to have been executed by the Jewish or Roman authorities.
3. This is the same Jesus some of whose followers soon began worshiping as a living god (or demigod).
That all three propositions are true shall be my minimal theory of historicity. As occasion warrants I might add features on to test the merits of more complex theories, but unless I explicitly say otherwise, the above is the theory I shall be testing against the minimal Jesus myth theory. Because if any one of those premises is false, it can fairly be said there was no historical Jesus in any pertinent sense. And at least one of them must be false for any Jesus myth theory to be true.
One thing that will become clear in the course of this book is that this minimal theory is unsustainable. Which means the only chance historicity will have of being more likely than a minimal mythicism is if a theory of historicity is developed that is sufficiently elaborate to overcome minimal mythicism in overall consequent probability. But as mentioned earlier, such elaboration necessarily lowers historicity’s prior probability, indeed far below that of myth—unless such elaborations can be shown to be necessarily the case or very probably the case, independently of the evidence they are invented to explain.
Nothing like that has been done. Hence anyone who will wish to continue denying the claim that Jesus never really existed will have to advance the field of Jesus studies with a theory of historicity that not only somehow maintains a high enough prior probability to have any chance of being true, but also successfully explains all the evidence, including a lot of evidence that is not so easy to explain (surveyed in Chapters 8 through 11). If such a theory can be successfully developed, I welcome it. But until one is, as the second half of this volume will show, the historicity of Jesus does not appear to have the merit it is presumed to.
Before this can be demonstrated, however, I must define the minimal Jesus myth theory that presents any challenge to historicity. And to that we now turn.
1. On the differences between antiquity and modernity and the significance of this for legendary growth see Richard Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith: Why Christianity Didn’t Need a Miracle to Succeed (Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com, 2009), pp. 161-218 (also 329-68, 385-405).
2. From Edmund Standing, ‘Against Mythicism: A Case for the Plausibility of a Historical Jesus’, Think 9 (Spring 2010), pp. 13-27.
3. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5 of Proving History, all attempts to do this so far have failed to maintain any logical validity; and as I also show in Chapter 1 there, every scholar who has seriously examined the methodologies involved agrees with me on that.
4. For discussion of different kinds of ‘myth-making’ phenomena that quickly envelop historical characters in Christian tradition (whether they were ever real or not) see Bart Ehrman, Peter, Paul, and Mary Magdalene: The Followers of Jesus in History and Legend (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Rose Jeffries Peebles, The Legend of Longinus in Ecclesiastical Tradition and in English Literature, and its Connection with the Grail (Baltimore, MD: J.H. Furst Company, 1911); Thomas Hahn, ‘Judas: The Medieval Oedipus’, Comparative Literature 32 (Summer 1980), pp. 225-37; and Paul Franklin Baum, ‘The Mediæval Legend of Judas Iscariot’, Proceedings of the Modern Language Association of America 31 (1916), pp. 481-632; and Dennis MacDonald, ‘A Conjectural Emendation of 1 Cor 15.31-32: Or the Case of the Misplaced Lion Fight’, Harvard Theological Review 73 (January–April 1980), pp. 265-76.
5. Most importantly, R.T. France, The Evidence for Jesus (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986); and Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), in which pp. 90-118 tackle objections directly (but no more correctly than Van Voorst in Jesus Outside the New Testament: see my discussion of the latter in Chapter 1, §2). France’s work has been somewhat updated in F.F. Bruce and E. Güting, Ausserbiblische Zeugnisse über Jesus und das frühe Christentum: einschliesslich des apokryphen Judasevangeliums (Basel: Brunnen Verlag, 2007). On Bart Ehrman’s poor treatment of the subject in Did Jesus Exist?, and now Maurice Casey’s, see note in Chapter 1 (§2).
6. See in particular Chapters 1 and 5 of Proving History; my conclusions are corroborated in Chris Keith and Anthony LeDonne (eds.), Jesus, History and the Demise of Authenticity (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2012); Dale Allison, ‘The Historians’ Jesus and the Church’, in Seeking the Identity of Jesus: A Pilgrimage (ed. Beverly Roberts Gaventa and Richard Hays; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008), pp. 79-95; Hector Avalos, The End of Biblical Studies (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), pp. 185-217; Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2002); Stanley Porter, The Criteria for Authenticity in Historical-Jesus Research: Previous Discussion and New Proposals (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000); and so on.
8. On all these points see discussion and sources referenced throughout Krzysztof Nawotka, Alexander the Great (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010); Waldemar Heckel and Lawrence Tritle, Alexander the Great: A New History (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); and Joseph Roisman (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great (Leiden: Brill, 2003); with: Georges Le Rider, Alexander the Great: Coinage, Finances, and Policy (Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society, 2007); Carmen Arnold-Biucchi, Alexander’s Coins and Alexander’s Image (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Art Museums, 2006); Frank Holt, Alexander the Great and Bactria: The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia (Leiden: Brill, 1988); A.B. Bosworth, From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and A.J. Heisserer, Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). On the Babylonian archives: Bert VanderSpek, ‘Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship’, Achaemenid History, Vol. XIII (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2003), pp. 289-346; Bert VanderSpek, ‘The Astronomical Diaries as a Source for Achaemenid and Seleucid History’, Bibliotheca Orientalis 50 (1993), pp. 91-101; Leo Depuydt, ‘The Time of Death of Alexander the Great: 11 June 323 BC, ca. 4:00-5:00 PM’, Die Welt des Orients 28 (1997), pp. 117-35.
9. A similar argument, even more ridiculous, is that we have more evidence for Jesus than we have for Emperor Tiberius (who would have been Jesus’ most famous contemporary). This is thoroughly refuted (fruitfully revealing the same points as I made for Alexander) by historian Matthew Ferguson in ‘Ten Reasons to Reject the Apologetic 10/42 Source Slogan’, AdversusApologetica (October 14, 2012) at http://adversusapologetica.wordpress.com/2012/10/14/ten-reasons-to-reject-the-apologetic-1042-source-slogan. That argument appears to have originated in Christian apologetics: see Gary Habermas and Mike Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004), p. 233.
10. Bruce Chilton, ‘Historical Jesus’, in Dictionary of Biblical Criticism and Interpretation (ed. Stanley Porter; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 159-62 (161). That this is an official entry on the topic of ‘the historical Jesus’ is a good example of what’s wrong with Jesus studies today.
11. Helmut Koester, ‘The Historical Jesus and the Historical Situation of the Quest: An Epilogue’, in Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluation of the State of Current Research (ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig Evans; Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 535-45 (544). I summarize the diversity and disagreement Koester observes (and the scores of other experts who have observed exactly the same thing) in Chapter 1 of Proving History.
12. Schubert Ogden (ed.), New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings by Rudolf Bultmann (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984), p. 32.
15. As I show, e.g., in Richard Carrier, ‘Christianity’s Success Was Not Incredible’, in The End of Christianity (ed. John Loftus; Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011), pp. 53-74, 372-75.
17. Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2006), p. 85.
19. Thus we get no advantage from an even more ambitious list than Porter’s, of ‘fifteen minimal facts’ developed earlier by E.P. Sanders, as summarized in Mark Strauss, Four Portraits, One Jesus: An Introduction to Jesus and the Gospels (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), p. 372:
(1) Jesus was born about 4 bc near the time of the death of Herod the Great; (2) he spent his childhood and early adult years in Nazareth, a Galilean village; (3) he was baptized by John the Baptist; (4) he called disciples; (5) he taught in the towns, villages, and countryside (but apparently not in the cities) of Galilee; (6) he preached ‘the kingdom of God’; (7) about the year 30 he went to Jerusalem for Passover; (8) he created a disturbance in the temple area; (9) he had a final meal with the disciples; (10) he was arrested and interrogated by Jewish authorities, specifically the high priest; (11) he was executed on the orders of the Roman prefect, Pontius Pilate; (12) his disciples at first fled; (13) they saw him (in what sense is not certain) after his death; (14) as a consequence, they believed he would return to found the kingdom; (15) they formed a community to await his return and sought to win others to faith in him as God’s Messiah.
As with Porter’s list, none of these facts are attested anywhere outside the Gospels and literature derivative thereof (and what is here added is even more dubious than what Porter included), except (6), which is Porter’s (10), and (13) through (15), which expand on Porter’s (7), but these are not facts about Jesus per se, but about his subsequent followers, which could be just as true of an ahistorical, mystically perceived Jesus, so their being true would not in itself support historicity. Strauss also mentions a smaller list (Four Portraits, pp. 356-57):
[According to many scholars] what can be known about Jesus can be summarized in a few short statements: [1] he came from Nazareth; [2] he was baptized by John; [3] he preached and told parables about the coming of the kingdom of God; [4] he viewed this kingdom as coming in the near future and (perhaps) as already present in some sense; [5] he performed, or was believed to have performed, exorcisms and healings; [6] he gathered a group of Disciples around him; [7] he associated with outcasts and sinners; [8] he challenged the Jewish leaders of his day; [9] he was arrested and charged with blasphemy and sedition; and [10] he was crucified by the Romans.
Here again nothing is attested outside the Gospels and Gospel-dependent literature (as I explain in Chapter 8), except (3) and (4) insofar as this is just Porter’s (10). And none of these is a sine qua non for a historical Jesus. Indeed for any one of them we can easily find scholars who doubt or deny it (and several certainly are not well founded: for instance, see my discussion of (1), (2) and (5) in Chapter 5 of Proving History).
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